Connections and tensions of time in Communication Theories

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Abstract

In Communication studies, time is not explicitly discussed in its constitutive dimension of interactional phenomena, or as a core variable of every action and of existence itself. Its apprehension is frequently noticed as a historical variable delimiting particular aspects of the social apprehension of temporalities. In other words, Communication studies tend to privilege time in its historical aspect, and not as an analytical or epistemic category. This article tries to develop a specific vision of the potentialities and limits of the presence of time in communicative processes. From the reflection about the temporal dimensions featuring certain Communication Theories, we realize that time is a component of distinction in theoretical formulations, but its specific aspects seem dissolve when it is considered as one dimension among others of the interactional phenomena.

Introduction[1]

At first sight, whoever seeks to understand the relations between time and communication as presented by the discursive body entitled "Communication Theories", may come to face a kind of ambiguity. On the one hand, one notices the temporal question as an underlying presence in almost all theories – as a human phenomenon, Communication is inscribed in time. In some cases, the link is explicit, as in studies on the History of Media and/or Communication, in collections such as the one by Nunes (1998) or on the works organized by Ribeiro and Ferreira (2007) or Freire Filho and Vaz (2006) or the assembly of works presented in the Work Group Memmory in Media, at Compos.

At institutions focused on the formation of professionals and researchers, both in undergraduate and graduate courses, the appropriation of time in Communication studies takes on a more or less explicit disciplinary shape. On the one hand, the discipline "History of Communication", often converted into History of media – and, therefore, into an acknowledgement of its technological development not necessarily accompanied by the social variables that relate to it – or a History of professional specializations, time, again, holds a place parallel to the phenomenon, approached from the point of view of its transformation into "past".

On the other hand, however, outside the perspective of history or memory, the result is inverted: there are few works approaching time as a dimension essential for communicative interactions and for the constitution of subjects and their shared way of life. One may notice, for example, the almost complete absence – an exception are the texts by Ferrara (2014) or Marcondes Filho (2015) – of this kind of approach in the discussions at the Work Group Epistemology of Communication, when it comes to another place of academic dialogue (Martino, 2014). The "states of art" found, for example, by Trumbo (2004), Bryant and Miron (2004), Sanchez and Campos (2009), as well as the taxonomies proposed by Lima (1983; 2001), Marcondes (2001) or Torrico Villanueva (2004) and reviewed by Martino (2015) do not deal with the question of time in any aspect.

It would certainly be difficult, if not impossible, to consider an exclusion of the "time" variable in Communication Theories. Some streams of investigation in Communication, as those mentioned in the beginning of the text, bring in themselves the temporal question as an important element, but, again, only in terms of its transformation into some related category – archive, memory,

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nostalgia. Time is, not rarely, transformed into past time, re-elaborated in the present or indicated in the construction of a past.

In another scale and mode of appropriation, one notices that the question of time has gained a brief prominence in studies on the Internet and the environment of digital media, when questions related to synchronous and nonsynchronous interactions in the possible communication in such spaces came to be thought of as relevant elements for understanding Communication (PETERS, 2003; PRIMO, 2008).

The modalities above evidently do not exhaust the appropriations and uses of time in Communication Theories, but they somehow point the characteristic appropriations of time in the area – and, above all, the space of this articulation.

In epistemological terms, Communication Theories are evidently developed in temporal appropriations, as all existing things, but they rarely come to think about this factor's own relevance.

In general, when one talks about the relations between "time" and "communication", in the space of theoretical elaborations, what one mostly finds is the development of communicational thinking along chronologic time, and not the position of time in such studies – which may be seen, for example, in works dedicated to the historiography of concepts and Communication Theories. Time, in this case, becomes synonym of constraining demarcation of certain theoretical-epistemological perspectives. Such procedure surpasses the limits of epistemological discussion, unfolding itself in other spaces.

Taking on the risks of any kind of generalization, one may say that time, in Communication studies, is not explicitly problematized in its constitutive dimension of intersubjective phenomena, or, rather, as a variable of every action and of existence itself: there is not, so to speak, a specific view concerning the potentialities and limits of the presence of time in communication processes. One notices, very often, its acknowledgement as a historical variable limiting certain aspects of social acknowledgement of temporalities – in other words, Communication studies tend to favor time as history or as an organizing dimension of experiences and common events, but not as an analytic category or even an epistemological one.

In the many traditions of studies on communication processes, the variable and/or dimension of time, though fundamental, seems not to occupy a privileged place in the sphere of discussions and operations. With exceptions, the modalities of perception of time in communicational acts rarely feature the foreground, in the sense that it is perceived as one among other elements, especially within the scope of the Communication Theories. And, yet, the questions concerning temporalities –

in its myriad forms – are effectively inscribed in the center of every and any communication process.

Indeed, it would not be a complete mistake to claim that the very existence of a communication process implies, in logical terms, the presence of some kind of temporality. Either thought of in terms of "transmission", or "sharing", variables pointed by Lima (1983; 2001), communication implies the existence of time intervals in which it takes place. The indications are that, no matter which theoretical premise one adopts in order to think about Communication, time should hold an eminent place, often presenting itself as a heuristic category at once invisible and determinant for the understanding of certain phenomena.

The present study focuses on the problem of time as an epistemological question partially structural to thinking about communication, as it features the historical-historiographical course of Communication Theories, taken, in this case, as theoretical discourses that constitute the object of this work. This way, one seeks to observe the transversal presence of this theme within the scope of the so-called "canon" of Communication Theories, such as presented, among others, by Mattelart and Mattelart (1999), Martino (2009) or França and Guimarães (2016). This study places itself in the framework of epistemological questions concerning the fundaments of theoretical discourses posted in the Area (Ferreira, 2014).

The aim of this text, therefore, is to outline a few relations between time and theoretical thinking in Communication, based on a double question. It seems to exist, in Communication studies, a paradoxical appropriation of time: despite its fundamental importance as a constitutive element of communication phenomena, its investigation in epistemological streams in the area does not reach the same level of importance as other elements.

Such aspects, taken as a delimitation, do not effectively exhaust the subject, but point out the lines that shall be followed here. In the following, one seeks to outline two contradictory and complementary aspects of this relation. On the one hand, one seeks to observe the way how the set of Communication Theories, taken as a theoretical discourse that, like other discourses, cannot be separated from the historical conditions of its creation but, at the same time, do not stablish itself as a simple consequence of this, organizes itself temporally in a "History" elaborated based on political and epistemological criteria.

Afterwards, the text turns to observing in detail four of such theories, having in mind the particular importance they invest on time. If, as said, a considerable part of theoretical thinking in Communication time is an invisibilized variable amidst the set of other statements, there are at least a few theoretical elaborations –

Communication Theories – in which time gains prominence as temporality or as a set of temporalities constituting interaction processes.

2. The general problem: Communication Theories'place in time

The exam of the definition of periods in Communication studies, particularly in the domain of Communication Theories, presents itself as the result of the perception of a taxonomy responsible for positioning the regions of a "past" theoretical thinking in the area, in terms of chronological time, based on which one would be able to stablish criteria for delimiting what may and what may not be effectively studied. It is interesting to observe that, if non-elaborated ordinary perceptions may work as an index, there seems to exist a sense of "progress", if not overt "evolutionism" in the surreptitious evaluation of Communication Theories when it comes to its association to certain time periods.

Historical disposition and systematization according to periods in Communication Theories often features the same order as that of media development. A "history of the Communication Theories", in this sense, may be rather called "history of thought on technological means", since the organization by periods follows rather the advance of technique than communication possibilities themselves, in all of its social links, disclosed by technique.

This remits us, at once, to the problem of the place of discourses in time. In his classical historiographical study, Lowenthal (2004) recalls a fundamental difference for the theoretical elaboration we propose here: there is a difference between "Time", "History" and "Past". Initially, it would be possible to define his thesis as indicating that the appropriation of time by history is driven to the construction of a past. From the beginning, the author abandons a metaphysical perspective on the appropriation of time, delimiting his space of discussion: the metaphysics of time belongs to Philosophy and may be discussed, with its countless merits, in this ambit.

What one seeks in History is not time, but the conversion of time into a "past" acknowledgeable and intelligible from a present point of view. History, in this aspect, is not specifically the mediator between "past" and "present", but between "time" and "past", understood as categories in a permanently tense articulation. Such mediation, evidently, is tied to a myriad of variables that come up in the process of selection, choice and signification of elements that can effectively produce a past.

When interpreting Lowenthal (2004), Jenkins (2006) observes the contrast between the view of the historian and that of the sociologist or geologist: in epistemological terms, such different views concerning the same space are characterized precisely by the specificity of a certain scientific activity, one responsible for appropriating reality inside a definite outline that dialogues but does not overlap others – the "lineages" which Ferreira (2007) refers to.

Jenkins explains that History, in this aspect, does not seem to work but with the possibilities of reconstructing a past in the sense of attributing some kind of meaning to it, identifying it with something that surpasses the fleeting of perception in order to stablish itself as intelligible categories – "epoch", "period", "duration" or any other form of classification – which effectively conduces to another point, the validity of such classifications.

As a cognitive process, Garcia Gutierrez (2009) recalls, every classification features a double face, presenting itself at once as indispensable for any intellection, but equally responsible for creating constraints, maybe insoluble, associated to historical, economic, social and political factors that preside, often in an invisible way, the formation of classificatory criteria. Thus, the transformation of time into past is not free from the power formations that exist in the mediation of the discourse of History in which such conversion takes place.

There is, then, a complementary triad for thinking the question, aligned with a problem of perception that comes close to metaphysics – the question of the reality of time – with the effective possibilities of its appropriation by the human being, existing when the flux of temporalities is converted into events recognizable and, somehow, passible of a determinate causal delimiting in terms of its "beginning" and "end".

"Time" makes itself appropriable as duration, but this transformation seems to occur only at the expense of not being able to perceive anything outside duration, rendering time invisible. It is in this aspect that one observes the emergence of the Historic variable: hermeneutic construction of durations responsible for delimiting happenings and their disposition created in accordance with other equally Historical categories.

This is the moment when time, previously converted into duration due to the very limitations of human perception, enters a second order of transformation and is converted into "past", a set of constructed data based on History with which one may, indeed, work. This way, one moves from the problem of the perception of time to its heuristic operationalization as past, elaborated by History.

However, Lowenthal (2004) continues, one barely notices this kind of passage, preferring, in everyday life, to seek a practical equivalence between

History and Past, as if the relation between them were not only direct, but inevitable. It is in this sense, he argues, that the two factors maintain a relation of closeness with time without necessarily finding some kind of necessary equivalence among them. Past time is accessible only via History, which means to say, at the same time, that there is not a past except in as historical time, elaborated up from the possibilities that a historiography, or rather, an epistemology of History may retrieve. We shall see further how Walter Benjamin contradicts this perception of History as causally ordered past, as he proposes to contemplate the past in its counterflux, highlighting the dialectics that articulates past, presence and future.

Past states itself, in this case, as a way of interpretation of history that depends on factors surpassing the specific question of "time" as a category of the construction of reality, presenting itself as an element dependent on what the present grasps of it. It is not by chance that Hayden White (2005), in this sense, tends to carry this possibility to extreme consequences when claiming that History does not seem to distinguish itself from other modalities of text creation, but, on the contrary, like any discourse, obeys the existent lines of force so as to accomplish an invention — the past, localization of events in time based on the possibilities disclosed by historiographic methods.

At this point, looking at the past posts itself above all as looking at what Guinzburg (2008) develops as the idea of possible "vestiges" to be found in such past, and, further yet, vestiges that could be interpreted based on the categories elaborated in the present. So, even face to the "past", the vestiges left by time as documents — a term we employ here in its usual sense in History —, looking at the past is always looking from the present that is supposed to invent a possible past given the current conditions.

Time presents itself, then, as featuring certain documental materiality that allows its exploration and reconstitution in a perspective of cognitive appropriation formed, or at least facilitated, by what one calls "History". It is not by chance that, thinking of time means, as we've seen, thinking of the past and its appropriations in the scope of history. It is in this aspect that one may ask how the past research in Communication, in the scope of the development Communication Theories, is simultaneously the history of the appropriation of temporalities in the epistemological thinking of the Area.

This being so, it would not be wrong to say that, in the Area, what we often call "History of the Communication Theories" or derivate terms, among which the most famous are the books by Mattelart and Mattelart (1999) and Miege (2004), is not but a history of the techniques and technologies of Communication, in an almost linear sense, far from any properly dialectical grasp of history capable of

making way for the development of its articulations beyond simple "invention", "emergence" or "outbreak" of technologies.

In this context, one seems to miss not only the meaning of communication, beyond its media-technological aspect, in time, but also the very way how historical and temporal matters inscribe themselves in the ambit of a communicational thinking, converted, in this case, in an inventory of the main technological innovations and their "impact" or "effect" on society.

Such emphasis on technological media seems to be responsible, at least in part, for the "evolutionary" character attached to the development of Communication Theories: the "old" theories, localized in a historical time constructed based on a media variable, if not mediacentric one, are supposed to be effectively overcome by "new" theories, elaborated based on equally "new" medias, and therefore destined to invalidate, in logical and epistemological terms, what had been done so far.

In this sense, the hermeneutical potential of a Communication Theory comes to be judged no longer for its heuristic possibilities towards the present, but only in terms of its temporal creation: "old" theories explain "old" media and, therefore, have no validity in the time of "new" media that require, for their turn, "new" theories.

Herbst (2008) approaches the research on Communication in a temporal perspective. According to his vision, historical and cultural transformations leave no doubt concerning the need to think, equally, the Communication Theories as a whole. However, his conception focuses rather on the formation of an area than on the historical closure of such and such theory – a limitation suggested also by Demers (2000). The perspective of historical circumscription is equally present, for example, in Carlsson (2007) and Lebesco (2007).

By all indications, the problem seems to be that epistemologically the relation between *empiria* and theoretical scope does not follow the linearity sketched out here, but rather a complex dialectics of relations between discourses, knowledge, techniques and social practices in which different epochs and media temporalities co-exist, and even "new" media do not destitute or completely invalidate "old" ones, but put each other in tension along with ever contemporary practices and ambiences (Ferrara, 2013; 2014).

So, the emphasis on media aspects as a form of classification seems to suggest, beyond a mere technological question, the perspective that the epistemological reach of a Communication theory is outlined according to its time of formulation and, especially, in reference to the "media" to which it is attached.

The duration of an "epoch" is supposedly linked to a constant transformation of everything that is not immediately useful for "explaining" away the present as an archeological artefact, as it follows the speed of technological innovations defined by a logics of market in terms of production and disposal, tending to transform theories themselves into equally disposable elements.

Jensen and Neuman (2013) think in terms of the "evolution" of the area and the "paradigm changes", in a previously seen track, among others, by França (2001), but with few questionings when it comes to the permanence of the explicative potency of each model. McQuail (2013), in this sense, brings another element to the discussion as he puts into question the extent to which it is possible, in fact, to talk of "paradigm changes" in Communication theories and researches due to the relatively recent history of the Area.

This kind of thinking is maybe one of the elements that allows one to understand the voracity with which concepts coming from diverse knowledge areas, ones that present themselves as the final word in terms of explanation of communicational phenomena and their correlates, are rapidly incorporated to the vocabulary of the Communication Area. Such movement is often accomplished with little concern for a wider epistemological examination of such concepts, aiming at its potential heuristic unfolding, only to be left aside as soon as the next innovation – not theoretical-conceptual innovation, but technical or market innovation – comes up.

Evidently, this does not mean to assume any kind of discontinuity between Communication Theories and the media background in which they were or are formulated. On the contrary, one seeks precisely to stress out that, if the validity of a theory is also attached to a temporal factor, it is necessary to acknowledge that the constructions of time, transformed into history, are localized in classifications that may be questioned and widened so as to include not only the "media" but also the historical conditions of the emergence of such media and corresponding theoretical appropriations. Technological determinism signs also the conservation of conceptions about a historical time that is supposed to be delimited and delimitable, with no acknowledgement of the continuity lines, however accidental they may be, responsible for the resonance of previous epochs.

It is not a coincidence that, once one seeks the inverse pathway, that is, to acknowledge the extent to which Communication Theories present themselves in their own temporal and epistemological dynamics, it is possible to observe a series of non-linear movements, the most complex appropriations and re-appropriations, which do not follow any kind of elaboration passible of being associated to "normal

science": one may not, in this aspect, leave aside Braga (2014), when he claims, precisely, that "there is no normal science in Communication".

A possible example, highlighted in another moment (Barros & Martino, 2003; Martino, 2008; 2010) is the course of McLuhan's ideas in the Communication Area, oscillating between violent criticism in the mid 1980's until the early 2000's, when social and technological transformations seem to have demanded a return to his thinking so as to understand some scenarios then challenging the Area (Lemos, 2007; Pereira, 2012). Such return, as well as the contemporary permanence of "old" theories – as, for example, the Frankfurt school by Rüdiger (2005), Duarte (2010) or Rodrigues and Martino (2011) –, suggests the mix of times as forms of understanding contemporaneity beyond any epoch classification.

The inscription of Communication Theories in time seems to take place, among other factors, based on the transformation of time into past in the pathways of History – in this case, a history of the Theories responsible for elaborating potential understandings of communicational phenomena beyond media technicalities.

3. The problem of time in four Communication Theories

In what follows we present, in a non-exhaustive and panoramic fashion, some evidences that time may be found in some theoretical branches of Communication, not in an eloquent form nor as part of the central argument of epistemological reflections. One needs to localize it and name it based on what's between the lines.

3.1 The time of the situated action and the anticipation of the interlocutor's actions

In symbolic interactionism it is possible to say that time may be considered based on two specific forms of action: the temporality ascribed by the production of a face-to-face encounter and the duration of this encounter; and the temporality present in the way how, based on the interpretation of each other's significant gestures (MEAD, 2006), the enunciating agents exert mutual influence (Mead's reciprocally oriented action) learning to interpret and anticipate (via a shared frame of expectations) their movements and performatic positions.

There is, for example, a temporality present in the reflections by Goffman (1999), who constructs a sociology of interactions as he attempts to understand

and analyze not man in his moments, but the moments and its men. The moments that matter are those that present itself in the time-space of ordinary interactions guided by behavioral patterns. "The orderly character of the interactions is recognized with resource to a large base of shared cognitive suppositions and self-sustained constraints or even normative suppositions" (Goffman, 1999, p. 202)[2].

The way how interlocutors relate to each other according to Goffman reveals the way how specific temporality acts on interpersonal exchanges: the orderly and recurrent character of interactions allow actors to *recognizebeforehand* the limits constraining their ways of action, creating expectations of behavioral adequacy according to the identified limits. To anticipate, in a situated interpretation, another person's gestures so as to construct a socially adequate answer is a form of "foreseeing" (and so often to constrain the other's possibilities of agency) the future and, then, to seize the control over it. Nonetheless, however the interlocutors may try to control the situation and their pairs' behavior, there is a frailty, precariousness and instability in the interactions and enormous potential rupture constantly threatening interactional relations (Martins, 2008).

For Goffman (1999), the interlocutors' meaningful gestures may be simulated thanks to the presence of either positive sanctions or rewards, or negative sanctions and punishment, so that the definition of sanctions is connected to the approval or disapproval immediately expressed and felt in interaction.

In this statement one may identify the constant co-existence of two kinds of temporality in Goffman's thinking on interactions: the future is always anticipated by simulations of behavior according to what has been foreseen and the immediacy of the judgement of such behavior as either adequate or not to the expectations associated to a given situation (actions regulated face to what is meaningful for the agents at the moment). As noticed by Martins (2008) and Gastaldo (2008), social actors supposedly lead their lives amidst an exercise of anticipating the consequences of their actions, seeking at all expenses to avoid situations of embarrassment that might corrode the projected images of themselves and, eventually, lead them to ruin and social discredit.

In verbal face to face interactions, different temporalities mingle in the attempt to define situations, themes and forms of engagement of the subjects in community. Ordinary negotiation of the present situation in which the interaction partners find themselves seals the aspect of "here and now" that brings subjects close to each other as they seek to produce meaning to the experiences they live. But interlocutors construct their agency and their performances in different

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[2] All quotations have been freely translated from vernacular editions indicated bellow.

temporalities among themselves and concerning the immediate configuration of "here and now". So, it is possible to say that it is in the crossing-over of such temporalities that continuous relational and *intersubjective* process is articulated, in which a subject's attitude before herself emerges in her encounter with the attitude of the other person face to her.

In other words, while acting in the world in an intersubjective way, individuals constitute themselves as social actors and political subjects who seek to strengthen the bonds of belonging to a group, at the same time as they seek social acknowledgement of their moral status as a legitimate interlocutor.

3.2 Time and communicational constitution of political subjects

Political activity requires, from a pragmatic point of view, the situation of interlocution in which the subjects not only produce a shared and common space of exchange, but also stablish a temporality dedicated to reflection and public justification. A political subject is one who has the time to speak and, when it comes to interaction, has a wide time of speech, which allows her to construct, express and review her points of view. In Goffman one finds many special metaphors (scene, façade, background, situation, etc.) responsible for characterizing the encounter of interlocution, performance and tensions arisen by adequacy and re-adequacy of behaviors to the norms and frames of meaning. But if there's a multiplicity of spaces, there is also a multiplicity of times whose unequal distribution among social actors discloses relations of power and oppression.

According to John Dewey (2008), politics manifests itself in a process of forming public agents constituted as such while they have to deal with the controversial question of public power. This kind of problem acquires a widened dimension not only for affecting many people, but also for demanding a kind of social reflexivity that guides collective action. So, a public problem and the public agents who define it come up simultaneously, stablishing a time and a space marked by the attempt to construct association and cooperation bonds capable of guiding communicative actions destined to better understanding and/or solving affairs of collective interest. The synchronicity of the "appearance" of the public agents and their problems is something that demands our attention, since "the main difficulty is to find out the means through which a disperse, inconstant and multiple crowd may recognize itself so as to define and express its interests" (Dewey, 2008, p. 54).

For Dewey, a crowd is formed by all those who see themselves affected by the indirect consequences of the communicative transactions and exchanges destined to the discussion and elucidation of collective problems. But "the same crowd does not exist in two moments or places. The situational conditions bring up different consequences of the action associated to its acknowledgement" (Dewey, 2008, p. 34). A crowd yields from its action localized in specific time and space, and their interests and demands yield from association, intercourse and interpellation. "The ones affected in a serious and indirect manner, either for good or bad, form a distinct group and comes to demand acknowledgement and a name: the Crowd." (Dewey, 2008, p. 49.).

The actions and movements of crowds in public spaces of interaction and discussion exist as signs[3], or signals or symbols that relate and constitute articulations and memories allowing a series of events to be registered and preserved as meaningful. Crowds detain, then, repertoires that allow them to recall past agencies, foresee and calculate future routes of action, facilitating the "calculus, planning and a new kind of action that intervenes on what happens so as to draw its course towards the foreseen and desired interest" (Dewey, 2008, p. 58). In this sense, crowds are forms of experience.

It is suitable to recall that Dewey's reflection on the signification of experience pervades all his oeuvre and features a strong temporal dimension. Experience is presented as the establishment of links between that concerning which an experience is made and the way how an experience is conducted: between an object and a subject. The temporal dimension of experience is present in the very movement stablished between a subject and an object, in mutual relation. For Dewey, "experience constitutes itself by a material full of uncertainty, moving towards its consummation through a series of various incidents" (2005, p. 95). The depth of experience is given by the relation between present and past experience, through connections between what has already been done and what must be done after that. "In an experience the flux goes from something to something. Since a part conducts to another and the other part brings the one that came before, each one gains distinct features in itself. The permanent whole is differentiated by successive phases that emphasize its different nuances" (2005, p. 90). An experience yields from a process or temporal organization in which "the

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[3] It is important to stress out that Peirce's semiotics also features a temporal dimension related to three modes of perception of the phenomena of the world by the mind: primary, secondary and tertiary are categories of perception of phenomena that structure themselves, respectively, based on the time of contemplation (affectation of plain feeling), time involved in the operation of distinction and shock among elements by the law of action and reaction, and time destined to the production of an intelligible synthesis of the phenomena via thinking (that is, its translation into a sign).

final arrival" is related to everything that happened before as the culmination of continuous movement. The work of gathering the parcels of an experience manifests itself in the development of a "plot, which depends on a scenario, a space where it may develop and a time in which it may unfold" (2005, p. 95).

Experience is movement, rhythm, cadence in different speeds in a velocity, connecting movement to the temporal chaining of facts. Due to its continuous resurgence, says Dewey, there are no cracks or gaps in which one haves an experience. There are pauses, places of rest, but they signal or define the quality of a movement. "They sum up what has passed and avoid its dissipation and its evaporation in vain. Its acceleration is continuous, keeping the parts from falling apart" (2005, p. 90). The pauses of experience relate to a constant endurance, "in which the consequences of a previous doing are absorbed and guarded and each doing brings in itself a meaning that has been extracted and preserved" (2005, p. 105). The many parts of an experience are tied to each other and not only succeed each other in time, so the result is always anticipated at each moment and periodically appreciated with special intensity.

The concept of experience and crowd in Dewey, as well as Mead's concepts of reciprocally oriented agency and "generalized other" hold a prominent place in second generation Critical Theory, especially in Habermas. The temporalities of experience and elaboration of public problems configure, according to Habermas, a model of democracy that conceives politics not as processes occurring only in the ambit of institutions, but as networks of communication shaped in every-day life, amidst the intersubjective negotiations of norms, values, beliefs, interests and understandings accomplished by the actors in a given social context, situated in a specific time and space.

3.3 Time between work and leisure in Critical Theory

In Critical Theory the question of time may be dealt with based in two remarks made by Adorno and Horkheimer. The first refers to a kind of dilatation or distention of present in order to accommodate all the consumerism impulse stimulated by conformism and constant repetition of the same formulas and appeals. "Consumer's conformism satisfies itself with the reproduction of the same. Cultural industry consists in repetition" (ADORNO and HORKHEIMER, 2002, p. 27). "The repetition of the same" remits to a temporal invariability that stablishes a consensual routine favorable to both the dissolution of conflicts and of the borders between work and leisure. Present time, widened by cultural industry, claims that the needs and desires must be fulfilled "here and now", so that entertainment is

seen as an extension of work. In this sense, the second remark is that what is consumed as entertainment during the time destined to leisure is a copy of the work process, automatic succession of regulated operations.

Along with contiguity between work time and leisure time new rhythms of existence come up, and also the domestication of the senses. The criticism in *Dialectic of Enlightment* to cultural industry's messages of entertainment is widely known: "If cartoons have another effect beyond habituating the senses to a new rhythm, it is that of inculcating in all brains the ancient truth that continuous abuse, shattering all individual resistance, is the condition of life in this society" (1983, p. 33).

There are, then, two temporalities that crumble the subject and her possibilities of resistance: one that makes her live in the present all the time so as to keep up with the novelties and appeals of consumption; and another that, by dissolving leisure in work,kidnaps the time necessary for elaboration and reflectionon past facts and experiences, also demobilizing the plans for the future and the planning of actions for changing the present. Besides, the very regulation of work and leisure times determines the ways how each subject is to take on activities and actions, how each one is to position and be positioned in spaces dedicated to sharing and to the production of political decision and public participation. Reflexive and critical activity requires a slow-down in time, so that the glance may be newly habituated to contemplation and not only to the immediacy of the luminous flashes of merchandise advertisement.

Under this aspects, the engines of reproduction of cultural industry evince a division between those who live the time of the action and of reflexive knowledge and those who live the time of survival, alienation and repetition. Once their needs and desires are foreseen, forged and automatically supplied, individuals spend more time as consumers, as objects of cultural industry, than as emancipated spectators. Time here is the operator of diverse exclusions and asymmetries, acting, along with culture transfigured into merchandise, as an obstacle to emancipation and autonomy. Marxist criticism present in this unequal distribution of times and possibilities of expression among groups and subjects is centrally present in the philosophical approach by Jacques Rancière (*The Politics of Aesthetics*), for example, and more recently his interlocution with Axel Honneth (*Recognition of Disagreement*)[4].

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[4] The valuable debate between Rancière and Honneth is organized in the oeuvre: Genel, Katia; Deranty, Jean-Phillipe (eds). *Recognition or Disagreement: a critical encounter on the politics of freedom, equality and identity*. Columbia University Press, 2016.

3.4 Temporal legibility of dialectical images

Another approach of time based in Critical Theory may be found in the thinking by Walter Benjamin and its interfaces with memory and History. In Benjamin, the gesture of recollection produces images, forms of reading time and ways of shifting the consensual dispositive that organizes past, present and future in a linear and causal order. Under such prism, dialectical image, according to him, leads to understanding the way how times become visible and passible of supporting ways of imagining and producing politics.

According to Michel Löwy, dialectical image expresses the fact that "the relation between today and yesterday is not unilateral: in an eminently dialectical process, present enlightens the past, and enlightened past becomes a force in the present" (Löwy, 2005, p.61).

This definition, according to Gagnebin (1999, p. 15), "puts into question an abstract and empty representation of historical time as infinite succession of points that could only be connected by the order of its apparition". Historical phenomena would be, then, fruit of such dialectical tension between past, present and future, taking on the form of a constellation. Historical phenomena, isolated like stars in the sky, do only acquire a meaning when a work of recollection and montage produces the line that unites present and past. For Gagnebin (1999, p. 16), the requirement to recollect the past "does not imply the mere restoration of the past, but also a transformation of the present so that, if the lost past is then found again, it does not remain the same, that is, it is also retrieved and transformed".

"Benjaminian image, then, is presented as a form of legibility of time" (Löwy, 2005, p.131), since it not only produces itself in the encounter of diverse temporalities, but also crosses over temporalities as a lightning, lights that occasionally cut and illuminate the totalitarian and consensual horizon that usually organizes the experiences.

Didi-Huberman explains that dialectical image is not an image in the denotative sense of the term, but a metaphor for a dispositive that brings up and saves the "inestimable moments" that resist capture, silence and the excesses of discourses constructed by the media and the State. For this reason, he constructs the hypothesis (2011, p. 119) that image is a temporal operator of survival, carrying a political potency related to our past, present and future.

The concept of dialectical image allows us to perceive the time of gestation of contra-powers, "seeing the rhythm of coups and contra-coups, tempos and

contra-tempos, themes and contra-themes, acclamations and revolutions" (Didi-Huberman, 2011, p.110).

The impure temporality of our historical life yields from the outline of a unique connection between two phenomena (or more) that acquire a new meaning and draw a new historical object, so far unsuspected, more truthful and more consistent than linear chronology (Gagnebin, 1999). Opposed to the narration that chronologically numbers the sequence of happenings, this procedure, as it clips privileged moments   from the chronological continuum, is defined, by the end of the *Ten Theses on History*, as "the apprehension of a savior constellation". Time operates in the dialectical image also as an operator of montage and dismantling in the political gesture of "accepting the discontinuous aspects of history, proceeding to the interruption of this chronological time with no roughness, renouncing to the happy development of a syntax straight and flawless" (Gagnebin, 1999, p. 99).

Dialectical image subverts the consensual and naturalizing orderings of the stablished discourse and requires us to constantly mind the future, refusing demobilization for nostalgia. This is so because, according to him "the real object of recollection is not, simply, the particularity of a happening, but that which, in it, is specific creation, promise of the unknown, emergence of the new" (Gagnebin, 1999, p. 105). Recollection is the creative and transforming gesture that makes way for active and constant construction of the present.

3.5 Temporalities of becoming-minor

Gilles Deleuze's reflections on cinema images carries and is articulated by the notion of time. But his encounter with Felix Guattari promotes an approach of time that seems provocative and is enunciated as such: "to believe in the world means to bring forth happenings, even small ones, that may escape control, or engender new space-times, even if in reduced surface or volume" (DELEUZE, 2013, p. 222). With this statement, Deleuze articulates the notion of becoming-minor with practices of resistance and existence of political subjects. Such movement is interesting for Communication not only for the space-temporal proposition associated to the constitution of possible worlds, but also because becoming-minor operates through the creation of statements and modes of enunciation that enable the emergence of a "shared existence in cooperation".

The constant tension and transit between majority/minority, molar/molecular marks the refusal of social identities that imprison, and the quest for existential territories not subjected to a majoritarian principle. So, becoming-minor discloses the production of multiplicity in action, the invention of becoming

autonomous, unexpected, producer of molecular agency of multiplicity. Such agency, according to Deleuze's appropriation by Maurizio Lazzarato (2007), seeks to experiment gadgets, to create institutions more favorable to the dynamics of creation and accomplishment of possible worlds.

To create tense transits between molar and molecular, majority and minority, would supposedly bring forth the conditions for transforming and experimenting the power relations that constitute such pairs. But one needs to recall that transiting "in between" implies encountering temporalities, velocities and rhythms of production of lines of flight able to keep molar forces from enclosing themselves as majoritarian models, and to turn molecular forces into a source for processes of creation and subjectivation (Lazzarato, 2007). The production of "in between", passages and transits, also present in Benjamin, create the conditions for transforming and experimenting power relations that produce subjectivity and difference. Becoming-minor updates virtual, fluid and revertible relations, the ones open to experimentation of subjectivation that escapes the states of domination. This is the philosophical basis that has supported reflection, in the field of Communication, on the insurgence and uprising that took over the streets and networks of Brazil, as the student movement in June 2013 (Altheman, Marques and Martino, 2017; Silva, 2014).

This attempt to explain some temporal dimensions in certain Communication Theories reveals that time is a special component in conceptual formulations, but its specific aspects, when the due problematization is missing, seem to be dissolved as a dimension among others in interactional phenomena.

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