Contracampo

AFTER THE COUP

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN TIMES OF POST-DEMOCRACY

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Presentation: Challenges of Political Communication after the Coup

"We   The legal-parliamentary-mediatic coup of 2016, which brought Dilma Rousseff's administration to an end, caught political scientists and researchers in Political Communication entirely by surprise. Some decades after the end of the military dictatorship, the consolidation of Brazilian democracy was taken for granted.. The collapse of Brazilian democracy was and was not spectacular, depending on how we look at the process. It was not spectacular as it did not occur by means of an act of force: differently from the 1964 Coup, the 2016 Coup did not involve troops and tanks in the streets, but it was executed by the warped behavior of democracy's fundamental institutions, such as the Legislative, the Judiciary and the Public Prosecution. However, the 2016 Coup was spectacular in a way that the 1964 Coup was not, given the leading role played by the media – particularly mainstream press – in the process of delegitimizing representative political institutions and criminalizing the political left wing, making way to Dilma Rousseff's impeachment.

Nevertheless, the coup was not fulfilled when vice-president Michel Temer took office, replacing the vacant spot of the elected president. More than simply removing Dilma Rousseff from the Presidency, the plot of the coup sought to promote the dismantling of social policies developed by the Workers' Party administrations since 2003 and, more importantly, made it impossible for any left-wing forces to return to power by electoral means, using, for this purpose, a selective application of the laws. As a result, former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was arrested after a second-instance conviction based on extremely fragile evidence, while his political rivals had their proceedings discontinued, albeit based on much more solid evidence. Additionally, political repression have become increasingly common and, like in the military regime, they have in the

universities their primary target. Some examples are the systematic persecution of UFSC's rector Luiz Carlos Cancellier Olivo, the case of UFMG's rector Jaime Arturo Ramirez and vice-rector Sandra Regina Goulart Almeida, who were coercively taken to testify to the federal police, in addition to the moral harassment promoted by the Education Minister Mendonça Filho against professor Luiz Felipe Miguel, due to a course about the coup offered by him at UnB.

It seems strange that, in the midst of the coup process hurricane, universities have been quite shy on bringing academic responses to these recent events. Some people seem to believe that the topic is too recent to allow rigorous scientific analysis - the equivalent of saying that the only possible medical science is that practiced by the legists. It is worth noting that the ascending of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States has been object of a considerable amount of academic papers which have highlighted the risks that his political style implies for democracy. Similarly, the rise of far-right populism in Europe has sparked concerns that translate into numerous academic papers about this topic. There is no valid reason, therefore, for an "Olympic" attitude towards the assault on democracy in Brazil to become compulsory among the country's researchers.

Particularly, it must be recognized that the dynamics of the assault on democracy that has taken place in Brazil has entirely different characteristics from the processes that have been taking place in the United States and Europe. While in these countries what is emphasized is the relative inability of accountability institutions to prevent populism and anti-system politicians, in Brazil the warped behavior of these same agents have been transformed into the central element of a dismantling process of the democratic order. It is important to note that this pattern of democracy destabilization did not occur only in Brazil, but also in other Latin America countries and Egypt. This present dossier represents, therefore, an unique opportunity to discuss this political phenomenon.

Four papers are included in this dossier. "The normalization of the coup: the empty of politics in the journalism coverage of Dilma Rousseff's impeachment", written by Kelly Prudêncio, Carla Rizotto and Rafael Cardoso Sampaio (UFPR), examines the ascertainment made by the three main Brazilian newspapers – O Estado de São Paulo, Folha de S. Paulo and O Globo – about

the impeachment process of the former president, based on the analysis of more than two thousand news pieces from the perspective of the multimodal analytical framework, which considers, in an articulated way, elements related to the type of framing, narrative and visual representation of the phenomena described. The paper conclusion is that the coverage of these three newspapers contributed to the coup naturalization. On this perspective, the contribution of the press to the coup process was not an explicit positioning on its favor but rather its casual treatment, as "politics as usual", which systematically ignored the possibility that the process, as it happened, could represent a crisis for democracy.

Two other papers consider the coup process beyond Dilma Rousseff's impeachment using two different strategies. In "The role of media in the impeachment processes of Dilma Rousseff (2016) and Michel Temer (2017)", written by Theófilo Machado Rodrigues (UFRJ), the author contrasts the views provided by the press to these two events, considering other attempts to depose Brazilian presidents in the past (as in the cases of João Goulart and Fernando Collor de Mello). The evaluation is made from published editorials in a diverse set of newspapers, some of which are considered as "national expression" (O Estado de São Paulo, Folha de S. Paulo, O Globo and, in lesser extent, O Correio Brasiliense) and others considered as more "regional" publications, like O Estado de Minas and Zero Hora. From this material, the author identifies a great convergence between the editorials of different newspapers in favor of Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, but not of Temer and, on the basis of this, the paper alerts to the danger that the oligopoly of the means of communication represents for the Brazilian democracy.

On the other hand, the paper "New steps of the coup: the framework of the Pension Reform on Jornal Nacional", written by Luiz Ademir de Oliveira (UFSJ and UFJF), Carla Montuori Fernandes (UNIP and UNIFAI) and Genira Correia Chagas (UNESP and PUC-SP), discusses the coup from its impact on the government social policies. By doing so, it points out a fundamental aspect which has rarely been explored academically: the coup was not against a group of people or institutions, but a way to ensure the approval of certain unpopular policies that were difficult to be approved at the polls. The paper focuses on the coverage of the Pension Reform by mainstream press through content analysis methodology. The authors discuss in detail three aspects of this coverage: the emphasis on the Reform objectives, which are considered to be essential for the

country; the dynamics of dispute between supporters and opposers of the Reform and the physiology of this project. The paper draws attention to the way in which resorting to patronage methods in the conquest of votes for the Reform was presented without questioning in the press. It should be highlighted that this attitude directly contrasts with the behavior of the press in regard to the Mensalão scandal that broke on 2005 – which, ultimately, was also a case of political patronage – and whose coverage extended over several years, helping to pin the image of the Workers' Party administrations as utterly corrupt.

The paper "From 'gay kit' to the indoctrination monitor': the conservative reaction in Brazil", written by Richard Romancini (USP), closes the dossier. It explores the social dynamics of the moral panic construction in the formation of a conservative public opinion as regards Dilma Rousseff's administration. For this purpose, the author explores two cases that have been especially mobilizing for conservative groups (especially for the evangelical right-wing community in Brazil): the "gay kit" and the "indoctrination monitor". The first case refers to a set of complains that characterize government initiatives to prevent bullying against homosexuals as an effort to induce young people; the second concerns the initiative promoted by the Gazeta do Povo newspaper of Paraná state to create a digital platform to collect complaints of ideological indoctrination in the classroom, in accordance with an agenda promoted by the Free Brazil Movement (MBL). The paper makes a relevant contribution by exploring evidence of a convergence between distinct sectors of the right wing around the project of overthrowing the elected president. Both cases report a new dynamics of dispute over the control of publicly disclosed information, the possibilities that social media have provided to previously marginal actors to exert greater influence, and, more recently, the effort of traditional media to restore its virtual information monopoly through the concept of fake news.   Taken as a whole, the papers that compose this dossier make way for a necessary effort to construct analytical alternatives that allow us to consider, in a consistent and systematic way, the new challenges that arise in the field of politics in Brazil and the world, particularly considering the central role of the media in these new circumstances.

Three papers in the free themes section complete this issue. In "2016 Elections in fanpages of regional newspapers", Michele Goulart Massuchin (UFMA) analyzes how nine newspapers, each of them in a different state of Northeast

region of Brazil, adapt their coverages to social media during the electoral campaign. The same social platform is the object of the paper "Facebook interactions and practices", written by Alex Primo (UFRGS), Vanessa Valiati (FEEVALE), Ludmila Lupinacci (London School) and Laura Barros (UFRGS). Through a survey made with more than 800 respondents, this paper explores aspects related to how Facebook influences subjective expression and self-writting. Finally, in the paper "The musical dissemination of Brazilian radio: from 'caitituagem' to the challenges of digital competition", by Daniel Gambaro (USP), Eduardo Vicente (USP) and Thais Saraiva Ramos (Anhembi Morumbi), the authors explore the role played by professionals of the radio industry in the mediation of music, highlighting, in particular, their role in curatorship and in exploring the different strategies that they employ for this purpose.

Afonso Albuquerque (Universidade Federal Fluminense) – guest editor

The normalization of the coup: the emptying of politics in the journalistic coverage of Dilma Rousseff's "impeachment"

KELLY PRUDENCIO
PhD in Political Sociology by UFSC. Professor in the Communication Department in UFPR, Curitiba, Paraná, Brazil. Coordinates COMPA, Research Group in Communication and Political Engagement. E-mail: kelly.prudencio5@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0003-4064-8058.

CARLA RIZZOTTO
PhD in Communication and Languages by UTP-PR. Professor in the Communication Department of UFPR, Curitiba, Paraná, Brazil. Researcher in COMPA Research Group in Communication and Political Engagement. Brazil. E-mail: carla_rizzotto@yahoo.com.br. ORCID: 0000-0002-0847-4660.

RAFAEL CARDOSO SAMPAIO
PhD in Communication and Culture by UFBA. Professor in the Political Sciences Department in UFPR, Curitiba, Paraná, Brazil. Coordinates COMPA, Research Group in Communication and Political Engagement. Brazil. E-mail: cardososampaio@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0001-5176-173X.

Abstract

The article presents the results of research on the coverage of the impeachment process of President Dilma Rousseff between December 2015, when the process was opened in the Chamber of Deputies, and August 2016, when she was definitively dismissed by the Federal Senate. We analyzed 2,202 news articles published by the newspapers O Globo, Folha de S. Paulo and O Estado de S. Paulo for the methodological perspective of the multimodal framework, which considers by using content analysis the textual, visual and narrative aspects of the news. The data allow us to verify that there has been a slightly superior editorial orientation to a pro-impeachment position, but this can only be affirmed by joining the three modes of framing, since the news text followed the pragmatic coverage pattern. We argue that this pattern eventually normalized impeachment as a legitimate process, by depoliticizing it and by erasing the aspects that evidence it as a parliamentary Coup d'état.

Keywords

Introduction

On December 2nd of 2015, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha, authorized the "impeachment" petition against president Dilma Rousseff. At that time, this attitude was taken as a political revenge for the lack of support of the Workers' Party in a committee that judged the deputy. The petition which initially sounded like just an attempt to wear the Workers' Party administration, soon gained shape, especially when the vice president Michel Temer started to publicly admit that he would take the position if the impeachment was confirmed, and the PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party), Temer's and Eduardo Cunha's party, stopped supporting the administration of Dilma Rousseff. The impeachment was approved in the Chamber of Deputies on April 17th of 2016, with 367 votes for and 137 against, the president was removed from office and Michel Temer took over as interim president. Finally, on August 31st 2016, the Senate approved the "impeachment" of President Dilma Rousseff with 60 votes for and only 20 against. Michel Temer took office the next day as president of Brazil.

The process of the impeachment was, generally speaking, marked by a series of political disputes on both sides, but we highlight the direct clash for the narrative. On one hand, President Dilma and allies constantly denounced the petition as a parliamentary coup, since the alleged crime of responsibility committed by Rousseff, the so-called "pedaladas fiscais," or pedaling fiscal obligations into the future, had already been adopted by all the previous presidents and also was common practice of the governors in-service. Therefore, in practice, legal loophole in the constitution was being used exclusively to take power by force, as the Workers' Party had won the last four presidential elections. On the other hand, the supporters of the impeachment rejected the idea of a coup, since the possibility of the petition was in the constitution and the "pedalada fiscal" was in fact something prohibited for the chief of Executive. The fact that the Supreme Federal Court (STF) did not accuse the coup should be another reason why the impeachment was considered legal.

Therefore, through its own capacity of spreading messages and strengthening certain perspectives, the journalistic coverage of the impeachment was seen as something of great relevance for its development and its conclusion. The newspaper companies remarkably took sides favoring the impeachment and also rejecting, in general, the hypothesis of a parliamentary coup through editorials and opinion articles (Guazina, Prior, Araújo, 2017; Marques, Mont'Alverne, Mitozo, 2017). It is also important to note that the Worker's Party historically was given significantly more negative coverage from the press than that given to

candidates/politicians of centre-right orientations, particularly during the elections (Albuquerque, 2013; Aldé, Mendes, Figueiredo, 2007; Azevedo, 2009; Feres Júnior, Sassara, 2016; Miguel, 1999).

Nevertheless, this work argues that the bias taken by the great professional journalistic vehicles can happen in a much less obvious or explicit way than the one already reported by the literature, especially when the analysis is about the news and the journalistic articles and not only opinion material. For that reason, this work argues that the journalistic coverage of the process that became known as the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff presented this political event as an ordinary fact of national politics. In other words, professional journalism legitimated the impeachment by not highlighting the series of problems, disputes and alternative narratives. Finally, while not considering it as a unique political event with great repercussions of various natures, or still, by normalizing it, by emptying it to an ordinary political event, journalism made an important contribution to the coup against Dilma Rousseff.

Albæk et al. (2014, p. 77-8) classify this way of treating politics as a pragmatic conception of the role of journalism in democracy. According to this concept, journalists tend to deal with the news about politics by applying the same criteria and values they would apply to any other topic. This differs from a conception that the authors entitle sacerdotal, that tends to put politics as a separate field from the "mundane life". Taking a pragmatic approach when covering political facts leads to framing them into conflicts and/or games, which has already been verified by some authors (Iyengar, 1991; Porto, 2002). The news about Dilma's departure from the presidency followed this pattern, as will be demonstrated next, diminishing this event to a question of arm wrestling between government and opposition, treating the facts as victory or loss of one or another group.

Secondly, as we know, journalism can take roles according to an impartial dimension or, then, to a partisan point of view of any conflict in subject (ALBæK ET AL, 2014). The first values the equity of the coverage while the second considers taking sides in political disputes is acceptable. The coverage of three Brazilian newspapers adopted the formally impartial dimension; this would lead to conclusion that the Brazilian press did not stand politically, as the news were mainly balanced. We claim that the multimodal framework analysis, which casts a series of minutiae and specificities of the journalistic coverage, is capable of exposing the pretense impartiality of our journalism. In other words, contrary to what is found in the literature in political communication, the bias against President Dilma is far from

being majority or very explicit, however it is present in several smaller parts in the journalistic writing, as we will seek to demonstrate later.

A third approach that is brought by the authors is the orientation of the news towards information or entertainment. In the last case, the news would deal with political events from what they call privatization of political news, of the emphasis on the private life of politicians and of the coverage of scandals. In the Brazilian case in analysis, the orientation was clearly informative, with sparse notes about the state of the affected politicians, as can be observed in the narrative framework. The scandal was not thematized, and the impeachment process, as said before, was treated like an ordinary fact of politics and not a coup with important implications for democracy.

In short, our argument is that the journalistic coverage normalized the coup by depoliticizing it (Vimieiro, Maia, 2017; Wood, Flinders, 2014); that is, it moves the discussion of the great conflicts, scandals, political consequences (here in its wider meaning) to the simple ordinary political game (i.e. horse race journalism), leading to the accession of the logic that "there are no alternatives", thereby drastically decreasing the possibility of being framed or discussed as a parliamentary coup.

Multimodal framework analysis of the journalistic coverage

Studies on framework seek essentially to understand aspects of journalistic narrative in the coverage of certain phenomena or events, highlighting the elements that are emphasized or hidden in the coverage. In other words, "framing is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more prominent in a text" (Entman, 1993, p.52, our translation), especially when these projections promote "a definition of problem in specific, a causal interpretation, a moral evaluation and/or a treatment recommendation for the described item" (Entman, 1993, p.52).

Although there are numerous ways of application (Matthes, Kohring; 2008; Mendonça; Simões, 2012; Pozobon, Schaefer, 2015; Vimieiro, Maia, 2011b),

> at the core of this kind of operationalization lays a concern to understand how discourses establish frames of meaning, framing the world from specific perspectives. It is sought to think how the discursive content itself creates a context of meaning, convoking the interlocutors to follow a certain interpretative trail. (Mendonça; Simões, 2012, p.193).

According to Matthes and Kohring (2008), one of the problems of framework studies is in the application of methods with little reliability or replicability, because they are very broad, holistic applications or based on excessively broad cultural elements, and are therefore very questionable to the interpretation of the researchers themselves and unverifiable by the peers. The authors believe that a more reliable method lies in the verification of minor and more objective variables and categories in the products to be evaluated and that subsequently there would be a concern with the generation of the idea of framework.

Wozniak et al. (2014), in turn, criticized the fact that most of the analysis on framework are dedicated to the textual content of the articles, pursuing the application of broad categories of the concept of framework. The authors believe that a more thorough and systematic analysis of at least three communicative approaches present in journalistic articles is necessary, and they point out the narrative, the visual representation and the categories of framework, as suggested by Entman.

The classic perspective of news framework, restricted to textual analysis, is not, in our vision, the most appropriate to address a multi-faceted political event as was the parliamentary coup of 2016. A prior analysis of the partial corpus[1] of this research showed as more efficient an approach that takes into consideration also the visual and narrative elements, because they allow a closer approach between the researcher and the general experience of printed newspaper readers (Rizzotto, Prudencio, Sampaio, 2017). The cross-check of the images analysis and the narrative analysis of[2] the news that put Dilma Rousseff as the main character of the event, whether in the role of victim, villain or heroin, showed the existence of a conflict of roles framework in 33% of the news. So, not rarely, she was presented in one way by the narrative construction and in another by the image (Rizzotto, Prudencio, 2017). It is based on this conflict that often the receiver constructs their interpretation of the news, and that is why we support the multimodal framework analysis as a more appropriate methodology for the analysis of the news coverage of this critical moment in national politics. Thus, our analysis,[3] inspired by Wozniak et al. (2014), is systematized in Figure 1 below:

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[1] This previous analysis was carried out in a corpus of 318 news, being 187 of the paper O Globo and 131 of the Folha de S. Paulo, published in December 2015, when the impeachment petition was introduced, and in May 2016, when Dilma Roussef was provisionally removed from the presidency after the first vote in Senate.

[2] Sixty news of the partial corpus were analyzed here that associated to Dilma Rousseff some role in the narrative and that, at the same time, represented her in the image.

[3] For further discussion about the methodology adopted see (Rizzotto, Prudêncio, Sampaio, 2017).

Figure 1 - Multimodal Analysis

Source: COMPA (2016)[4]

The referred multimodal analysis, based on manual content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004), was applied to a corpus of 2.202 news articles published by the papers O Globo, Folha de S. Paulo and O Estado de S. Paulo, from December 2nd of 2015 to August 31st[5] of 2016. From the total corpus we analyzed only the photographs and excluded the infographic analysis, illustrations and others, resulting in 1,820 images analyzed. The news were coded by the members of the Research Group Communications and Political Participation (COMPA) of the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR), who went through an extensive training followed by reliability tests[6] to increase reliability and, to some extent,[7] the validity of the data. The most relevant data for the discussion proposed in this article will be presented

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[4] The Codebook with the description and exemplification of all categories is available in: https://bdc.c3sl.ufpr.br/handle/12345789/27.

[5] The news were selected initially by an automatic filter that sought the key word "impeachment" in the politics section of the 3 newspapers. Later they went through a manual filter that removed from the corpus opinion articles, interviews or news that did not contain images.

[6] Framed component, 0.681 Krippendorff; Person represented in the image, 0.703 Krippendorff; Activity accomplished, 0.666 Krippendorff; Camera angle, 0.683 Krippendorff; Camera shot, 0.669 Krippendorff; Dramatization, 0.69 Krippendorff; Emotion, 0.703 Krippendorff; Personalization, 0.689 Krippendorff; Stylistic ornamentation 0.705 Krippendorff; Problem - actors, 0.67 Kappa, 71% agreement; Problem - sub-topics 0.55 Kappa, 62% agreement; Causes - 0.55 Kappa, 62% agreement; Moral judgment, 0.59 Kappa, 67% agreement. Treatment recommendation, 0.73 Kappa, 80% agreement. We choose to use Kappa measure in the categories of rare apparitions because Krippendorff's alpha is quite sensitive to disagreement in these cases, which are common specially in narrative and framework analysis. For more about the reliability test, see Krippendorff (2004).

[7] The database is available in the repository of scientific databases of UFPR, in: https://bdc.c3sl.ufpr.br/handle/12345789/26.

next. As we can see, at some points the comparison between the three vehicles is significant, in others, the longitudinal comparison between two moments of the process is more important - before and after the provisional removal of the president.

The first important data that the longitudinal comparison allows us to realize is that the frequency of publications falls considerably from the period of which Michel Temer took office as interim (Graph 1). In the 165 days preceding the vote in Senate that temporarily dismissed Dilma, an average of 9.17 daily news were published; in the 108 days of coverage after her removal, about 6.37 news a day were published. The frequency of coverage provides evidence to conclude that with Dilma already out of the presidency, the impeachment ceases to be a recurrent topic, since there would be, following this thesis, low chances of reversing the situation, as demonstrated in Chart 1.


Chart 1 - Longitudinal frequency.
Source: COMPA.

With the situation practically consolidated, we also notice an attempt by the newspapers to legitimize Michel Temer as president, which can be verified from the increase of the attribution of the role of hero to Temer in comparison to the period

prior to his position as interim. The longitudinal evolution of the roles present in the narrative will be further discussed.

The degree of narrativity, which considers *dramatization*, *emotion*, *personalizati*on an*d stylistic ornamentation, presents important differences between the three vehicle*s, as demonstrated by Chart 2:


Chart 2 - Degree of narrativity.
Source: COMPA.

Dramatization appears in 20.6% of the news analyzed, emotion in 31.4% and stylistic ornamentation in 13.9%. Considering, however, the characteristics of Brazilian journalism, which has American influence, with strong presence of the ideal of objectivity, marked by the techniques of lead, inverted pyramid and copy desk, as well as the technical education that shaped its professionalization (Traquina, 2004; Ribeiro, 2000), this number seems quite expressive. In the same direction, the personalization present in 47% of the news says a lot about the remoteness of contemporary Brazilian journalism from the approach based on facts that marked the second half of the 20th century; almost half the news is focused on characters, their actions and their statements. According to Ribeiro (2000), the techniques adopted in the newsrooms and the ideas of objectivity and neutrality marked the journalistic field along with the refusal of connections with literature

and politics, creating the conditions for their consolidation from the 1960s. The results presented here, however, indicate the use of language strategies with the purpose of "making believe" and "making feel", in addition to "making know" that characterizes the "view of information" as explained by Charaudeau (2007). The author completes:

> In the speech of information, however, it's not about the truth itself, but the truth linked to the way of reporting the facts: it is not quite about the conditions of the rising of truth, but the conditions of veracity. It is the responsibility of the mediatic instance to authenticate facts, to describe them in a verisimilar manner, to suggest causes and to justify given explanations. (Charaudeau, 2007, p.88)

The news published by the paper O Globo on June 12th of 2016, entitled "All for impeachment" (Figure 2), totally focused on Michel Temer's performance after his first month of interim government, presents the four elements of narrativity previously cited, and represents the changes in the journalistic craft to which we refer.

Figure 2 - All for impeachment

Source: O Globo, June 12th of 2016.

The following section needs to be highlighted:

> Beyond all political issues, the fact that really shook Temer mad at that time was the protests in front of his house that made his wife, Marcela, and his youngest son Little Michel, scared of an invasion. On the day he announced his first economic measures, Temer fled to his usual discreet tone, he slammed his hand on the table and said that when Secretary of Security of São Paulo, he "used to deal with criminals", in a message to the protesters. (IGLESIAS, ALENCASTRO, 2016)

Stylistic expressions like "shook Temer up" and "Temer fled to his usual discreet tone" help to build a narrative in which Michel Temer is the victim of the institutional political game, placing him among the "pressure of allies"and the aggression of opposition, materialized in the actions of the demonstrators who protested in front of his house and in Dilma's performance as president, which "deputies and senators [...] complained of the lack of attention they got" (Iglesias, Alencastro, 2016). Protesters and Dilma Rousseff are thus the real "villains" in the narrative construction of this news. The main image that illustrates the article also corroborates this point of view, Temer seems reflected and concerned about hearing what Romero Jucá (at the time minister of planning, budget and management) has to say, in a condition of passive subject who is victim of circumstances. It is also noted that the news in question is totally based on the so-called reporting journalism, quoting, however, only two identified sources – the secretary of government Geddel Vieira Lima and Temer himself - and abusing of anonymous sources - "an auxiliary", "a close adviser to Temer".

As for the roles assigned to the characters of the process, they appear in a low number of news - 13% present a victim, 15.6% a villain and 8.6% a hero or heroin. When they appear, they are distributed as followed between the most recurrent subjects of the news about the process - Dilma, Lula, Cunha and Temer (Chart 3):

[Victim; Vilain; Hero]

Chart 3 - Longitudinal evolution of roles.

Source: COMPA

In the period before the interim removal, Dilma Rousseff appears as the most frequent victim (61.2%), followed by Lula (7.5%), Temer (6.9%) and Cunha (3.3%); after removal, Cunha and Temer's frequency playing the role of victims increase (12.7% and 7.8% respectively), while Dilma loses incidence in this role (40,1%) and Lula disappears. In the role of villain, Dilma goes from 22.2% before her removal down to 16.9% after; Lula from 3.7% to 4.7%; Cunha from 23.1% to 11.3%; and Temer from 12.6% to 13.2%. Dilma appeared more often as heroin after her removal (10.5% against 20.4%), Lula was hero more often before

removal (10.5% against 2%), Temer after removal (9.8% against 26.5%) and Cunha appeared only as a hero before removal (3.5%).

Associated with the analysis of news framework that will be exposed to later, these numbers lead to a construction of the process of impeachment in which Dilma was mainly victim, sometimes of the political game and Cunha's blackmail while establishing the process, and other times of her own incompetence; sometimes villain, whether for her "strict" conduct (and in this case we highlight the sexist vision that characterizes a woman's seriousness as strictness, but does not do that with a man with the same behavior), or for her political inability that was responsible for the Brazilian crisis; and heroin when she defended Lula on the occasion of his coercive conduct and his appointment as chief of staff, when she defended herself, especially on August 29th when she participated in a session in Senate that lasted more than 10 hours, or when she received a tribute of hundreds of women who gathered at the Palácio do Planalto in April 19th of 2016 to support her administration. On the other hand, even when the supporters of the impeachment were portrayed as villains, they were presented as intelligent villains, who knew how to move adequately in the chess game behind the impeachment vote or even, in the case of Cunha, to manipulate Parliament's rules in favor of his agenda.

The news framework analysis was carried out from 5 variables - actors, definition of the problem, causes of the problem, moral judgment and recommendation of treatment (Entman, 1993; Vimiero, Maia, 2011a). Chart 4 shows who were the actors that appeared in the news before and after Dilma's interim removal:

Chart 4 - Actors.

Source: COMPA.

Before removal, the prevalence is of pro-impeachment politicians (30.6%), followed closely by Dilma and allies (29.3%). Then civil society appears (13.4%), the judicial field (10.1%) and economic field (2.3%). It is not surprising that the two opposing political fields are the most recurrent characters, as also shows the variable which determines the definition of the problem, since the process of impeachment was depicted mainly as a political fight, featuring a bias of stripping political content. Civil society appears in the news about the protests, both favorable and contrary to the coup, and in these cases is generally embodied as the "hero" character. The judiciary appears more often when it comes to discussions about the legality of the process. The economic field rarely appears, indicating that the newspapers had little discussed the fundamental issue that led to the accusation against Rousseff, the so-called "pedaladas fiscais". After the removal, Temer and allies' presence becomes considerably higher (35.3%) than Dilma's and allies (which falls to 18.8%); with Dilma out of the picture, the judiciary field and Temer's group's actions and statements are the ones who receive the most attention of the news, suggesting the legitimization and normalization of the event (going up to 16.7% almost the same number as Dilma's presence and of other

politicians against the impeachment). This presence is confirmed by the news images, as we can see in Chart 5, which points out a small prevalence of the political group led by Temer and Cunha:

Chart 5 - Person represented in the image.
Source: COMPA.

The main problem of the news is centered on the *crisis scenario* (31.8%), i.e. news that do not directly address the impeachment but present elements that can be used to strengthen the thesis of the impeachment, such as the economic scenery, accusations from the Car Wash Operation and corruption etc. Then the *political dispute* appears (24%), indicating that the motivation of the petition for the impeachment is the dispute or political game and/or fight for power. The *impeachment petition* itself is also recurrent (21.1%), these news approach legal technicalities and often count the votes of the deputies and, subsequently, the senators. The *future post impeachment* (11.2%), the *repercussions on the population* (9.2%) and the *history recovery* (2.4%) of the political scenery appear less frequently (Chart 6).

Chart 6 - Definition of the problem.

Source: COMPA.

A good amount of the news do not present causes for the problems described (23.4%), according to Chart 7 below. When they appear, the causes focus mainly on *political-ideological controversy* (30.8%), confirming what was previously stated about stripping political content, described as a institutionalized locus of disputes and, therefore, distant from the population. The *Widespread corruption* (15.4%) and the *political inability of Dilma's administration* (9%) are also presented as causes of this crisis scenario that justifies the removal of the elected president. The *legality of the impeachment process* (13.5%) is the justification consistently associated with the problem *impeachment petition*, defining it as legitimate because it is constitutional.

Chart 7 - Causes of the problem.

Source: COMPA.

The moral judgment (Chart 8) is absent in the vast majority of the news (71.9%), justified by the inheritance of journalistic neutrality that prevents the execution of judgments in an explicit manner. When it appears, it often leads to Dilma's culpability for his own destiny (10.7%), followed by criticism of political fights (7.8%), the formal aspects of the impeachment (5.2%) and the politicians who used it as a type of revenge (4.1%). This result points to the depolitization of the coup, while presenting itself as neutral, journalism in this case emphasize Dilma's guilt, by not questioning the process, or the disputes that make politics a "dirty"area, from which the population must remain apart.

Chart 8 - Moral judgment.

Source: COMPA.

Finally, the last variable about the news framework marks the existence of a recommendation for treatment (Chart 9), absent in most cases (80.6%) - which is also explained by the inheritance of the values of neutrality and objectivity. When present, the recommendation is for the impeachment in 11.5% of the cases, against the impeachment in 6.6%, and in favor to hold new elections in 1% of them. This data is another indication that the journalistic coverage either opted to empty the political discussions and consequences of the impeachment or, in a lesser frequency, tended to position itself more favorably to the impeachment.

Chart 9 - Treatment recommendation.

Source: COMPA.

As regards the visual framework, the predominance of the variable medium shots and close-ups (Chart 10) contributes to the result about the personalization of the news in the narrative. The images portray the characters of the news, without background scenery and in closed environments in 65.4% of the corpus. This data associated with the people portrayed in the images (Chart 5) reinforces the framework of the process as a dispute between two opposing groups, and Cunha, Temer and allies appear in 27.5% of the images while Dilma, Lula and allies in 22.8% of them. The wide shot allows us to identify the location and the situation in which the fact occurs, but was only identified in 23.5% of the images, which intensifies the framework of the event as a cabinet problem.

Chart 10 - Camera shot

Source: COMPA.

The variable position of the camera indicates the construction of meaning for the ones portrayed in the image. A high-angle camera shot diminishes the importance of the portrayed; a low-angle camera shot positively values the object or person in the image; and the regular angle of the camera is protocol. Chart 11 shows that the coverage benefited from the regular angle of images (78.4%), consistent with a pragmatic and objective perspective of Brazilian journalism.

Chart 11 - Camera angle.

Source: COMPA.

The activities that these politicians develop in the images (Chart 12) are basically none (32.3%), presentation or speech (20.2%) and spotted everyday activities (15.5%). What we verify is a selection of images in which people are in a passive state, because there is no information in the images that indicate the activity. Very distant from this are the protests images, with only 8.1% of the corpus. These images could grant the news an indication of the presence of other social actors in the discussion of the impeachment/coup, as there were popular demonstrations in favor and against what was happening in the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate.

Chart 12 - Developed activity.

Source: COMPA.

Combining the variables camera shot, camera angle, people portrayed and developed activity we get a visual framework of politics as a scene of interaction between two political groups, with little visibility to the other groups. Regular angle and medium shots or close-ups indicate the absence of proximity to the observer, once again putting a distance between politics and society. The Image 3 below is representative, illustrating the political fight between two opposing groups at the same time when it presents these groups distant from the reader. In the coverage of the paper O Globo, the emphasis on political debate is also clear by the choice of the expression "The Battle of the Impeachment" as the kicker.

Image 3 - Spirits running high.
Source: O Globo, August 26th of 2016.

In the news above, "Witnesses turn into target. On the ¹ˢᵗ day of Dilma's trial, defense and prosecution raise suspicion about deponents", the first paragraph draws attention, which brings the conclusions presented in this article about the coverage's emptying of politics while emphasizing that the debate held in the trial should be technical and not political - even though the newspaper also leaves aside the technical aspects over the period analyzed as demonstrated by the analysis of the variables of the news framework presented before: "The first day of trial of the impeachment of the removed president, Dilma Rousseff, was marked by an attempt to politicize the process even more, deflating the technical debate." (Jungblut et al, 2016)

Final considerations - the depolitization of the coup

When looking at the variables analyzed, it is possible to realize that the journalistic coverage of the period of which the national congress worked for the

deposition of President Dilma Rousseff was favorable to her dismissal. This inference, however, does not come from quantitatively significant data, but from a perspective crossing the variables. This highlights the importance of research that avoids very broad categories, opting for the verification of the coverage's minutiae, as suggested by Mathes and Kohring (2008). In short, in the three newspapers analyzed, the press favored the impeachment, even without supporting it emphatically. It is precisely this pretence of neutrality that we are calling here "normalitzation of the coup".

In the absence of crime of responsibility, the facts to be reported were in the political game between adversaries. Thus, the coverage used characters to lead the stories (the resource of personalization). In less than 15% of the corpus, these characters were associated with the roles of victim, villain or hero. This is also a factor of normalization, as it uniforms the fields in conflict, as if they were in equality of dispute and of reasons. Dilma Rousseff was framed in all the roles, depending on the context in which the news was inserted, but was certainly more approached as a villain for her own incompetence or as the victim of her persecutors (who were smart and devious in the political game), having possessed little chance to be portrayed as heroin that leads the resistance to the attack of the opponents.

Therefore, the textual news framework emphasized conflict and political game; without moral judgments about the conduct of actors and processes, putting the ordinary world of politics as the cause of conflicts, which, in our vision, ended up naturalizing the coup as impeachment and the impeachment as an acceptable event in a democracy and especially as a everyday political event such as any other political vote. In turn, the visual framework reinforced the image of politics as inhabited by figures distant from society, in purely technocratic situations with no ties to social demands. Unlike what was imagined, the images also strengthened a vision of "politics as usual", not denouncing the extraordinary character of a petition for impeachment.

This kind of pragmatic coverage (Albæk et al., 2014) favors what authors like Wood and Flinters (2014, p. 152) treat as depolitization, a phenomenon related to the growth of mistrust in democracy. They define depolitization as a movement of displacement of political decision from the center of the political system - in the sense of deresponsibilization by decision - to other social spheres. But not only the political system is depoliticized; the authors also deal with societal and dicursive depolitization. In the first, in which the media act together with other groups of interest, public affairs are removed from the agenda of political deliberation. And

discursive depolitization is operated by[8] *the refusal* of contingency (which characterizes the realm of politics), is the spread among individuals that certain subjects are "normal" and "natural", in addition to the accession to the logic that "there are no alternatives". The result of this broad process of depolitization is, according to the authors, provision for a disinterested democratic culture, opening a dangerous space for an anti-political environment (see also Vimiro, Maia, 2017)

The results of the research on the coverage of the three newspapers allow thus to affirm that the tone of the news was highly depoliticized, it did not present the impeachment/coup as the object of public discussion, but as a normal fact of the daily routine in the Palácio do Planalto. The population watched the episodes of a boring soup opera, which script is already common in political news. As defined by the authors, "Depoliticized politics, therefore, would present little debate about the main social issues or political options alongside a very sterile political scenario in terms of public engagement and social dynamism" (Wood & Flinders, 2014, p. 159).

Therefore, the impeachment was essentially presented as legitimate for the population, as its dimension as a democratic rupture was rarely on focus. The coverage was dedicated to arrange the different actors as favorable or contrary to the petition, and was absent from discussing the controversies and negative consequences that could involve the process. This becomes evident in the variable "treatment recommendations", where the news took a stand (11.58% favor and 6.67% against) without discussing what this represented to democracy. Another indication in this direction is the confluence between the variables "definition of the problem" and "causes of the problem" that had greater[9] incidence in the political dispute. Broadly, Brazilian journalism treated the issue as political, with political causes and merely political consequences, and it didn't emphasize the impacts on the democratic order or even the population.

Thus, we have coverage classified as pragmatic (Albæk et al., 2014), with information content that was restricted to recording facts. The fact for the three newspapers was about an impeachment process of a president without the presence of a crime of responsibility. As far as this absence of crime didn't consist at least of a reflection with discussion about its implications, the newspapers ended up treating the event, even though formally according to the general principles that

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[8] Biroli and Mantovani (2014, p. 204) observe something similar in relation to the journalistic coverage of the corruption process of the so-called "mensalão", also of the Workers' Party. According to the authors: "the News are presented, in turn, as narrative attached to facts and, as such, not positioned. The angle presented as legitimate for coverage is naturalized at the same time as the positions in dispute, which would involve distinct perspectives for the production of the news, are excluded or domesticated as reactions to facts."

[9] As a matter of curiosity, we had an initial check of all the titles of 2202 subjects and only 36 present the word coup. And in all, it was only to emphasize that certain political actor considers that it is in fact a coup or not, or that raises the thesis of a coup.

make journalism a reference of reality, as something inexorable and undebatable, therefore, without the possibility of deliberation. The political choice was reduced to simply taking a stand in favor or against it, as represented in the news by the positions of the political actors involved, divided into two opposing groups.

Future research and even critiques need to be attentive of this way to "implicitly" support a certain side triggered by this so-called independent journalism. This "super neutral" journalism, which only didn't take position in appearances, acted as normalizer of the coup, which was possible to demonstrate by the relation between the variables facilitated by the multimodal framework.

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The role of the media in the processes of impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (2016) and Michel Temer (2017)

THEÓFILO MACHADO RODRIGUES
PhD in Social Science from Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-RJ). Professor at Political Science Department of UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. E-mail: theofilomachadorodrigues@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0003-1709-1546

Abstract

The tense relationship between media and politics in Brazil is well known by specialized literature. Getúlio Vargas, João Goulart and Fernando Collor are examples of presidents who did not finish their mandates and who suffered resistance from the press. This article argues that this history of the media in destabilization processes remains current. The hypothesis was tested from the observation of 34 editorials of Brazil's main print newspapers, during Dilma Rousseff's impeachment in 2016 and the opening of Michel Temer's investigation in 2017. The first case had a certain unity between these newspapers; in the second case, there was divergence in the press

Keywords

Introduction

The tense relationship between the media and politics in Brazil is relatively well-known in the specialized literature. On the one hand, there is the recurring practice, on the part of media companies, of defending their interests via political agenda-setting (Biroli & Mantovani, 2010; Biroli & Montovani, 2014; Fonseca, 2011; Miguel & Coutinho, 2007). In addition, through their outlets, they express their preferences and strive to influence electoral results, which invariably displeases one or another of the actors in dispute (Feres Jr. & Sassara, 2016a; Feres Jr. & Sassara, 2016b; Mundim, 2012, 2014; Mundim & Bezerra, 2011; Aldé & Mendes & Figueiredo, 2007). On the other hand, politicians oftentimes are the very holders of radio and television concessions in their areas, [a fact] that part of the literature has labeled as "electronic coronelism" (Costa & Brener, 1997; Santos, 2006, 2008; Lima, 2015). Though the latter is obviously unconstitutional, the former is not. Freedom of expression, a liberal achievement found in modern constitutions since the eighteenth century - see the French and American Constitutions - occupies a very prominent place in the 1988 Brazilian Charter, and very few are the voices that, in a democratic regime, call for the return of censorship. The problem under discussion is not exactly how to avoid the positioning of certain media outlets, but rather how to ensure that there is cultural diversity and plurality of information among them. In Habermasian terms, how to elaborate a rational deliberation that results in consensus and qualitatively informs the production of public policies, if the information guiding the process is biased or asymmetrical? This is the dilemma of a society such as the Brazilian one, often characterized by part of the literature as prone to the occurrence of media monopolies or oligopolies (Azevedo, 2006; Canela, 2008; Borges, 2009; Martins, 2014; Mielli & Damasceno, 2015; Lima, 2015).

Ruiz (2010, p.37) understands that "this tension between the media and politicians is democratizing insofar as it strengthens the democratic quality of the media system." [It is] democratizing as long as three indicators are respected: the amplitude of voices; the ability to criticize all instances of power; and the strengthening of the common informative base, i.e., "providing credible information, at the same time, for the different sectors of political antagonism" (Ruiz, 2010, p. 38). But it is hard to argue that this democratizing scenario is exactly what is found in Brazil today, where political polarization has undermined the trust of political actors in certain media outlets. For instance, José Szwako and Fabiano Santos (2016, p. 115) argue that, among "the ingredients that make up the current Brazilian socio-political framework", there is "an oligopolized media that is increasingly partisanized and aligned with specific sectors of the power

structure." According to Luis Felipe Miguel (2017, p. 115), "the central point is that printed newspapers and magazines, as much as radio and television broadcasters, are controlled by a small number of business groups, which, with very few exceptions, align themselves with the same political interests". Domingues (2017, p.1750) is even more incisive when he states that today group *Globo* is "the leading 'organic' intellectual for a large portion of the Brazilian bourgeoisie, and indeed it is their main political party."

In the case of Brazil, there is a certain history in this tension between the media and politics (Albuquerque, 2000; Sodré, 1983). The role of the press in the political crisis that led to the suicide of Getúlio Vargas in the 1950's is rather well-known. In his classic book about the União Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Union-UDN), Benevides (1981, p. 88) exposes how Julio de Mesquita Filho himself, owner of the *Estado de S. Paulo* newspaper, sought the then commander of the Superior War School, General Juarez Távora, "to probe him on the possibility of a coup against Getúlio." But it was not only *Estado de São Paulo.* According to Alzira Alves de Abreu (undated), the opposition against Vargas was led by "the journalists Carlos Lacerda, owner of the *Tribuna da Imprensa* newspaper, and Assis Chateaubriand, owner of *Diários Associados.* In addition to his newspaper, Carlos Lacerda made use of Radio Globo and *Rede Tupi*, a television network." Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos (2017, p. 34) recalls how the denouncing of Getúlio was "masterly modeled by the oppositional press, spearheaded by *Tribuna de Imprensa* and *O Globo*". The same can be said of what occurred in the mid-1960s, when João Goulart was deposed. In his research work on press interference in politics, Arêas (2015, p. 75) recalls that among those who "worked toward the destabilization and overthrow of the Goulart government, (…) there were the main press companies such as *O Globo*, *Jornal do Brasil*, *Estado de S. Paulo* and *Folha de S. Paulo.* "

However, it was certainly after the impeachment of Fernando Collor de Mello, in 1992, that the specialized literature further developed its knowledge on the dynamics of media interference in politics. *A imprensa faz e desfaz um presidente* (The press makes and unmakes a president) - a book by Fernando Lattman-Weltman, José Alan Dias Carneiro and Plínio de Abreu Ramos - became a classic, not only because it was one of the very first to delve into this context, but also due to the depth of their approach. Published in 1994 after research carried out by the *CPDOC* of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, the book describes how "the media became an analytically autonomous and occasionally decisive factor both in making up the electoral scenario from which Collor emerged with a victory and also (…) in conducting the process of mobilizing the political forces that deposed him"

(Lattman-Weltman et al., 1994, p. 2). Among the printed press agencies analyzed by the authors were the newspapers *O Globo*, *Jornal do Brasil*, *Folha de S. Paulo* and *Estado de S. Paulo*, and the magazines *Veja* and *Isto É*. Fausto Neto (1995) also stands among those who perceived that tendency immediately after the fall of the former president. In his study on the role of television in the impeachment of Fernando Collor, the author states that media outlets "not only report on, but they act upon the political space, either by steering it towards themselves at certain moments, or, in other situations, by working as a 'parallel power'" (Fausto Neto, 1995, p.10). On that same note, Sallum Jr. and Casarões (2011) argue that the actions of Congress, of the press and the "organized civil society" were responsible for preventing Collor from reaching the end of his term. The authors even defend the thesis that, at the time, there was a "coalition of the left and center parties, aided by the press and extra-parliamentary organizations, which conducted the investigations and all the initiatives and negotiations that ended up in the impeachment" (Sallum Jr. & Casarões, 2011).

The present article argues that this historical course of action of the main media outlets in destabilizing presidents in Brazil remains current. The hypothesis was tested by analyzing thirty-four editorials from the main printed Brazilian newspapers published during the process of impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016 and the investigation on Michel Temer, 2017. The former event was marked by a certain unity of those newspapers; during the latter, there was greater divergence of stances among the press. The media outlets under analysis include the newspapers *O Globo*, *Folha de S. Paulo*, *Estado de S. Paulo*, *Estado de Minas*, *Correio Braziliense* and *Zero Hora*. The criterion adopted for choosing such vehicles was simple: those are the printed newspapers that, besides having a vast circulation, also exert influence on the national political debate. There was also the region factor. For instance, *Correio Braziliense*, though it does not figure among the ten largest newspapers in circulation, is an important outlet when it comes to the public sphere because, being from Brasília, it directly informs the main political actors on the national scenario.

The choice of editorials as research objects seemed intuitive. It is through editorials that press vehicles present their opinions to the readers (Melo, 1994, 2003). According to the *Folha de S. Paulo's* writing manual (1992), their editorial "should concisely present the theme to be addressed, develop the arguments defended by the newspaper, refute opposing opinions and conclude by condensing the position adopted by *Folha*". The writing manual from Group Globo (2011) says that its editorials must "mirror the vision of its editorial board, composed of members of the Marinho family and the journalists who run the newsrooms."

Zanotti (2017, p. 74) goes even further by defending that the point of view expressed in an editorial is not only that of the newspaper, but also "of the groups of interest that gravitate around the publication, such as shareholders, advertisers and a contingent of its readers". Therefore, editorials seem to be rather privileged research objects. Of course, the specialized literature knows quite well that the opinions of press outlets are not only present in their editorials, but also in the way that headlines are written, experts are selected, information is filtered or images are chosen. Such a study could be very useful to understand the indirect stance-taking of the press. However, we prefer to select only editorials as our research objects, in order to figure out what is the direct stance - with no in-between lines or subterfuges - that those media vehicles want to present.

In the first section, we analyze twenty-seven editorials published between 2015 and 2016 and focused on the possibility of removing Dilma Rousseff from office. At first, nine editorials from *Estadão*, seven from *O Globo*, five from *Folha de S. Paulo*, four from *Zero Hora*, two from *Estado de Minas* and one from *Correio Braziliense* were analyzed. In the second section, seven editorials published between May and August 2017 are examined, focused on the accusation of passive corruption that could lead to the impeachment of Temer. Among them, there are three [editorials] from *Estadão*, two from *O Globo*, one from *Folha de S. Paulo* and one from *Zero Hora*. The conclusion is that the very same scenario from cases past, which had already been exposed in the literature, was repeated against Dilma and, to a much lesser extent, Temer.

The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff

The process of impeaching President Dilma Rousseff began on December 2nd, 2015, with the admission, by the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha, of the complaint of crime of responsibility filed by lawyers Hélio Bicudo, Miguel Reale Junior and Janaína Paschoal. On April 17th, 2016, the impeachment was approved in the Chamber of Deputies and, on August 31st, 2016, the Senate condemned Dilma Rousseff to removal from office. Vice president Michel Temer took over after her.

There is a growing consensus in the literature about the active role played by the media in Dilma Rousseff's impeachment process. According to Luis Felipe Miguel (2017, p. 113), "the media bias was obvious to anyone who followed (…) the journalistic coverage in the period that stretches from the proclaiming of the election results in October, 2014, to the final removal of the president from office, in August, 2016." José Szwako and Fabiano Santos (2016, p. 116-117) state that

"it was the concerted and articulated action - what sociologists call 'agency' - between parties, social movements of an elitist stratum and supporters among the media and the judiciary, that culminated in the impeachment." In other words, Marcus Ianoni (2017, p. 143) presents the same evaluation: "the coalition for impeachment" brings together "parties, parliament members, elites of the public bureaucracy of the state apparatus and actors from the civil society, especially the organized sectors and agents from financial markets, including, obviously, the great oligopolized media." Melo and Nunes (2017, p. 289) defend the thesis that it did not matter much whether the technical arguments in favor of the impeachment were convincing, because the fundamental [factor] was that a large majority in Congress, in society, in the media and in finances had reached the conclusion that it was necessary to remove the president. The most scathing critic of the process of impeachment against Dilma Rousseff, Jessé Souza (2016, p. 122-123), argues that "the front line of the reactionary coup" was formed by the "articulation between the media - as the arm of the wealthy that is in charge of the symbolic violence - commanding and stimulating street demonstrations of the more conservative portion of the middle class, and the more conservative and corporate fraction of the legal caste." On the other hand, Feres Jr. and Sassara (2016a, p. 183) point out that "Dilma's impeachment was the product of several factors, (…) yet it is difficult to imagine how all these elements came into synergy without the active collaboration from the media."

The international literature also turned its attention to the participation of the Brazilian press in the process of impeachment. Teun Adrianus van Dijk, a researcher at the Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona, published an article in the Discourse & Communication magazine, where, by analyzing the discourse of *O Globo* newspaper between March and April, 2016, he noticed how the media "played a decisive role in the coup by manipulating both the public opinion and the politicians who voted against Dilma" (Van Dijk, 2017, p. 199, translation by the authors). Van Dijk's thesis may exaggerate the power of *O Globo* newspaper to mobilize political actors, but the exaggeration does not invalidate the point. More cautious, Ariel Goldstein, from the University of Buenos Aires, saw something similar: "the conservative-liberal press provided legitimacy to the advance of the conservative impeachment of Dilma Rousseff from presidency in August, 2016" (Goldstein, 2016, translation by the authors).

The first of the most incisive *O Globo* editorials was published on March 19th, 2016. Its title alone was enough to convey the message: "The impeachment is an institutional way out of the crisis." It read that "with the ongoing process of impeachment, a relief valve was opened" for the economic and political crisis and

that "Congress and Justice (...) are the only ways for the nation to overcome the crisis without institutional shocks." i.e., in the newspaper's opinion, the technical grounds for impeachment were not that relevant; the crucial thing was to overcome the crisis, and the impeachment was the path to that. On the same note, on May 12th, the editorial "New milestone for the defense of social responsibility" argued that "filling the case against Dilma means a consolidation of the civilizing principle of fiscal responsibility". Later in March, the newspaper began to hint on its concern over the narrative that impeachment would be a coup. In "The farce of the 'coup' made up by *lulopetismo*", the editorial of March 30th, 2016, sought to demonstrate how "the process of impeachment against Dilma, in its turn, is being dealt with by our institutions with no missteps", differently from what had occurred in the 1964 coup. On April 18th, the day after the Chamber of Deputies approved of the admissibility of the impeachment process, the newspaper reaffirmed the idea already defended on March 19th that "the economic crisis and the political knot could be solved before 2018, after the departure of the Workers' Party (*PT*) from the *Planalto* Palace, where it has been for 13 years, the longest period of a political group in power, via direct election, in our Republic." By stating in this editorial that "there is no reasonable justification for the Senate not to initiate the trial of the president with maximum urgency," the newspaper gave a new hint: its pressure would now be in the Senate. At the same time, it was necessary to ensure that the impeachment would not be mistaken for a coup. In an editorial dated May 15th, 2016, entitled "Impeachment shows that Brazil is not Venezuela", *O Globo* tried to legitimize the impeachment procedures, comparing the Brazilian institutions to the Venezuelan ones. According to the newspaper, a campaign was under way "to spread the delirious version that the impeachment process of the now-suspended president Dilma Rousseff is a 'coup.'" In fact, a significant part of the international media expressed doubts regarding the impeachment perpetrated in Brazil. What *O Globo* argued was that this version of the coup should not be spread, since "the republican institutions - more stable than in 1992, when there was the first impeachment of a president, Fernando Collor - are working well, and the typical checks and balances of a representative democracy are working satisfactorily". Under the title "Accelerating the impeachment would not hurt the right to defense," the August 4th editorial once again proclaimed the urgency of the impeachment: "It does not matter whether or not accusations will emerge against Temer. Dilma's impeachment process cannot be blocked in the name of that. The best for the country is to rush the impeachment verdict." And on the final stretch, on August 25th, the newspaper was already taking the outcome for granted: the impeachment "today enters its final stage, with *lulopetismo* and the president's lawyer, José

Eduardo Cardozo, unconvincingly rebutting the accusation that she has committed crimes of responsibility in the tax field."

Folha de S. Paulo exhibited a more complex stance. Between 2015 and 2016, the newspaper varied its repertoire of opinions about the impeachment. The editorial "No Steps Behind", dated April 19th, 2015, celebrated the fact that the Federal Court of Audit(TCU), had concluded "that the federal government has failed to comply with the Fiscal Responsibility Law (*LRF*) by adopting maneuvers aiming to artificially improve the results of public accounts in 2013 and 2014". According to the newspaper, the *TCU* could "recommend to Congress the rejection of the Rousseff administration accounts, which would be unheard of and would, in theory, allow for the opening of the impeachment process against the president." Interestingly, in an editorial on August 25th, 2015, entitled "No Bananas", *Folha* opted to act more soberly. In condemning the political action of opposing parties in favor of deposing Dilma, Folha stated that the impeachment, "being a mechanism that is always traumatic, cannot - contrary to what part of the opposition wants to make believe - be employed without deep reasons that would require it." For the newspaper, "a deposition based on banal reasons would bring internal instability and would tarnish the image of the country in the eyes of the international community." But this parsimony was set aside in the editorial "Last Chance" from September 13th, 2015. According to *Folha*, if the president did not correct the economic policy direction, society would force her "to abandon her presidential responsibilities and, eventually, the office she occupies". In 2016, *Folha* found a new narrative to boost. While agreeing with the need to interrupt Dilma Rousseff's administration, it disagreed that her ousting should be via impeachment. On April 2nd, 2016, the editorial "Neither Dilma, Nor Temer" proposed the solution: "Dilma Rousseff must resign immediately to save the country from the trauma of impeachment." According to *Folha*, "her resignation would impart, as a gesture of detachment and realism, the mandatary's conscience that conditions other than her will are preventing her from fulfilling her mission." Michel Temer should follow the same path and resign alongside Dilma. On April 17th, 2016, the voting day in the Chamber of Deputies, the newspaper once again made this position clear in the editorial "The Decision of the Chamber": "Instead of such an extreme instrument, it would have been better to hold presidential elections already this year. Under the terms of the Constitution, [elections] would be convened in the event of the president's and her vice-president's resignation - a joint attitude defended by this outlet." Unlike *O Globo*, for whom the impeachment would be the solution to the country's economic and political crisis, for *Folha de S. Paulo* the process would not be as simple as that: "If the president's deposition is confirmed, however, it will not

immediately represent a solution for the political, economic and moral crisis in which the country is mired", *Folha* stated in its editorial. According to the São Paulo newspaper, "the impeachment process is a traumatic measure, projecting into the future divisions and nonconformities that do not contribute at all to the - possibly long-lasting - journey through this difficult economic moment."

However, it was probably *Estado de S. Paulo* that used the heaviest artillery against Dilma. The first major editorial came shortly after Eduardo Cunha accepted the accusation in the Chamber of Deputies. In "The real reasons for impeachment," published on December 6th, 2015, *Estadão* made an emphatic defense of the impeachment petition signed by lawyers Hélio Bicudo, Miguel Reale Júnior and Janaina Paschoal, and concluded that "Dilma must be tried for the fiscal irresponsibility of her government, perfectly exposed in the petition admitted by Cunha." The same tone was kept on the following week. Entitled "Irresponsibility as a method," the December 13th editorial began its first sentence by indicating which would be the newspaper's stance from that moment on: "Worker's Party's Dilma Rousseff can no longer remain in the Presidency of the Republic for the simple reason that she has adopted irresponsibility as a government method." On April 7th, 2016, it was *Estadão*'s turn to dialogue with *Folha de S. Paulo*. In order to counterbalance the famous editorial in which *Folha* preached against the impeachment - but in favor of Dilma's and Temer's resignation - *Estadão* published an opinion article entitled "Impeachment is the best way." But the counterpoint was not only directed to its competitor on newspaper stands. The editorial also presented criticism against the novel proposal of anticipating presidential elections, by means of constitutional amendments, that some politicians were calling for as an alternative. "Common sense thus recommends the process of impeachment as the best way," argued *Estadão*, because "the remedy for this crisis does not have to be invented: it is in the Constitution and it is called impeachment." In a certain way, the newspaper began to hint that it would support Michel Temer, differently from *Folha* and *O Globo*. In fact, that was the alliance that would consolidate itself, as we will see in the next section. On May 11th, the day the Senate agreed to initiate the process sent by the Chamber of Deputies, the editorial "After the disaster, oblivion" presented one of the heaviest criticisms, with a personal attack against the figure of the president. For *Estadão*, "Dilma Rousseff ended up losing whatever remained of her dignity before losing her mandate as president of the Republic" and she should "get ready for the destiny that Brazil has generously reserved for her: oblivion." The next day, May 12th, in the text "Return to Irrelevance," the newspaper suggested that "Dilma's impeachment became imperative," because "it was about putting an end to a trajectory that ruined Brazil and Brazilians and threatened

democracy." On May 31st, another scathing editorial under the title "Why Dilma cannot return." It read that Dilma's return "to office would be a cataclysm, because the administration would be handed back to [the one] who divorced [herself] completely from reality." Under the title "One step to impeachment", published on August 9th, the newspaper argued that impeachment "is the only way to put an end to the irresponsible populism that plunged the country into crisis, by scheduling and carrying out expenditures greater than budget availability". The approval in Senate of her deposition on August 31st, 2016, was not enough to satisfy *Estadão*. In "The Aftermath of Impeachment," published the following day, the newspaper declared its abhorrence against the fact that the president of the Federal Supreme Court, Ricardo Lewandowski, allowed for Dilma to maintain her political rights, and the Senate approved of that despite the impeachment. "This immorality opens a precedent for a cascade of scandals," warned the indignant text. On the same day, September 1st, 2016, the newspaper published yet another editorial, "Can we look ahead?", where it claimed that the process finished the previous day, "more than putting an end to a dark period of the political history of the nation, should mark the beginning of a time of hope for the definition and construction of the path that could lead Brazil to the political pacification necessary to the building of its future."

The leading newspaper of the southern region, *Zero Hora*, controlled by the RBS group, also presented its official stance on the impeachment, but in a much more timid manner than the other outlets. At first, the editorial "Impeachment, a mistaken thesis" from April 23rd, 2015 - thus prior to the process admitted by Eduardo Cunha - indicated that Zero Hora would be opposed to Dilma's deposition. "In the current Brazilian political crisis, the most sensible thing is to reject both options: impeachment, at the moment, no; and a coup, never", the newspaper stated. But this stance seems to have changed over the course of 2016. On March 15th, 2016, the editorial "One more step to impeachment" presented the idea that the streets were clamoring for impeachment. "The crowds who wore green and yellow to protest on this second Sunday in March unequivocally manifested against President Dilma Rousseff's permanence as head of state, against the hegemony of the Worker's Party and of its allies in national politics," the newspaper declared. According to *Zero Hora*'s own words, it was "an explicit and loud endorsement, from part of the Brazilian population, to the process of impeachment." On April 13th, 2016, the editorial "Democracy is not under threat" argued in favor of the procedural legitimacy of the impeachment. According to the southern newspaper, "the government's supporters try to confuse public opinion when they say that democracy is under threat by the impeachment process of president Dilma Rousseff". Just like *Estadão*, *Zero Hora* also considered, in the editorial "Legal

Insecurity" from September 2nd, 2016, that the decision to allow for the maintenance of Dilma's political rights was wrong: "The senseless political agreement that ended up in separate voting for former President Dilma Rousseff's loss of mandate and her incapacitation to hold a public office can only be seen with unrest, as it is a direct blow to the Constitution," the newspaper stated.

The most important news outlet in Brasilia, *Correio Braziliense*, belonging to *Diários Associados*, also did not shy away from taking a stance. "Transition without trauma" was the title chosen for the editorial of April 29th, 2016, where it strived to legitimize the impeachment procedures: "the Constitution has been respected. It is not being ripped off as the supporters of the President of the Republic have been insistently clamoring about", the newspaper declared, as its southern competitor had done two weeks before. Also administered by *Diários Associados*, *Estado de Minas* was much more straightforward in its public stance. In the editorial of May 11th, 2016, we find, for instance, under the title "Populism Never Again", a celebration of the expected result of the voting that would take place that day. With Dilma's impeachment, "Brazil is preparing to write a new page in history and to put an end to a cycle that shall not be missed, burying nightmares like gender politics in public schools," the newspaper stated. In a certain way, the editorial also indirectly put pressure on the deputies from Minas Gerais to vote according to its interest: "The legitimate representatives of the Brazilian people in the highest legislative house will interrupt an inept government that was established in Brazil by the Worker's Party (*PT*)", Estado de Minas foretold.

To sum it up, it observed that the country's major printed newspapers, in varying degrees, expressed their pleasure with Dilma's departure from office. The 28 selected editorials of the period between 2015 and 2016 are an evidence to how some outlets openly defended the impeachment, as was the case with *O Globo*, *Estado de Minas* and *Estadão*, while *Folha de S. Paulo* chose to call for Dilma's and Temer's resignation. *Correio Braziliense* and *Zero Hora*, although not openly advocating for the impeachment, used their editorials to legitimize its procedural validity. In a context in which a considerable portion of society perceived the impeachment as a "coup", the legitimizing of its procedural validity can be perceived by that said portion as advocating in favor of its materialization.

The investigation process against Michel Temer

Very little or nearly nothing has been published so far regarding the media stance about the investigation on Michel Temer, that was processed in August, 2017. With the approval of Dilma Rousseff's impeachment in the Senate in August

31st, 2016, Michel Temer became the country's president de facto. Although his positive image in society was minimal - about 3% of approval according to opinion polls[1], the new president managed to articulate the governability required by coalitional presidentialism with a solid base in Congress[2]. This parliamentary support was enough to, at first, reject the requests for impeachment that came to Congress. However, the news about the rather non-republican taped conversation between Temer and the CEO of JBS company, Joesley Batista, on the night of May 17th, 2017, altered that scenario. The tapes imparted the idea that Temer had advised Joesley to keep the illegal payments that would guarantee silence from former president of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha, then in prison[3]. Thus, in June 2017, the Attorney General, Rodrigo Janot, filed a complaint of passive corruption against Temer in the Federal Supreme Court. But, for that complaint to be investigated by the Supreme Court, a prior authorization from the Chamber of Deputies was needed. It did not happen. On August 2nd, 2017, Temer's broad support base decided, in the Chamber's plenary, to close the case that could have led to impeachment.

In that short period of two months, between the leaked recordings and the voting in the Chamber, the mainstream media took a stance regarding Temer's ousting from office. But unlike the events involving Dilma, there was no unanimity in the country's major newsrooms when it came to Temer's deposition. On the one hand, *Folha de S. Paulo* and *O Globo* openly supported Temer's ousting in their editorials; on the other, *Estadão* stood in defense of the president.

The first outlet to call for the deposition of Temer was *O Globo*. Oddly enough, the newspaper published the editorial "The President's Resignation" on the afternoon of May 19th, 2017. Just as *Folha* had done with Dilma the year before, *O Globo* now understood that the best course of action was not impeachment, but rather the president's resignation. In *O Globo*'s opinion, Temer's fall was inevitable, if not via resignation, it would be via impeachment. If he did not resign, Temer would drag Brazil "into an even deeper political crisis that, make no mistake, will nevertheless arrive at the same outcome, either by impeachment or by a complaint admitted by the Federal Supreme Court." The Rio de Janeiro newspaper sought to send a warning to those who thought necessary to keep Temer in office until the

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[1] According to the polling institute IBOPE, who interviewed two thousand people between September 15th and 20th, 2017, Temer's administration had only 3% of approval rates. It is the worst rating in the historical research that began in 1986. Retrieved from: https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/governo-temer-e-aprovado-por-3-e-reprovado-por-77-diz-ibope.ghtml

[2] "Coalitional presidentialism" was a term coined by Sergio Abranches (1988) to describe the political system that presents, among its characteristics, presidentialism, multi-partisanship and proportional voting. Since no single party alone can acquire the necessary majority to govern, a wide coalition base is necessary to support the government.

[3] Right after Dilma's impeachment, deputy Eduardo Cunha, from Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), had his mandate revoked and was arrested by Operation Carwash.

very end in order to secure pension and labor reforms. In the newspaper's opinion, it was the opposite; Temer's presence would disrupt the approval of such reforms:

> This newspaper has supported president Michel Temer's reform project from start. (…) Such reforms are essential to lead the country towards political stability, social peace and the normal functioning of our institutions. (…) No citizen that is aware of the obligations of citizenship should fail to acknowledge that the president has lost the moral, ethical, political and administrative conditions to govern Brazil. There are some who think that the end of this government will provoke, once again, a delay of the long-awaited stability, the longed-for economic growth, the dream of social peace. But it is exactly the opposite. (…) Besides contributing to the perpetuation of such practices that have been the misfortune of our country, [his permanence] will not hasten the reform project that Brazil desperately needs. (…) Only a government with moral and ethical conditions can push it forward. The sooner a new government is installed, according to what the Constitution determines, the better (O Globo, May 19th, 2017).

On the voting day in the Chamber, August 2nd, *O Globo* published a new opinion requesting the acceptance of the lawsuit against Temer. Entitled "The approval of lawsuit against Temer is the best alternative," the editorial stated that "the nation needs answers to its numerous doubts regarding the actions of President Michel Temer in the meanders of such subterranean hidden political finances. Also due to this, he must be prosecuted." Once again worried about the progress of reforms in pension and labor legislation, *O Globo* concluded that "a weak president, under suspicion, will not be able to lead them forward."

Folha de S. Paulo followed the same course taken by *O Globo*. On June 4th, 2017, it published the editorial "Without Temer", where it agreed with *O Globo*'s thesis that the president's ability to push for reforms had become fragile: "Temer's administration has been pushing forward a bold list of structural reforms that are pointing to the right way. His ability to move forward with this program seems seriously hampered," the paper said. However, the simplest way to change governments would not be resignation, but the revoking of the Dilma-Temer mandate by the Superior Electoral Court. In its words, "it is with dismay that Folha, therefore, considers commendable to revoke the mandate and [Temer's] removal from office."

However, as mentioned, the fall of Temer was not an unanimity among mainstream media outlets. *Estadão* disagreed with its main competitors by defending the maintenance of Temer's administration. There is an interesting and incidental order in the publication of *Estadão*'s editorials. On May 16th, 2017, a day before the leaking tapes, the newspaper published the editorial "The Legacy of Temer", where it made an emphatic defense of the new government. But the

argument used for this defense could be considered uncommon, unusual to say the least. According to the newspaper, Temer's main quality would be his high rejection rate, as it would allow him to conduct reforms without aiming at reelection. In other words, the best quality of the Temer government would be its unpopularity. According to this editorial,

> "In face of the circumstances of his rise to the Planalto Palace, of the bleak times that are taking over the Country and the unpopular essential measures that must be adopted by the government to correct the national trajectory - such as the adoption of a limit to public spending, apart from the reforms already mentioned - the rejection rates of President Michel Temer are no surprise. However, this is precisely a factor that allows him to carry out such projects with no risk of resorting to the populism of those who govern with their sights on the next election (Estado de S. Paulo, May 16th, 2017).

What the newspaper might not have known is that such disapproval rates would increase even more, right on the following day. In its first editorial after the tapes were leaked, entitled "Time for Responsibility" and published on May 19th, the newspaper tried to disqualify the leak. According to *Estadão*, the leak revealed the existence of a plot to prevent Temer from carrying out pension reforms.

> The leak to the press of part of Joesley Batista's statement was not an accident. Certainly, in the institutions that have access to this kind of document, there are those who are interested, for whichever reasons - in generating turbulence in the government precisely when President Michel Temer seemed to have gathered enough votes for the difficult approval of the pension reform. (EEstado de S. Paulo, May 19th, 2017).

If, on May 19th, the leak was condemned, on June 1st, 2017, the legal instrument of plea bargaining by turning state's evidence became a target of the newspaper. According to the editorial "Is this justice?" published that day, "turning state's evidence have become eminently political instruments." Estadão's stance was that plea bargains were being used to convict politicians with no evidence, and that was unjustly happening to Temer. "Although no evidence seems to corroborate the allegations, the damage will already be done," the paper concluded. Such thesis only began to be proclaimed by *Estadão* when the target of such statements was Temer[4].

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[4] Data from the Social Communications Secretariat for the Federal Government, SECOM, collected by journalist Miguel do Rosário, demonstrate that, between 2015 and 2017, *Estadão* had an increase of 677% in annual payments from the federal government for publicity services. Retrieved from: https://www.ocafezinho.com/2017/11/17/temer-aumentou-verbas-para-o-facebook-em-mais-de-50/

The RBS group, who controlled Zero Hora, once again decided to remain close to neutral. The editorial published on August 2nd, 2017, entitled "A Necessary Definition", argues that "parliament members must decide immediately on the complaint against the President of the Republic, presented by the Attorney General's Office," because "this permanent state of suspense delays investments, undermines decision-making and, consequently, the recovery of employment rates." The text tries to convey the idea that the southern group was not worried with the final result of the voting that would take place that day, but rather with the rush to settle the process sooner than later, either in favor or against Temer.

The seven editorials selected from that period, between May and August 2017, demonstrate how the media role in the dynamics of the political crisis that involved the Temer administration was different from the one faced by Dilma during the previous year. There was neither unity nor unanimity when it came to Temer's deposition. While *O Globo* defended his resignation and *Folha* defended the revoking of his mandate by the Electoral Supreme Court, *Estadão* openly advocated in favor of Temer. The other outlets did not take a clear stance.

Finals considerations

The present article tested the hypothesis that the media [act] as an "analytically autonomous and occasionally decisive factor" (Lattman-Weltman et al., 1994, p.2) in the current waves of government destabilization in Brazil. In order to prove this hypothesis, it was adopted as method the analysis of editorials of the main printed outlets in the period that goes from 2015 to 2017. It is our assumption here that the most straightforward opinion of a media company is the one presented in its editorials (Melo, 1994, 2003; Zanotti, 2017). Thus, thirty-four editorials were chosen, from newspapers such as *O Globo, Estado de S. Paulo, Folha de S. Paulo, Estado de Minas, Correio Braziliense and Zero Hora*. Out of these, twenty-seven dealt with the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff between 2015 and 2016, and the other seven had the lawsuit against Michel Temer, that was voted in August 2017, as their theme. As expected, a strong bias in favor of Dilma Rousseff's impeachment was found virtually in all these outlets - though, it does matter to say, in different degrees. Regarding the ousting of Michel Temer, results were not the same. While *O Globo* defended his resignation and *Folha* defended the revoking of his mandate by the Electoral Supreme Court, *Estadão* openly argued in Temer's favor. *Zero Hora, Estado de Minas* and *Correio Braziliense* did not take a clear stance.

It is not my intention to defend the thesis that editorials are enough to understand the political positioning of the press. The specialized literature is well aware that press opinion is present in the way headlines are written or photos are chosen for newspaper covers. A further study on such journalistic topics and contents would contribute to this kind of study on the political positioning of the press. In fact, research has already been successfully carried out in this direction, such as the one by LEMEP (Laboratory for Media Studies and Public Sphere), of the IESP-UERJ institute. (Feres Jr. & Sassara, 2016a, 2016b). Nor is the goal here to defend the thesis that the media positioning is the only determinant variable for the stability of a government. As we know, reality is the synthesis of multiple factors. What we can affirm with some degree of certainty is that the protagonism of the press in political life cannot be ignored. In a monopoly or oligopoly context, a favorable position of the media is one of the decisive variables for the success of a government, along with the maintenance of a solid parliamentary support, the absence of popular dissatisfaction, positive economic indexes, and so on.

Is that an unavoidable feature of the Brazilian political system? It happened to Getúlio, Jango, Collor and Dilma. Whenever a certain unity of criticism among the media was mirrored by social, political or economic disturbances, the rulers on duty were ousted even before new elections could be held. Well, not always. One exception that still needs to be further analyzed is, perhaps, Lula's government; criticized as much as the others, not only did it survive but also it managed to elect a successor. A keen interpreter of political conjunctures, Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos warns: "it is not possible to democratically govern a society with a press that is gagged by oligarchical interests like it is in the Brazilian case" (Santos, 2015, p. 185). According to Santos, the solution involves imposing in Brazil "a discussion to enable media democratization" (Santos, 2015, p. 184). A similar proposal is presented by Szwako and Santos (2016, p. 120) when they state that "democratizing the media" is among the "challenges to rebuild our democracy" after the 2016 impeachment. A difficult debate, since, as Miguel recalls (2017, p. 116), "against the democratization of the media, corporations will brandish the values of freedom of expression."

It is not condemnable that media outlets have political stances. In a democratic society, or rather, polyarchical, the press should enjoy the widest freedom of expression as an institutional guarantee (Dahl, 2012, p. 27). The problem is when, in a given society, only a few outlets that hold the same opinion can freely express themselves. The asymmetry of voices and narratives becomes evident. In this scenario, therefore, there is neither cultural diversity nor plurality of information, but rather a communication oligopoly. As we have seen, a relevant

part of the literature defends the thesis that such a context of lack of plurality is typical of Brazil. As long as this structure prevails, there will always be a threat against the stability of governments who dare to challenge this oligopoly's agendas. Altering this scenario through public policies is an imperative task for our democratization.

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New Steps of the Coup: the framing of the Pension Reform on Jornal Nacional

LUIZ ADEMIR DE OLIVEIRA
Master and PhD in Political Science from IUPERJ, professor and researcher at the Graduate Program in Communication (PPGCOM) at UFJF and Social Communication – Journalism at UFSJ, São João Del Rei, Minas Gerais, Brazil. E-mail: luizoli@ufsj.edu.br. ORCID: 0000-0003-3959-980X.

CARLA MONTUORI FERNANDES
PhD in Social Science from Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP), São Paulo, São Paulo, Brasil. Professor at the Graduate Program in Communication (PPGCOM) at Paulista University (UNIP). Researcher at the Art, Media and Policy Studies Center (NEAMP-PUC/SP). Brazil. E-mail: carla_montuori@ig.com.br. ORCID: 0000-0002-7625-8070.

GENIRA CORREIA CHAGAS
PhD in Social Science, with emphasis in Political Communication from Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP). Researcher at the Art, Media and Policy Studies Center (NEAMP-PUC/SP), São Paulo, São Paulo, Brasil. E-mail: genirachagas@uol.com.br. ORCID: 0000-0001-7014-338X

Abstract

The objective of this article is to analyze the framing made on *Jornal Nacional (JN)*, of *Rede Globo* Television, of the pension reform presented by President Michel Temer (*MDB*). The hypothesis of this study is that *JN* provided a favorable framework for the Reform, with reports that highlighted the need for the measure approval. However, due to the difficulty inherent to proposing a bill to Congress, the narratives of the news program have proven to be contradictory by exposing the loss of political support and the conflicts between the government and part of the allied base. The analysis looks at 20 reports, from December 1st, 2017, to January 26th, 2018, with the highest concentration of news between December 4th and 16th, when Temer intended to submit the Reform to a plenary vote.

Keywords

Communication; News Report; Pension Reform; Framing.

Introduction

Michel Temer (Brazilian Democratic Movement - *MDB*) became President on August 31st, 2016, following Dilma Rousseff's impeachment (Workers' Party -*PT*), in a lawsuit that was considered by analysts and political scientists as a coup to break the institutional logic (Souza, 2016; Santos, 2017). In addition, *MDB* was accused of betraying the previously signed alliance with Dilma and PT in the 2014 presidential elections. Nevertheless, the closing cycle of the 12 years of the Lula era showed signs of weakening. Singer and Loureiro (2016) identify that the waves of mass protests that began in June 2013, the tight re-election that secured Dilma's victory in 2014, and the disintegration of the government coalition in the National Congress, in addition to the adoption of tax adjustment policy that protected the economic elites in 2015, together represented signs of the weakness of the *PT* government.

Even before the impeachment took effect, Vice President Temer released a document entitled *Ponte para o Futuro* (Bridge to the Future) on October 29th, 2015, whose main proposal was to promote a tax balance through adjustments and cuts in public spending. Mancebo (2017, p.880) points out that *Ponte para o Futuro* is a program that intends to insert the country into an ultraconservative neoliberal policy by deepening the role of the lean and supposedly efficient minimal state; increasing the participation of the private sector; loosening the labour market regulation; and expanding international competition by leaving the door wide open to the sale of national assets.

Among the prerogatives of the *Ponte para o Futuro*, the principles of Labor and Social Security Reforms are worth highlighting due to the fact that they were presented by Temer as a way out of the economic and fiscal crises. Such reforms had the hegemonic press as their main guarantor. Therefore, within this scenario, we intend to analyze the framework of the Pension Reform in the *National Journal (JN)*, a news program.

The article brings the hypothesis that *Rede Globo* aired reports in *JN* seeking a positive framework to the adoption of the reform, treating it as a prerogative for the fiscal adjustments needed by the country. However, due to some variables, such as the loss of political support, the difficulty of submitting a controversial theme to a vote within a few days of parliamentary recess and the government conflicts with its own allies, such contradictions came to surface. Even though it sought to build a narrative entirely in favor of the Reform, *JN* showed that there were disputes and obstacles to the government strategy.

As theoretical bases, two theoretical axes were established: (a) the media as a political actor (Albuquerque, 2012; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Lima, 2006; Azevedo, 2006); and (b) the debate on public opinion (Bourdieu, 1983; Habermas, 1984; Lippmann, 2010). To test the hypothesis, 20 reports were selected on the pension reform broadcast by the television news in December 2017 and in January 2018. Framing theory was applied as the analysis methodology and therefore allowed us to list four interpretative axes: (a) Crucial Reform; (b) approval of the reform strategies; (c) loss of political support and reform at risk; and (d) News Network and the framing of the facts.

The Media as Political Actor and the Public Opinion

Discussing the role of the press as a social and political actor in Brazil necessarily refers to the debate about media systems linked to political systems. Here, the media was deployed and remains attached to economic and political groups, as is the case of *Rede Globo* and other conglomerates. Lima (2006, p. 97) points to concentration and cross-ownership as fundamental characteristics of the Brazilian media, in which a group detains control in the various media (radio, TV, print, portals etc.).

According to Lima (2006), family hegemonies are a feature of communication in Brazil since business journalism began in the first decades of the 20th century, which was the moment when mass press developed, reaching also radio and later in the 70's, with the emergence and consolidation of TV as a hegemonic media. The author explains the adoption of the Trusteeship system in broadcasting, in which the state has the power of concessions and private initiative is the main performer, coupled with the economic deregulation of the media in general, the history of political pressure and the lobbying by communication companies upon governments, the concentration of media ownership and the promiscuous relations between the communication and political fields in the country.

Lima (2006) explains that in the 1990's and 2000's, the deepening of yet another feature of the Brazilian media system has occurred: internationalization, with the law of Cable TV (1995), and the emergence and consolidation of internet. Digital technologies strengthen blogs, alternative sites and social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, among others, that did not break the hegemony of the big groups, but open prospects for new mass media agents. As Albuquerque and Magalhães (2014) point out, the ideological framework of national politics is increasingly strained by phenomena such as the Expanded Progressive Blogosphere

(BPA), sites of criticism to the press, like the online media observatories or even by the entrance, via the internet, of journalistic coverage made by international press vehicles.

Therefore, it is relevant to discuss the relationship between political and media systems, which has been analyzed by several scholars. Hallin and Mancini (2004), cited by Chaves (2017), differentiate three ideal models and seek to apply them in Western countries systems: (1) Polarized Pluralist; (2) Democratic corporatist; and (3) Liberal. The Polarized Pluralist model (European Romance language-speaking countries, such as Italy, France, Spain and Portugal) is typical of countries with an authoritarian past and a recent democratization. They are marked by strong state intervention in the economy and low legal/rational regulation of the communication industry. They have low newspaper circulation and strong electronic media.

With respect to the Democratic Corporatist model (Nordic countries, Germany and Switzerland), it is characterized by great circulation of newspapers, high degree of professionalism of the journalistic class and high political parallelism, since press is traditionally linked to social movements and politicians, and seen by the citizens as an institution for the functioning of democracy.

Finally, in the Liberal model (present in countries like USA, UK and Canada), the communications sector is organized under the market logic. Thus, the field of communication is markedly independent from the state and the political field. These are historically liberal-democratic states with little intervening tradition.

As Albuquerque (2012) points out, one must be cautious not to apply models without taking into account the specificities, for example, of the Brazilian case, which differs from the countries Hallin and Mancini (2004) took as a parameter. However, even with such remarks, Azevedo (2006, p. 92) argues that Brazil can be framed in the Polarized-Pluralist model for having

> (…) an authoritarian past (which of course implied the absence of press freedom for long periods), a relatively recent democratization, a partisan collision dynamics in presidential contests polarized between leftist forces (1989, 1994 and 1998) or center-left and center-right (from 1989 to 2002) , thus setting a clear polarized pluralism, although in recent years sparingly.

Albuquerque (2012) argues that, although Brazil always possessed a high degree of political parallelism and a close link between the fields of media and politics, since the consolidation of journalism in the business model, news vehicles of the country have sought to incorporate the discourse of journalistic objectivity. It reveals an adherence to the American model by the newspaper companies even if, at times, Brazilian press gives up such principles and takes clearly biased positions,

as in the case of the overturn of President Dilma Rousseff (*PT*) and even in the coverage on the *PT* governments.

As Albuquerque (2012) emphasizes, in some cases, as in Brazilian television journalism, the adoption of the informational model and predominantly under a supposed objectivity over openly interpretive and opinionated content has been precisely a way of camouflaging the historical position of the conglomerates which constantly interfere with the formation of public opinion and political decisions, especially in periods of instability.

Lima (2006) highlighted some relevant episodes of media activity in the political context, as the preference of *Globo* organizations for candidate Fernando Collor de Mello (National Reconstruction Party- *PRN*), manifested in the replay of the last debate between then candidates Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (*PT*) and Collor in the second round of the presidential elections of 1989 and in the support of the election and re-election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazilian Social Democracy Party-*PSDB*) in 1994 and 1998.The presidential election of 2002 marked an important political change in Brazil. According to Albuquerque and Magalhães (2014), since 2003, with the victory of a center-left party, a change has taken place in the vicinity until then existing between mainstream media and the federal government.

Notwithstanding, during Dilma's impeachment, the role of the major media creating the conditions and the opinion climate necessary for the execution of the process became visible. During the period, the hegemonic prevalence of traditional media companies appeared, which can position themselves as interested and decisive agents in political events of national interest, especially in times of crisis.

Concerning Temer's government, one can recognize adhesion in a few moments and a critical positioning in others, even so because of the President's low popularity. According to a *Ibope* research, released on April 5th, 2018, the President is rated as bad or awful by 72% of respondents and as good or great by only 6%.[1]

The role of the media as a political actor also relates to the debate about its performance in the public space and in the formation of public opinion. Even though the discussion on public opinion, dates back to the classics and to liberals like Locke and Tocqueville, it became known in the field of Communication since the pioneering book of Walter Lippmann was released in 1922. Lippmann's argument on public opinion is that it is formed based on individuals' reactions to a world perceived or drawn in their minds. Such image of the world, formulated from cognitive shortcuts, is considered by the author as a pseudo-environment. Based on

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[1] Retrieved July, 2nd, 2018 from: <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2018-04/pesquisa-cniibope-aponta-que-popularidade-de-temer-mantem-se-estavel>.

the interference of the mass media, which were beginning to show signs of their manipulation power, the author casts a critical eye. Lippmann (2010) questions the legitimacy of public opinion within mass society, since individuals, in his opinion, would not be having a right access to reality. The author argues that, due to the complexity of the world, it would become increasingly difficult to learn it on one's own, independently. To form opinions, it would be necessary to trigger the information conveyed by the media. But this would be an access to the world mediated by the filters imposed by the media. Among these filters there would be components that were clouding the vision of reality, as stereotypes or personal perceptions over collective interests.

Bourdieu (1983), on the other hand, in the article *Public Opinion Does Not Exist*, questions the idea of public opinion from the analysis of a number of surveys done by specialized institutes, which classify opinions expressed by the interviewees in many contexts as truths. The author states that there were many methodological distortions in the collection and analysis of the gathered data. He uses three postulates as a starting point for his criticism. The first implicit assumption is that any poll assumes that everyone can have an opinion or that the production of an opinion is within everyone's reach. The second postulate is that there is a premise that all opinions have value. And the third postulate is that, by asking the same question to everyone, there is an implicit assumption that there is a consensus on the issues or an agreement on the issues that deserve to be discussed.

It is crucial to bring Habermasian contribution to this debate. In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas (1984) speaks on a decadent public sphere and points to a pre-fabricated public opinion in order to meet market interests.

> Therefore, in general, the criticism made to a process of emptying in policy and political debate is correct; to the inconsistency of what has been called the public opinion; to quantitative and qualitative methods of data gathering of this opinion; to the bureaucratization and increasing commodification of public space; to manipulation; and the role that media and marketing exercise in this sense (Almeida, 2007, p. 1).

Habermas, however, in his current works, after the 1980's shift with the theory of communicative action, begins to discuss the existence of a multiplicity of public spheres, in which subjects are constantly restructuring their relations, as opposed to an only totalizing public sphere. In the perspective of Oliveira and Fernandes (2018), there is a degree of complexity in society that prevents one from seeing it in its entirety. The end of the ideal of the single and singular public sphere

makes it possible to observe the existence of overlapping and connected arenas, supranational, national, regional and local. In this sense, it is no longer a public realm under the domain of the interests of commercial bourgeoisie and one cannot work with the vision of a prefabricated and manipulated public opinion.

Michel Temer and Pension Reform

Upon taking office after the departure of Dilma Rousseff, government Temer announced a package of neoliberal measures, which included the Labor Reform and the Pension Reform, among other initiatives of fiscal adjustment. In this sense, one of the first actions of President Temer (*MDB*), still acting, was to edit Provisional Measure No. 726, on the same day of his inauguration, May 12th, 2016, transferring the National Social Security Institute (*INSS*) from the Ministry of Labor to the Ministry of Social and Agrarian Development. The Ministry of Finance received the National Superintendency of Supplementary Pension (*Previc*), the National Supplementary Pension Council, the Supplementary Pension Board, the Social Security Resources Board and the Social Security Information and Technology Company (*Dataprev*).

Such measures already announced the intention of the government to dismantle Social Security as a body for social protection. Since then, the president has come to treat it as a source of problems for the federal government as a way of justifying a drastic reform. Another intention envisaged with these measures was to open up the public pension supplementary bodies to the private pension market.

Under the allegation that the Pension Plan accumulates a deficit of approximately R$ 270 billion, representing the main factor of imbalance of the public accounts, on December 5th, 2016,[2] the Executive Branch sent to the Chamber of Deputies the Proposed Constitutional Amendment n° 287 (Brasil, 2016), with indicatives for a pension reform, which, if approved, will make the right to benefits unfeasible for the system's taxpayer. It will mean the extinction of social security, especially for the most sensitive sectors of society. To public servants, the proposal represents the end of full retirement, forcing them to hire supplementary pension services.

With *PEC* 287 (Brasil, 2016), the Special Welfare Policy (*RPPS*) – for public servants -, the General Social Welfare Policy (*RGPS*) and social welfare will undergo a set of restrictions. The most relevant of them are: (a) the value of public

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[2] Retrieved January, 20th, 2018 from:
<http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra;jsessionid=097FD1E7A385683028C2
0F38239BE71E.proposicoesWebExterno2?codteor=1514975&filename=PEC+287/2016>.

servants' retirement is limited to the ceiling of the *RGPS* benefit, and it is incumbent upon each entity to implement a supplementary pension scheme for benefits above this amount; (b) to receive the pension benefit in the amount of the ceiling, both servants and the *RGPS* insured will have to contribute for 49 years; (c) Restriction rules are created for families of retirees and pensioners, with a prohibition on the accumulation of benefits in the event of the death of one of the insured spouses, as well as on the number of dependents; (d) the Continuous Benefit may be a sum lower than the minimum wage; (e) the minimum age for retirement was set by the government at 65 years for men and women without distinction; and (f) rural workers will have to contribute as a percentage of the minimum wage in the same way as urban workers.

In order to clarify Social Security accounting, Senator Paulo Paim, of the *PT / RS*, proposed a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (*CPI*), which included Senator Romero Jucá, Senate Government Leader and *MDB* National President. After hearing representatives of civil society and the various spheres of government in 31 sessions, the CPI concluded that there is no deficit in the Social Security. What does happen is, among other factors, poor management of resources, lack of supervision, non-collection of debts from taxpayers and diversion of Social Security resources to other areas of government through the Federal Income Unbundling (*DRU*) mechanism.

Background: an analysis methodology

The first systematization of the concept of framing, called framing analysis, was carried out by Erving Goffman in his work *Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of experience*[3]*, published in 1974*. The framing idea (frames) derived from Goffman's concern to understand how each particular subject classified and organized a given social situation and attributed meaning to the reality around him or her. For the author, "frameworks are understood as more general interpretive frameworks, socially constructed, that allow people to give meaning to social events and situations" (Goffman *apud* Porto, 2004, p. 78).

During the period of research, Goffman paid attention to the issue of the audience in order to check how the public received and interpreted the information framed by the media. However, the first application of the concept of framing in the field of communication was published in 1978 by sociologist Gaye Tuchman in *Making News*. The research sought to demonstrate how the framing of information

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[3]The translated version arrived in bookstores in 2012 under the title: *Os quadros da experiência social: uma perspectiva de análise (*The frames of social experience: a perspective of analysis*)*.

can act in the sense of reinforcing political power by helping to construct or define a given reality (Porto, 2004).

Later, after numerous studies have broadened the notions of framing with analyzes of media discourse in the social and political spheres, Campos (2014) points out that there is still some theoretical imprecision in framework studies within political communication. However, he does not think the main cause of inaccuracies lies in the polysemy of concepts. According to the author, it would be in the absence of techniques capable of clarifying and rigorously identifying what each author may call framing. Considering that the construction of mediatic frameworks follows an informal routine, in which each researcher categorizes discourses and rhetoric by similarities and differences, and considering what is recurrent in the coverage of a given theme (Tankard Jr., 2001), it is necessary to resort to more accurate procedures of analysis for a correct application of the methodology.

In this perspective, the notion of interpretative packages (Gamson; Modigliani, 1993) is sought, since the framework presupposes the articulation of certain discourses in a given formal organization. Maia and Vimieiro (2011) define interpretative packages as groups formed by certain symbolic devices whose essence consists on framing. They are defined, in the view of the authors, as a certain standard in a given text, consisting of several elements.

> These elements are not words, but components or devices of previously defined frames. Instead of hardcoding the framework as a whole, we suggest dividing the framework into their isolated elements, which should be easily encoded in a content analysis. After that, an analysis of groups of these components should reveal the frameworks. (Mattes & Kohring, 2008, p.263 *apud* Maia; Vimieiro, 2011, p.261)

For a framing to occur, in the view of Gamson and Modigliani (1993), some devices that form the interpretive package are needed. As a way of identifying the interpretative packages, the authors divided the symbols into framing devices and reasoning devices. The symbols that make up the framing devices consist of metaphors - slogans or buzzwords, representations or visual images. On the other hand, reasoning devices are formed by elements that emphasize the differences by means of causal analysis (roots), consequences (effects) and appeals to principles (moral judgment). This analysis is based on the interpretative packages in order to identify the framework applied by *JN* in the approach to Pension Reform.

Framework for Pension Reform in *JN*

Choosing the *Jornal Nacional* is justified by two aspects: television still enjoys significant importance, being the preferred media by 63% of respondents (Ibope Inteligência, 2016); and the fact that the TV news still occupy strategic places in the television schedules, functioning recurrently as a collective expression of social reality construction. In addition, *JN* is the oldest and most watched television news program, with the highest ratings, adding 30 average points a year, [4] according to a survey published in December 14th, 2017.

The sample covered the month of December 2017, as it was the period in which the negotiations for the approval of the Pension Reform were intensified, until January 26th, 2018, the month before the Reform vote in the Chamber of Deputies, initially scheduled for February 19th.

For the selection of the *corpus*, we used the collection of *JN* editions, published on the *Jornal Nacional's* website[5], whose descriptors point to the Pension Reform both in the report headline and in the content of the materials conveyed during the period. The sample comprised 20 reports on the subject as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Reports conveyed by *JN* on Pension Reform

Date	Report	Report Length	Length of *JN*
12/01/2017	Life Expectancy Increases and Impacts Retirement Calculation	2min24s	41min04s
Week 1	**Total**	**2min24s**	**41min04s**
12/04/2017	Government speeds pace of meetings with allies to vote Welfare	3min03s	42min14s
12/04/2017	Current Welfare contributes to inequality, says World Bank	6min20s	42min14s
12/05/2017	Government does the math and thinks Welfare can be voted in 2017	3min18s	46min50s
12/06/2017	*PMDB* and *PTB* will force members to vote for Welfare Reform	3min09s	35min00s
12/07/2017	Government intensifies search of votes in the Chamber of Deputies to approve	2min48s	46min05s

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[4] Retrieved January, 18th, 2018 from: <https://www.terra.com.br/diversao/tv/blog-sala-de-tv/bom-de-ibope-jn-se-aproxima-dos-30-pontos-de-media-no-no,b40044f0fe3a0f13adb74a0cc7ca918e2qqn6w6c.html>.

[5] Retrieved August, 28th, 2018 from: <http://g1.globo.com/jornalnacional/>.

	Welfare		
12/09/2017	Temer makes meeting at *Alvorada* to discuss Pension Reform	2min24s	42min01s
Week 2	**Total**	**21min02s**	**3h32min11s**
12/11/2017	Pension reform begins to be discussed in the Chamber on Thursday (14)	2min54s	41min29s
12/12/2017	Temer admits that Welfare vote may be postponed until February	2min47s	45min08s
12/14/2017	Date of vote on Welfare is a contradiction between Jucá and Temer	4min15s	35min10s
12/14/2017	Maia postpones vote on Pension Reform to February in the Chamber of Deputies	4min23s	46min43s
12/15/2017	Temer says vote on Welfare was postponed to avoid embarrassment	3min04s	41min33s
12/16/2017	*PSDB* promises to punish deputies who vote against Pension Reform	2min42s	40min57s
Week 3	**Total**	**20min05s**	**4h11min**
12/18/2017	In the effort for Welfare, *PMDB* says there is no room for betrayal	3min48s	41min16s
Week 4	**Total**	**3min48s**	**41min16s**
12/26/2017	I do not see it as blackmail, says Marun about the Pension Reform - video 42 seconds	42s	41min10s
12/27/2017	NE Governors Respond to Marun's Speech on Funding by *Caixa*	2min45s	42min03s
Week 5	**Total**	**3min27s**	**2h3min13s**
01/12/2018	Country cannot approve structural reforms, says Standard & Poor's	2min56s	42min58s
Week 6	**Total**	**2min56s**	**43min58s**
01/22/2018	Hole in Welfare fund in 2017 was the largest in history: almost R$ 270 billion	2min23s	41min15s
01/25/2018	In 2017, public debt grew R$ 447 billion and reached a record of R$ 3.6 trillion	43s	45min56s
01/26/2018	IR chart has not kept up with inflation for more than two decades	2min49s	40min39s

Week 7	Total	5min55s	2h7min40s
	Total	59min37s	14h0min22s

Source: prepared by the researchers.

As it can be seen in Table 1, there was a government effort, corroborated by the media - in this case *Globo* at *JN* -, to try to construct the idea that the Pension Reform is essential for the country due to the growth of public spending, which would put Brazil's economic situation at risk. In addition, it tried to show that the Reform could be voted on and passed by the Chamber still in 2017. However, the reports reveal that both the government's speech and that of *JN* were insufficient to convince the deputies, since in the week of December 11th to 16th, when it could be put to a vote, it was suspended for not having enough votes. This shows that the government was fragile in approving the Reform and that the alarmist speech of the media did not have effects in the government bench, revealing a more fragile government, besides the infeasibility to vote such a controversial subject at the end of the year, just a few days before the parliamentary recess. In terms of length, it is observed that, despite the biased coverage of the newscast with subjects that pointed to the risks in case of non-approval of the Reform, the time allocated to the subject was relatively small - 59 minutes and 37 seconds in a total of 14 hours and 22 seconds, which means 7% of the total.

Based on the reports of *JN*, it can be noticed that, from the 20 stories that were broadcasted from December 1st 2017 to January 26th 2018, most of them concentrated in December when there was a government effort to try to put the reform vote in the Chamber of Deputies. As it can be seen in Table 1, concerning the distribution of articles per week, the greatest number of reports was in the second and third weeks, during the period from December 4th to 16th December, a total of 12, six to each week, which corresponds to 60% of the total, i.e. 30% each, respectively. If the reporting times are added, this value is even higher - 68.98% of the total time, 35.29% in the second week and 33.69% in the third week. There was an attempt to emphasize the need for the Pension Reform even with a very short deadline due to the parliamentary recess in the first week of December. However, in the second week, facing an unfavorable situation, both the government and *JN* had to change the tone of the narrative by having to admit that the Reform would not go to a vote and would be put off to 2018, due to the lack of political support in the Congress.

Quantitative mapping with the help of MAXQDA qualitative analysis software identified the main interpretive packages of *JN*, which were structured into three main frameworks, as pointed out in Table 2.

Table 2. Frameworks carried by *JN* in the analyzed period

Framework	Description	Total News	Length
Crucial reform	The Reform is essential to reduce the ceiling on public spending, so that the country will grow again, expand the supply of jobs and reduce inflation and interest rates. One of the pillars of fiscal adjustment.	05 (25%)	14min39s (24)
Strategies to Reform approval	This framework refers to the negotiations around the adoption of the Reform, in which the political field becomes a space of dispute between winners and losers, with emphasis in the negotiations signed among parliamentarians. Negotiations based on pork barrel practices are included. Emphasis on strategies and on the scoreboard.	06 (30%)	17min36s (29%)
Loss of political support and Reform at risk	The framing relates to the news articles that disclose the fragility of the government with loss of political support, in addition to the difficulties in taking the Pension Reform to vote in the Congress and guaranteeing its approval. It also shows resistance of political groups concerning the proposal and conflicts between the government and the allied base.	09 (45%)	27min22s (47%)
	Total	100%	100%

Source: prepared by the researchers.

A mapping of the 20 reports was done based on the framework categories listed above. Out of the total twenty, nine fall under the category *Loss of political support and Reform at risk*, which means 45%. As for the length, we have 27 minutes and 22 seconds, which represents 47%. On the other hand, the *Strategies to reform approval* framing had six reports (30%) which combined lasted 17 minutes and 36 seconds (29%). Finally, *Crucial Reform* got five reports (25%) and 14 minutes and 39 seconds (24%). In this sense, the data show that, in spite of major government mobilization and favorable media coverage, there was fragility about political support, which led to the postponement of the vote until 2018.

Crucial reform

The *Crucial reform* framing appeared in five reports of *JN*. Television news has awarded space to specialists in economics and clarified the importance of the reform, linked to the end of the recession and to the balance of fiscal accounts. Pension reform was treated as the main obstacle to economic growth, upturn in employment and the end of inflation.
Table 3 shows the reports.

Table 3. Crucial reform

Date	Report
12/01 2017	Life Expectancy Increases and Impacts Retirement Calculation
12/04/2017	Current Welfare contributes to inequality, says World Bank
01/22/2018	Hole in Welfare fund in 2017 was the largest in history: almost R$ 270 billion
01/25/2018	In 2017, public debt grew R$ 447 billion and reached a record of R$ 3.6 trillion
01/26/2018	IR chart has not kept up with inflation for more than two decades

Source: prepared by the researchers.

The first report, entitled *Life Expectancy Increases and Impacts Retirement Calculation*, is an attempt not only to schedule the issue of Pension Reform, but to frame it as a necessary and urgent measure due to changes in the expectation of life, which would increase the number of beneficiaries. The increased longevity of the Brazilian population appears as a problem to be solved urgently. According to the report, the increase in life expectancy will impact on actual gains for retirement, with a downfall of the value received over the years. Throughout the narrative, that brings data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (*IBGE*), the television news explains the damage to citizens ' pockets if the current scenario remains unchanged. In this sense, it explains: "The logic is as follows: the more time you have to enjoy, the more the benefit money has to last. Only the years of contribution remain the same. So, Welfare divides the cake into more slices, which are smaller than before "(*JN*, December 1st).

In the December 4th report, *Current Welfare contributes to inequality, says World Bank*, the news brings a connection between the data published by the World Bank and the government spending with Welfare, which is, according to the report, the main obstacle to the adjustments that the country needs. Without mentioning

the fact that the World Bank study was commissioned by the Government's economic team[6], *JN* declares that the fiscal hole promoted by Welfare inhibits investments in health, education and road building.

Upon data analysis, it can be noted that the framing was only resumed in January when the government had lost the first battle by postponing the vote from December 2017 to 2018. On January 22nd, 2018, the report *Security Hole in 2017 was the biggest in history: almost R$ 270 billion* informed, through an interview with the Social Security Secretary, Marcelo Caetano, that the Pension deficit grows in approximately tens of billions of *reais* per year, a sum that would be enough for the government to invest in areas such as education, housing and security. At the same time, the January 25th and 26th reports, broadcasted with the headlines *In 2017, government debt grew R$ 447 billion and reached a record of R$3.6 trillion* and *IR table does not follow inflation for more than two decades* associate pension reform approval and a solution to the troublesome fiscal situation, as well as assign the responsibility for the growth of public debt to welfare. In the voice of presenter William Bonner: "The welfare hole has a great weight in this account. The delay in approval of the reform was one of the factors cited by the agency Standard & Poor's to downgrade Brazil at the beginning of this month ".

Strategies to Reform approval

The *Strategies for Approving the Reform* framework appeared in six articles of *JN*. From December 4th to 11th , when there was the possibility of putting the reform to a vote in Congress, *JN* acted in line with the Government in order to create the expectation that the measure could be approved still in 2017 and showed the government strategies in pursue of support. The news did not mention the difficulties and the possible postponement of the vote. Table 4 shows the reporting of this framework.

Table 4. Strategies to Reform approval

Date	Report
12/04/2017	Government speeds pace of meetings with allies to vote Welfare
12/05/2017	Government does the math and thinks Welfare can be voted in 2017
12/06/2017	*PMDB* and *PTB* will force members to vote for Welfare Reform
12/07/2017	Government intensifies search of votes in the Chamber of Deputies to

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[6] Commissioned by Temer, World Bank study defends pension reform. Retrieved January, 20th, 2018 from: <https://www.cartacapital.com.br/economia/Encomendado-por-Temer-estudo-do-Banco-Mundial-defende-reforma-da-previdencia>.

	approve Welfare
12/08/2017	Temer makes meeting at *Alvorada* to discuss Pension Reform
12/11/2017	Pension reform begins to be discussed in the Chamber of Deputies on Thursday (14)

Source: prepared by the researchers.

The *Strategies to reform approval* framework can be found in six reports, concentrated mainly from December 4th to 11th, 2017, when there was the possibility that the Government would put the constitutional amendment on the issue to a vote in Congress. The news program features a stream of news that shows how the measure could be put to discussion and vote in Congress and how there was strong mobilization by the government towards the allied base. Nevertheless, it does not make a critical contextualization clearly pointing out the difficulties of the government in obtaining enough votes on such a controversial topic and in an unfavorable moment, since it was a few days before the parliamentary recess.

The second framework focused mainly on the scoreboard or in the battle for the approval of the reform. In this framework, the reports highlighted the government efforts to get the 308 votes needed for approval in the Chamber of Deputies. Reports privileged only the government-friendly scoreboards showing daily the increased adhesions around the topic. On December 4th, the report *Government accelerates pace of meetings with allies to vote Welfare* indicates that the government has a base of 260 parliamentarians, but needs from 315 to 320 to bring the Reform to vote.

The reports of the 5th, *Government does the math and thinks Welfare can be voted in 2017*, and December 6th, *PMDB and PTB will compel MPs to vote in favor of Welfare*, deal with the necessary votes counting, indicating that the government did not yet have sufficient support for the approval of the Reform.

The report on the next day updates the score, with 270 favorable votes (*JN*, December 7th). Thus, it is perceived that the television news uses the *horse race* framework, very common in electoral periods, especially in situations in which the evolution of the campaign is conceived as a race among the candidates (Porto, 2004), to deal with the approval of the Reform. Nonetheless, in this game, there is no opponent. The news highlights only the favorable votes and remains silent about the efforts of the opposition or about how many lawmakers balk at the proposal, as in the report of December 7th , under the title "Government intensifies search for votes in the Chamber of Deputies to approve welfare", in which the President still

counted on 270 votes. Subsequent reports join the government battle in search of undecided deputies.

It is worth mentioning that during the analysis period, *JN* prioritized interviews with Reform-friendly politicians from the government base, as the report with excerpts of the interview with the Minister of Planning, Dyogo Oliveira, endorsing the relationship between economic growth and approval of the reform. In Oliveira's words: "The economic growth we are having and the positive expectations that all economists and market players have for the coming year and the next few years is closely tied to the reform agenda" (*JN*, December 7th, 2017). The television news also provided space for the Reform rapporteur in the Chamber of Deputies, Arthur Maia (Popular Socialist Party-*PPS*), who claimed that the change will correct and cut privileges. By promoting only the voices of the government and economists who support the changes without discussing any counterpoints, the television news agenda makes a skewed approach, bundling the responsibility for the fiscal imbalance in the public accounts to the way the benefit is structured.

Loss of political support and Reform at risk

The *Loss of political support and Reform at risk* had the largest number of reports – nine. *JN*, despite being aligned with the federal Government, in an attempt to play for pension reform, could not silence about the failure of the Government to put it to a vote. On December 12th, Temer announced at a press conference that he would seek to put the theme to vote in February. Then, on December 14th, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Rodrigo Maia (Democrats-*DEM*), announced that, in fact, the vote was postponed until the following year. Then the reports reveal conflicts in the allied base, such as the report on the 16th, in which the news report states that the *PSDB* has promised to punish those who did not vote in favor of the amendment. Table 5 shows the reports.

Table 5. Loss of political support and Reform at risk

Date	Report
12/12/2017	Temer admits that Welfare vote may be postponed until February
12/13/2017	Date of vote on Welfare is a contradiction between Jucá and Temer
12/14/2017	Maia postpones vote on Pension Reform to February in the Chamber of Deputies
12/15/2017	Temer says vote on Welfare was postponed to avoid embarrassment
12/16/2017	*PSDB* promises to punish deputies who vote against Pension Reform

12/17/2017	In the effort for Welfare, *PMDB* says there is no room for betrayal
12/26/2017	I do not see it as blackmail, says Marun about the Pension Reform - video 42 seconds
12/27/2017	NE Governors Respond to Marun's Speech on Funding by *Caixa*
01/12/2018	Country cannot approve structural reforms, says Standard & Poor's

Source: prepared by the researchers.

The reports disclose the contradictions in the news itself. Although it sought to schedule and frame the Pension Reform as an urgent and necessary measure, the television news ended up showing that the government was experiencing a delicate moment of loss of political support. Some reports show pork barrel practices, conflicts in the allied base and even clashes between governors of the Northeast with Congressman Carlos Marun (*MDB*), who had taken office on December 9th, 2017 at the Secretariat of Government precisely to be a political articulator at the Congress alongside political leaders.

Government fragility becomes evident in the news of the week from December 11th to 16th 2017 when it recognizes not having the political support to implement the Reform. Whereas there had been a strong mobilization in the previous week and *JN* ratified the government's speech without pointing out the difficulties and resistance to the allied base, it became clear in the pronouncements and decisions of the government and its articulators in the following week. On the 12th, Temer admitted that the Reform could be postponed. On December 13th, the report *Welfare vote date is a contradiction between Jucá and Temer* indicates the negative reaction of the market, as a falling dollar and rising stock market, after misunderstandings of parliamentarians around the issue. The news points out that, after Jucá's statement on the postponement of the vote until 2018, the mood of the market fluctuated and the Ibovespa index closed down more than 1% (*JN*, December 13th). On the 14th, Rodrigo Maia finally announced that the Reform had been postponed until February 2018.

The theme was once again defended by the news program in the report *Temer says Reform was postponed to avoid embarrassment*, in which the narrative brought the president's concern about the rise and fall of the financial market due to the non-approval of the Reform (JN, December 15th). However, the report already showed a fragile president without the necessary support base for the reforms that were his main promise in taking over the government after the coup against President Dilma.

The framework of patronage was present in some reports in which the Pension Reform was being discussed. Negotiations involving financial sums, political

offices and approval of projects that meet the interests of parliamentarians have become the hallmark of the Temer government. This is what happens in the reports that point the suspicious bargaining. While the reform project was following a calendar of approval, the newscast conveyed new government promises such as: releasing R$ 250 million to healthcare in Minas Gerais; approving projects of the liking of several groups, especially the ruralists; release of R$ 2 billion tp states and municipalities, as well as the return of positions to deputies who voted against the continuation of the accusations against Temer. On December 16th and 18th, the reports praised the government's negotiating position in order to secure more votes and use the newly created electoral fund, an essential funding for candidates in 2018, as a bargaining chip.

The television news also points out the importance of the reform to the business community by establishing a relationship between its approval and the increase of investments in the country. The subject *Temer admits that Welfare vote can be postponed until February*, published on December 12th, recounts the call that 150 entrepreneurs from various sectors have made to President Temer for its approval. In the same vein, reports in subsequent days sought to establish a relationship between the stability of the financial market and the approval of the reform.

The Minister of the Secretariat of Government, Carlos Marun (*MDB*), became involved in a controversy to act as the main articulator of the Government in the battle for the Reform. In a meeting with governors and mayors of the northeastern region of the country, he was accused of blackmail, by tying the release of funds from public banks to the States and municipalities in exchange for the support of Deputies to the pension reform[7]. With wide media visibility, *JN* just pointed out the event and aired part of an interview to Marun in which he justifies blackmailing as something important for the Country (*JN*, December 26th).

The news report failed to mention the highly pork barrel practices in the government, which could be seen in the December 27th report, with the headline *Governors of the NE react to Marun's talk about Caixa finances*. Despite mentioning the radicalism in the Minister's speech, the only speech shown by the report was that delivered by the government, especially President Temer, who praised the urgency of the Reform so that the country would not face radical situations such as those experienced in some European countries. The report did not grant voice to the governors of the North-East; it just mentioned an excerpt of the open letter directed to Temer, in which seven out of the nine governors stated that they would

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[7] Retrieved January, 18[th,] 2018 from: <http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,marun-admite-que-usa-banco-publico-para-pressionar-por-reforma-da-previdencia,70002131403>.

not hesitate to promote the political and legal responsibility of the officers involved if Marun's threat were confirmed.

The negative framework of disqualifying Temer government, even though unintentionally on behalf of JN, reappeared on January 12th, 2018. The report *Country cannot approve structural reforms ', says Standard Poor's & features* the downgrading of Brazil by the credit ratings agency. The report pointed out that the main staff economist, Lisa Schinellar, decided for the relegation for understanding that the fundamental problem of the country is the fiscal situation, because Brazil spends more than it collects. In this sense, the television news program invests in a framework that treats Social Security as the main obstacle to the country's fiscal stability.

News Network and the framing of the facts

Journalism theories point to one of the factors that interfere in the process of producing news with considerable weight, which are the sources. The news network is strategic for some editorials. Traquina (2001), when working with Structuralist Theory, explains that there is a strong relationship between the news vehicles and primary defining elements. According to the author, the practical pressures of the work, as, e.g., time, as well as the requirements of the supposed impartiality, are combined to produce an exaggerated access of the media to those who withhold privileged institutionalized positions. This occurs significantly in the case of the covering politics, with a faulty net of sources in the political institutions.

In Picture 6, the sources used throughout the news reports on the Pension Reform are mentioned. It becomes clear that the official sources linked to the government were consulted and, especially, that the opposition was silenced, since no representative or political leader of the opposition parties was heard. This shows a lack of the plurality of voices, which breaks the principles of journalism.

Table 6. News Network and their respective frameworks

Type of Framework	News Network
Crucial reform **(five reports)**	IBGE - (1) Conde Actuarial Consulting - (1) Edgar Vanjari (HR analyst) - (1) Newton Conde (welfare consultant) - (1) Martin Raiser (Director of World Bank in Brazil) - (1) Henrique Meirelles (Minister of Finance) - (1) Paulo Tafner (researcher at Fipe) - (1) Gustavo Veloso (administrative assistant) - (1) Dárcio Reis (Chief Financial Officer) - (1) José Pereira (retired) - (1)

	Helenio Barros (director of Fenajufe) - (1)
	Marcelo Caetano (Secretary of Social Security) - (1)
	National Treasury Department – (1)
	Cláudio Damasceno (President of the National Union of Tax revenue Auditors) - (1)
	Marcelo Nunes Alves (Accountant)-(1)
	Roberto Vertamatti (Director of Economics, Anefac) - (1)
Strategy for reform vote (six reports)	Michel Temer (President of the Republic) – (5)
	Rodrigo Maia (Congress President) – (5)
	Beto Mansur (PRB Deputy) – (4)
	Henrique Meirelles (Minister of Finance) - (1)
	PP (1), PTB (2), PRB (1), PSDB (1), DEM (1), PR (1) and MDB (1)
	Alberto Goldman (President of PSDB) – (2)
	Baleia Rossi (deputy and MDB leader) - (1)
	Rodrigo Pacheco (MDB Deputy) - (1)
	Ciro Nogueira (PP deputy) - (1)
	Arthur Maia (PPS deputy and rapporteur for the Reform) - (3)
	Eliseu Padilha (Minister of the Civil House) - (1)
	Gilberto Kassab (Minister of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications) - (1)
	Marcelo Caetano (Secretary of Social Security) - (1)
	Arthur Lira (PP deputy) - (1)
	Aguinaldo Ribeiro (PP deputy) - (1)
	Dyogo Oliveira (Minister of Planning) - (1)
	Carlos Marun (Deputy and Minister of Secretary of Government) - (1)
	Eunicio Oliveira (President of the Senate) - (1)
Loss of political support and Reform at risk (nine reports)	Dyogo Oliveira - (1)
	Henrique Meirelles – (3)
	Michel Temer – (3)
	Rodrigo Maia - (3)
	João Martins (National Confederation of agriculture) - (1)
	Romero Jucá (leader of the Government in the Senate) - (2)
	Beto Mansur - (1)
	Arthur Maia - (2)
	Moody's and Fitch Agency – (1)
	Carlos Marun - (4)
	Geraldo Alckmin (Governor of São Paulo) – (2)
	Eliseu Padilha - (1)
	Governors of the North-East - (1)
	Lisa Schinellar (Standard & Poor's Economist) - (1)

Source: prepared by the researchers.

When taking the reports from the frameworks as a parameter, in the case of the *Crucial Reform* framework, it was found that *JN* sought supposedly more technical official sources to deal with the Pension Reform theme, as specialists in the subject. Nevertheless, the framework was extremely supportive of the Reform

with an alarmist speech about the risks of not voting the bill in Congress and having disastrous consequences in the future. There were virtually no dissonant voices, limiting the sources and characters to those who reproduced the dominant discourse.

At the same time, in the *Strategies to reform approval*, there was, again, a preponderance of official sources linked to the Government, mainly from the political sphere, in an optimistic tone regarding the possibility of approval of the reform still in December 2017. The news program did not care to listen to those who were against the reform in much of the news. In the six reports, official sources were predominantly of deputies, Ministers and governing leaders and President Temer himself.

With regard to the *Loss of political support and Reform at risk* framework, although it showed that there were conflicts in the allied base, the recurrence to the news network linked to the government was maintained. The biggest sticking point was the entrance by Mr Carlos Marun (*MDB*). Numbers are quite illustrative of how the news network was ruling markedly: President Temer and Rodrigo Maia lead as sources in eight of the 20 reports each (40%), followed by Mr Arthur Maia (Rapporteur), who has been the source in six reports (30%), just above Mr. Beto Mansur (Brazilian Republican Party-*PRB*), Henrique Meirelles and Mr. Carlos Marun (*MDB*) – each one being a source in five reports (25%).

Final considerations

Upon resuming the theoretical arguments and the empirical analysis of the reports of *Jornal Nacional,* it is important to highlight in the first place how television news, unlike the supposed model of journalistic objectivity, clearly positions itself as a political actor (Albuquerque, 2012; Azevedo, 2006; Lima, 2006). Nonetheless, despite attempting to interfere in the formation of public opinion, it is observed that there is a complexity in the understanding of the public sphere. If authors as Lippmann (2010), Bourdieu (1983) and Jürgen Habermas (1984) pointed to an audience that could be easily manipulated by the media, it can be noted, from the own review that Habermas makes of his works, that there are multiple public spheres that may be interconnected. In an environment where the media are present, individuals have access to diverse sources of information.

In that sense, from a perspective of extended and multiple public spheres, even companies like *Globo* network and its news programs will ultimately reveal the tensions between their interests and the political field and in relation to the opinion of the public. In the case of the Pension Reform coverage, *Jornal Nacional* showed

that there were strong resistances in the political field in approving the measure, just as it reflected opposing positions in the social fabric. Such contrast between the editorial line of *Globo* and the unfolding of the facts reveals that the attempt to impose a worldview in that particular case was thwarted.

This refers to another important point in the work of the press that concerns the news framework. As Tuchman points out, quoted by Porto (2004), the information framework can reinforce the political power by emphasizing certain aspects of reality at the expense of others. Such strategy is accomplished, according to Gamson & Midigliani (1993), in the articulation of the discourses, in the metaphors used or in relations of causality and in the attempt to point out possible developments of the facts. In the case of pension reform, *Jornal Nacional* sought to emphasize aspects that indicated possible causes for the urgency to change the retirement rules, as well as to create disastrous symbolic scenarios if the measure were not to be approved by Congress. In spite of being an important political actor, *JN* had to report that, in the multiplicity of public spheres and of interest disputes, there was no favorable climate to the approval of the reform, disclosing the weakness of the government and tensions in the political field. Thus, the media also reproduces the dynamics of society, marked by conflicts and power disputes.

Taking such issues as a starting point, it is important to point out more specific aspects of the news coverage by *Jornal Nacional* on the pension reform in the period studied, from the 20 stories aired on television news in this article. It is worth mentioning that the pension reform entered the television news agenda by means of a framework favorable to the arguments used by the government and by the economic team to justify such changes. During the short period of analysis, it is noteworthy that *JN* did not grant space to the critics of the Reform, social movements, or for politicians of parties opposing to the government.

Thus, by identifying the interpretative axes from the framework analysis, it was found that the coverage was clearly in favor of the pension reform. The data eventually revealed, in their reports, the contradictions and conflicts inherent to the political field. In 5 out of the 20 reports (which means 25% of the total), the emphasis was more technical, in the *Crucial Reform* framework, in which the news sought from the voices of experts to reveal a dramatic picture in the public accounts and the urgency of the reform, under the risk of putting the future of the country in jeopardy as a result of the increase in life expectancy and the welfare expenditure growth.

Throughout the decisive week to try to accomplish the vote and approval of the reform in Congress, namely the period from December 4 to 11, *JN* clearly took

a framework focused on the scoreboard and in the strategies of the government among the congressmen. The *strategies to reform approval* framework was present in six reports (30%), specifically restricted to such period, just before the parliamentary recess. During this period, JN expanded the governing voices. In the six reports, there was a significant emphasis on the need and urgency of the Reform with pronouncements and speeches by government-aligned politicians.

Lastly, while favoring the Reformation and using the space of open TV to try to make the discourse on the urgency of voting for the measure in Congress in 2017 succeed, *JN* eventually revealed the contradictions and conflicts of the political field. In nine of the 20 reports (45%), the operating framework for the *loss of political support and reform at risk* clearly shows the weakness of the government, as well as the loss of support by parliamentarians and the government conflicts with the allied base and governors. This became evident in the speeches of the governors themselves.

The explicit positioning of news from group *Globo* in favor of the reforms reinforces a tendency of news to promote a discussion devoted to neoliberal precepts in which welfare is treated as a barrier preventing the Federal Government from adjusting public accounts. It reveals how the media exerts the role of a political actor, even under the supposed idea of journalistic objectivity, which can be understood from the way the media system in Brazil has always been strongly linked to the hegemonic political system (Azevedo, 2006). In this sense, according to Albuquerque (2012), it contradicts the principles of the American model of a more informative journalism, which the *Globo* group sought to build in order to camouflage its political and ideological positioning.

On the one hand, it was possible to identify how the news program stands as another actor by the government team in an attempt to build a score in favour of Reform when it gives ample room for governing sources and the voices of opposition are silenced. It can even be observed that the news report ends up bringing to the forefront the corrupt web of Temer government with negotiations that involve the use of public funds for the approval of the Reform. The news merely described such abusive practices by the government. However, as the data reveal, there is a close relationship between the political field, the media sphere and public opinion. Therefore, even though it was favorable to the Reform, it was identified that *JN* had no way of silencing the fragility of the government, the loss of support in Congress, and the difficulties of approving the Reform. These contradictions are inherent to social and political logic which are present even in hegemonic narratives.

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From "Gay Kit" to "Indoctrination Monitor": the conservative reaction in Brazil

RICHARD ROMANCINI

Professor Doctor of the Department of Communication and Arts of the School of Communications and Arts of University of São Paulo, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil. E-mail: richardromancini@usp.br. ORCID: 0000-0002-1651-5880.

Abstract

Based on empirical research of documentary sources, the article discusses the conservative reaction in Brazil by analyzing two cases: the so-called "gay kit" and the "Indoctrination Monitor" (a digital platform created by a newspaper). It highlights their religious element, related to the demographic and also media growth of the neo-Pentecostals; in this case, creating a "moral panic." The study shows how Evangelicals had been distancing themselves from Dilma Rousseff, until they became strong supporters of the parliamentary coup. The comparison between the victory achieved by the conservatives regarding "gay kit" and the failure of the "Indoctrination Monitor" discuss some of the limits of the ongoing conservative project.

Keywords

Introduction

The article discusses the similarities and differences between the cases of the so-called "gay kit," a significant example of how politicians and conservative activists embarrassed the government of Dilma Rousseff, and the initiative of the digital newspaper *Gazeta do Povo*, inspired by the conservative movement *Escola Sem Partido* (School Without Party – ESP), "Indoctrination Monitor," which had brief duration, showing the limits of the Rightists' agenda.

The construction of an antagonistic rhetoric with progressive social topics and the creation of a "moral panic," based on strategies related to "media populism," are featured. I also discuss how these situations show, on the one hand, the strengthening of conservative and fundamentalist groups in Brazil and, on the other, their difficulty, especially in the second case, in imposing their ideas in a post-coup Brazil, in the complex environment of a "new media regime" (Carpini, 2018).

Before the exposure of these two cases, a description of a relevant political agent (especially in the first case) is made: Evangelical groups, as well as their strategic use of the media. Later, at the presentation of the cases, I focus on the forms of communication used to establish its framework from the "moral panic" perspective. Finally, a comparison is made between both situations.

Brazil's "new right" and the Evangelical bench

Córdova points out the emergence, in the whole Latin America, of a new religious and Evangelical right. This contravenes a regional history in which Protestantism, in the early 20th century, had progressive role, for example, with the defense of the secular State. The author interprets this fact from the dominant mode of religious conversion since the 1980s, when religious references "contrary to social and cultural changes that could affect the traditional patriarchal family" emerged (Córdova, 2014, p. 123).

Studies that analyze the religious politicians in Brazil, particularly Pentecostals, notice that their objective, especially in relation to the social advancements of certain groups, is to form a "new right," whose characteristics are "a combination of moral and cultural reaction, an opposition to the development and/or maintenance of the welfare State" (Cowan, 2014, p. 105).

The creation of an "Evangelical bench" dates back to the 1988 Constituent Assembly, and it can be explained by two fears about the new Letter: relaxation of moral rules (with the decriminalization of abortion) and the legal brakes on the

growth of (neo) Pentecostals, from the articulation between Catholics and leftists (Mariano, 2011; Silva, 2017). Elected with the slogan "brother vote for brother," the parliamentary activity of Evangelicals was contrary to that of progressive groups in moral (such as sexuality) and economic issues (pro market economy), winning a relevant by-product: radio and television concessions (Cunha, 2007).

The ability of popular and electoral mobilization of churches is related to changes in the religious profile of the Brazilian population, with growth of Protestantism[1], which makes possible the election of legislative representatives. Chart 1 shows the (almost always) continued growth of the "Evangelical bench," that is, the Evangelical Parliamentary Front (FEP).

CHART 1 Number of federal deputies of the "Evangelical bench" in the elections between 1982-2015

Source: Silva (2017, p. 247)

The only moment the number of deputies decreased was in 2006, when the bench lost almost half of their representatives due to the "*Mensalão* scandal" (2015) and the "ambulance mafia scandal" (2016). The fuss made "some denominations to take back the discourse of restoration of ethics in politics and emphasize other elements, such as traditional family values" (Silva, 2017, p. 246).

Evangelicals tend to align with parliamentarians of the "Catholic bench" on some social issues, but especially on moral issues (Alves, 2016; Silva, 2017). The so-called Catholic Charismatic Renewal (CCR) movement, the most recent conservative wave of the religion, began to emulate many of the practices of Pentecostals to join the partisan political environment (Silveira, 2008). Both groups have converging views: liturgical, theological and the concern with the use of the media (Silva, 2017)[2].

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[1] Both the Census of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and the surveys of Datafolha Institute indicate the same downward trend in the number of Catholics and growth of Evangelicals (in its various denominations). According to the institute, in 2016, Evangelicals were 29% of the population (in 1994, they were 14%) and Catholics amounted to 50%, against 75% in 1994 (Alves, 2017).

[2] Silva (2017) notes that it was difficult to assess the weight of this bench, however, in 2015, with the creation of the Catholic Mixed Parliamentary Front, with 209 deputies and five senators, it was possible to have a more precise notion of the representativeness of this group.

The Legislative Power is seen by many Evangelicals as the privileged scope of their political participation[3]. This occurs considering that, on the one hand, the occupation of these spaces allows them to propose or react against the legal frameworks and influence public policies. On the other hand, the electoral strategy used by the churches generally adopts an "institutional model" (Oro, 2003), developed by the neo-Pentecostal Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG), which has a centralized organizational structure that favors this strategy.

In this case, candidacy is built within churches, linking the candidate to the institution. The institutional charism is more important than the candidate (Silva, 2017). At least in part, the electoral success of Pentecostal candidates is due to the fact that their faithful have been recruited from lower economic strata and are, therefore, more susceptible to religious leadership influence (Machado, 2005).

The theological pillars of neo-Pentecostalism, the Domain Theology (with a dualistic cosmology, stating that, to be in the fight of "good" against "evil," the individual should be strong spiritually) and the Prosperity Theology (defending that the man of faith is meant to be prosperous in the earthly world) promote dialogue with economic groups in search of rise.

However, to interpret the political growth of Evangelicals only as something strictly religious does not seem accurate. According to Mariano (2011), the phenomenon stems from the national political culture: the religious occupation of the public sphere has been stimulated by party leaders.

The conquest of positions in the Executive is also on the horizon of Evangelicals, despite the preference for the Legislative. In this sense, the election of the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro Marcelo Crivella (nephew of Edir Macedo, creator and leader of UCKG) in 2016 is significant, since he is also a (licensed) bishop of this church. In this election, he managed to overcome rejections suffered (Mariano & Oliveira, 2009) by his association with UCKG.

Despite acknowledging that the Evangelical bench gives visibility and features a new presence in the national public scene of such churches, Prandi and Santos state that this group "does not seem able to cause with effectiveness and legitimacy any change in the country's future" (2017, p. 210). However, they recognize, as well as other authors, the strength of the *reactionary* engagement of Evangelicals, which focus on the ethical ground, "our [Evangelicals'] ground," according to Cowan (2014).

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[3] It is noteworthy the importance of occupying certain spaces, such as the presidency of the Commission on Human Rights of the Congress, in 2012, and even the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, which was the case of the deputy Eduardo Cunha, allied to the church Assembly of God (AG).

> That is, it is more likely that they act to oppose the criminalization of homophobia than to propose the criminalization of homosexuality, for example. Whether in society or in the parliament, the religion, Evangelical or not, when it wants to impose itself, acts as a brake to the advancement of modernity, not as a guiding ideology of the action, but as a guide for the entire society […]. (Prandi & Santos, 2017, p. 202)

As we shall see, this reactive content is clear, in a successful way, in the case of "gay kit." And the importance of the political articulation of the group gained more visibility and relevance with the strong support given by the Evangelical deputies to the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff. During the vote, "most parliamentarians justified their votes based on God, their churches and on the Christian family," indicating "the expressive presence of political representatives linked to Christian denominations in the Brazilian Congress" (Silva, 2017, p. 249).

Evangelicals and the media

It is said that protestants have created a peculiar and distinct culture in competition with other faiths, with a strong dependence on the media to gain legitimacy (Campos, 2004). The missionary content of the Protestant faith joined the expansion of print culture, which is related to the centrality of Bible reading in "historical" Protestantism[4].

Later, the modern means of communication (radio, television, internet) have also become agents of religion. Here, more than a line of continuity, we note a division between Evangelicals and their relations with the media. While the "historical" ones have a more rationalist theology, in which Protestantism is emphasized as a "religion of the book", the "neo/Pentecostals" prefer interior lighting and emotionalism, which is why their communication style heavily adapted to electronic media (Campos, 2008).

Thus, in the United States (source of neo-Pentecostalism), the link between the media and the Protestant religion shaped the so-called "televangelism," with the transmission of cults on radio and television, in this case, from the 1960s, as well as the creation of shows of religious character. American practices influenced Brazilian Evangelicals. The shows of televangelists such as Jimmy Swaggart and Rex Humbart were broadcast, through the purchase of time, on television networks in the country.

Although Brazilian Evangelicals, especially the neo-Pentecostals, have used, and continue to use, the radio and the press as preaching vehicles, maybe the main

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[4] Lutherans, Calvinists, Baptists, Methodists and other denominations that arose before the Pentecostal movement, which gained strength in the United States in the early 20th century. It is noteworthy that the term "neo-Pentecostal" is reserved to the churches created after the 1970s.

mark of their entry in the media is the insertion in the television market, with the purchase of RecordTV network by UCKG, in 1989. This network already had national coverage and was modernized by the church. The movement made by UCKG, based on the sublet of timetables in the programming of radios and televisions for the purchase of networks, is sought by other churches, however, it depends on the business structure that only few have.

The purchase of RecordTV was the culmination of a long process of Universal's involvement with the media, as Edir Macedo, early on, adopted the electronic evangelization. Before becoming the single leader of UCKG, Macedo hosted a popular religious radio show. The extraordinary growth of Universal, in a relatively short period of time, must be thanked, to some extent, to the use of electronic media. For Mariano (2004, p. 130):

> Due to its unique capacity to introduce the church, its message and its religious appeal in homes, electronic evangelism has the advantage of being able to reach those who have no contact or relationship of trust, friendship and kinship with believers of the denomination.

However, the occupation of the media space by Evangelicals[5] does not have only proselytist reasons, which are associated with stiff competition among churches (Campos, 2008). Martino (2014) notes that the acquisition of visibility by religion represents a possibility of making it a legitimate interlocutor in political discussions. And this has been exploited by neo-Pentecostal groups, in defense of their leaders and institutions and also in the public debate.

The media as an instrument of defense of Evangelicals

The critical scrutiny of traditional media groups towards (neo) Pentecostal churches has always been the norm, being frequent the accusations against Evangelical leaders of "exploitation of faith"[6]. However, the continued occupation of the media space by Evangelicals gave one more reason to be distrustful: the fear of unfair competition. The consolidated vehicle owners realized that the media outlets of the churches could survive with the money of the faithful.

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[5] In addition to the case of UCKG, several other denominations, with greater or lesser success, use the media (usually renting programming on networks). Among other pastors with current media presence there are Silas Malafaia, from AG, R. R. Soares, from the International Church of the Grace of God, Valdomiro Santiago, from the World Church of the Power of God, and Agenor Duque, from the Apostolic Church Fullness of God's Throne.

[6] To describe the political career of Marcelo Crivella, Mariano and Oliveira (2009) recover a significant set of media criticism, sometimes similar to evangelical leaders of different denominations. Campos (2008) also speaks of the criticism of the press against the segment in the mid-2000s.

It is particularly noteworthy the action of Grupo Globo and its TV network in this critical perspective, as it is surrounded by trade dispute. However, UCKG can defend itself in the public media space now. The peak year of the dispute was 1995, when Globo aired, during *Jornal Nacional*, the video of a pastor from UCKG kicking a statue of Our Lady, in a cult broadcast on Record, causing bewilderment among Catholics. In the same year, the display of a "motivational" video in which Edir Macedo "taught" pastors how they should get donations also provoked indignation. In cases of this kind, RecordTV, to defend the church, tends to transform the criticism at UCKG in "persecution" against all Evangelicals (Pereira, 2010).

Cunha (2015) points out, as of 2009, signs of the approach between Grupo Globo and the Evangelicals (such as the creation of a gospel label, by the record label of the group; the inclusion of Evangelical characters in soap operas etc.). However, the dynamic is "still ongoing and full of religious, market and political nuances" (ibid, 2015, p. 72-73), according to the author. In addition, this approach tends to deliberately exclude UCKG, and everything indicates that the conflict between the Evangelical trade media and Globo will persist.

It is noteworthy that RecordTV is not structured as a network dedicated strictly to proselytism and seeks to adopt a "secular" format (albeit defending the Evangelical values)[7], using commercial programming strategies. This relates to its goal of competing in the media market with the main TV network in the country, Rede Globo. UCKG, however, also created a network with religious purposes only, the TV Universal (former TV IURD). On the other hand, the sublease of programming from Record for the broadcast, in the mornings, of religious programming by UCKG has been, for 20 years, fundamental to the economic support of the network[8].

The renting of programming is also a usual strategy in other churches. Thus, when news were released about possible restrictions on the practice, Evangelicals mobilized themselves to fight against media regulation, claiming "censorship." And the leader of the Assembly of God (AG), Silas Malafaia, two days after the report on the subject (Wiziack, 2012), published on the website *Verdade Gospel* a manifesto called "The Government and the Workers' Party (PT) want to control the media" (Malafaia, 2012).

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[7] The justification for the creation of an "Evangelical media" given by actors of this group is the antagonism between individualistic and hedonistic values of traditional media and the culture of religious conservatives (Vital da Cunha & Lopes, 2012, p. 119).

[8] It is estimated that UCKG transferred R$ 575 million to Record, in 2016, because of this strategy, which represented almost 30% of the gross revenues of the network in the year mentioned (Feltrin, 2016). The church may have plans to suspend this practice in 2020 (Feltin, 2014), in order to legitimize Record in the advertising market as a "secular" network, but nothing indicates that the rent of programming in other networks with proselytizing purposes will be interrupted.

This episode, characterized yet by other manifestations from the Evangelical media against Dilma Rousseff, marks, according to Alves (2016), the initial moment of the removal of Pentecostals from the federal government, which reached its peak in the large group supporting Rousseff's impeachment. Also relevant is the coalition of this segment "with great part of the Brazilian media that also sees its interests and power threatened by State regulation" (Koren, 2016, p. 123).

Considering this resistance, the Minister of Communications released a statement and informed the retreat of the Executive. The concern has not had any more development on the part of the government, whose pattern alignment with the reaction was repeated in the case of "gay kit."

"Gay kit" as a strategy for creating a "moral panic"

Although in both mandates of Lula's administration (2003-2011) there has not been any progress in some agendas regarding women and groups of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transvestites/Transsexuals (LGBT) – abortion, civil unions between homosexuals, laws criminalizing homophobia, for example –, some researchers and activists claim that the overall balance was positive. Actions such as the Brazil Without Homophobia program, created in 2004, coordinated by the Special Secretariat for Human Rights, and the First Brazilian National LGBT Conference, held in 2008, justify the positive evaluation of the performance of the federal government. It was from the resolutions of the Conference mentioned that the National Plan for the Promotion of LGBT Citizenship and Human Rights (PNPCDH-LGBT) was elaborated, in 2009.

This also seems to be the perception of conservative groups and of the so-called religious bench. That way, when the demands of these groups began "to reflect on the Powers instituted, a robust reaction was manifested in the Legislature" (Lacerda, 2016, p. 9).

PNPCDH-LGBT made a diagnosis about the importance of education involving diversity and proposed the creation of a public-governmental cooperation project for public schools. This is the genesis of the set of educational materials intended for the approach and prevention of homophobic bullying in schools, pejoratively nicknamed "gay kit" by conservatives. Already by the way they called the material we can note the strategic positioning of the agents opposed to it in the attempt to create a "moral panic."

The interpretative key of "moral panic," used by Miskolci (2007) to discuss the issue of same-sex marriage, appears to have adjusted well to the case of the material in question, as it has been highlighted by Vital da Cunha and Lopes

(2012). The concept of "moral panic" refers to the "way the media, the public opinion and agents of social control react to certain disruptions of normative standards" (Miskolci, 2007, p. 111).

The "moral" character of this kind of panic is related to fears of changes in the social order or in its idealized conceptions. The symbolic politics of moral panic operates, according to Miskolci (2007), through a replacement mechanism, in which a group that cannot enforce its opinion in public debate changes the terms of the discussion. Thus, the agents of moral panic do not claim to be opposed to homosexuals or homosexuality, but rather to "pedophilia"; they do not claim to be against the discussion of sexuality and gender equality in schools or the organization and political mobilization of teachers and students, but rather "indoctrination."

The media often plays an important role in the construction of moral panics, to the extent that it amplifies the voices of actors interested in promoting them, developing topics related to basic fear. One can see that by following the case of the so-called "gay kit."

Educational materials, which began to be developed in 2008 and would make up an educational activity of the program School Without Homophobia, were created by an NGO from São Paulo (ECOS – Communication in Sexuality). They consisted of: 1) a guiding notebook to the educator ("School Without Homophobia Notebook"); 2) six bulletins geared to students; 3) poster for the dissemination of the project; 4) cover letters about the initiative to managers and educators; and 5) three educational videos with discussion guides. Training would also be provided to the educators who would use the material.

The public controversy began on November 23, 2010, when, at the seminar "School Without Homophobia," held at the National Congress, the material was presented, albeit without having been approved by the Ministry of Education (MEC). It is claimed that the "trigger" of the controversy was the statement, in jest, of one of the representatives of MEC, the secretary André Lázaro, on the discussions, while preparing the material, about a kiss between two girls in one of the videos (Vital da Cunha & Lopes, 2012, p. 113). However, the unfortunate declaration may have been only a pretext for the attack of the groups opposed to the discussion of sexuality in schools.

Thus, on November 30, the deputy Jair Bolsonaro (from the Progressive Party of Rio de Janeiro at the time), having already participated in a TV show to talk about the subject, makes a speech in plenary session[9], with untruths (including

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[9] Available in video from: <https://goo.gl/uX7bZo> and transcribed from: <https://goo.gl/so2ayJ>. Access on: Feb. 20, 2018.

that the material would be distributed to students aged seven years) and distortions/substitutions (such as the association between homosexuals and pedophilia: "This homophobia thing is a cover story to entice kids"). Such a speech made the deputy's supporters nickname the material "gay kit." In May of the following year, Bolsonaro produces and publishes a bulletin, which became known as "Information on Gay Kit,[10]" with a series of distortions in its criticism to the contents of PNPCDH-LGBT. This occurs "by omitting words, ideals and expressions. […] a number of pejorative adjectives ('Gay Republic', 'Gay MST', 'Gay First Job Program', among others) that reinforce a normative and conservative discourse" (Grespan and Goellner, 2011, p. 106).

Bolsonaro tries to create a "moral panic" based on low attacks and "irreverent" inventions. This happens in the "biographies," included on the last page of the material, of the "Defenders of Homosexual Fundamentalism in action," shown in Figure 1. All signs indicate the anthropologist and activist Luiz Mott never said "Pedophilia now!", however, he bears a resemblance to a celebrity journalist, notoriously homosexual, who used the catchphrase "Dignity now."

FIGURE 1. Part of the "Information on Gay Kit," by Jair Bolsonaro[11]

> "*Pedofilia já! Enquanto ainda estou com tudo em cima…*"
>
> "*… Nos últimos 36 anos de prática homoerótica, calculei que devo ter transado com mais ou menos uns 500 homens diferentes. No meu caso, para dizer a verdade, se eu pudesse escolher livremente, o que eu queria mesmo não era um 'homem' e sim um meninão…*"
>
> Luiz Mott - Fundador do Grupo Gay da Bahia e um dos idealizadores do PLC 122/06, que criminaliza a homofobia.

Source: https://goo.gl/ERS5Lc

Bolsonaro's discourse against the "gay kit" spreads, more or less mitigated, over the traditional media, with emphasis on RecordTV, which produces alarmist news stories on the subject[12] (Oliveira Júnior & Maio, 2017). In the developments of the case, the religious political representatives began to get a lot more involved

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[10] Available from: <https://goo.gl/ERS5Lc>. Access on: Feb. 20, 2018.
[11] Translated text: "Pedophilia now! While I still got it…"
"… In the last 36 years of homoerotic experience, I gather I must have had sex with almost 500 different men. In my case, to be honest, if I could choose freely, what I really want is not a 'man' but a big boy…"
Luiz Mott – Founder of the Gay Group from Bahia and one of the creators of PLC 122/06, which criminalizes homofobia.
[12] For example: <https://noticias.r7.com/jornal-da-record/videos/comentario-de-ex-secretario-do-mec-sobre-kit-gay-causa-indignacao-21102015>. Access on Feb. 20, 2018. The article uses the term "gay kit," naturalizing it.

in the discussion, attacking the government and the educational material, in an opportunistic convergence with other conservatives.

It is argued that three points, unrelated to the educational materials, worsened the conservative position. The first was the recognition by the Supreme Court of the stable union between homosexuals, in the trial of Actions on the topic, on May 5, 2011, which can be understood as a "moral shock." [13] As the attempts for the approval of this kind of legislation never advanced in Congress, the trial was seen as a victory for human rights activists and as a defeat for religious politicians. Another aspect linked to homosexuals was the concomitant discussion of a substitute to the Complementary Bill 122/2006, which provided the punishment for discrimination "by gender, sex, sexual orientation and gender identity." The religious bench nicknamed the project the "gag law," stating that the religious could be "censored" for defending biblical positions. The proposal was filed in 2014.

The other issue involved allegations of illicit enrichment of the Chief of Staff, Antonio Palocci. Religious and conservative fronts, with members of the opposition and also of the heterogeneous "allied base," take advantage of this crisis to bargain with the government, proposing that Palocci does not testify in Congress in exchange for the guarantee that the educational material would not be distributed to schools. The government gave in.

Many Evangelicals felt that the President had a "debt" with the group, for having defended (such as Edir Macedo) the then candidate, during the 2010 presidential election, from the charge of being pro-abortion. In fact, Rousseff said, before the first round, that: "in my government, we will hear systematically religious groups. This partnership is strategic for us" (Bertolotto, 2010). Reinforcing the commitment, before the second round, the candidate for Vice President Michel Temer went after the religious leaders. It is possible to say that there was "a clear adhesion movement to conservative values" (Vital da Cunha & Lopes, 2012, p. 100).

In this sense, one of the latest statements of the President, before the end of the debate on the anti-homophobia material, saying "it will not be allowed to any government agency to advertise sexual options" (Damé, 2011) was inconsistent with the historical trajectory of the Workers' Party, but not with the dynamics of the election campaign of 2010.

The fiasco of the "Indoctrination Monitor" and School Without Party

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[13] The "moral shock" (JASPER, 2014, p. 69) differs from the notion of "moral panic," as it refers to a disturbing event for certain group that favors the recruitment and mobilization for a cause. It is the case of the approval of abortion in the United States in 1970, which is associated to the rise of the religious right in the country.

On December 6, 2017, the digital newspaper *Gazeta do Povo* launched an internet platform dedicated to receiving "reports of ideological indoctrination in Brazilian classrooms, which would be published after rigorous journalistic verification" (Gazeta do Povo, 2017). However, on the tenth day of that same month, the company suspended the initiative, claiming that, after reflection motivated by criticism from readers and trade unions, had agreed with the argument that the idea could encourage a denouncement and harassment atmosphere in schools.

Although unorthodox, the initiative of *Gazeta do Povo* was not inconsistent with the editorial line that the newspaper has been adopting. In April 2017, the vehicle published several texts to clarify its "convictions"[14]. Previously, they had hired columnists aligned with its tendency, among them, Leandro Narloch (columnist of *Veja* magazine and author of the "Politically Incorrect Guide" to the Brazilian History), Ricardo Amorim (economist, columnist for the Millenium Institute's website, which promotes liberal ideas), and the economist Rodrigo Constantino (former columnist for *Veja* and president of the Liberal Institute Council). Constantino himself (2017) notes, when commenting on the editorial project, that *Gazeta* has invested heavily in this occupation of territory further to the right, it took risks, put itself out there. I ask my reader: how not to repay this brave act?".

The "guts" of the liberal-conservative project of the newspaper[15], in the case of the "Indoctrination Monitor," however, did not last. This initiative is aligned with the conservative agenda of the School Without Party (ESP) movement, which had been praised in previous editorial, because "it performs an extraordinary work, devoting itself to collect and report ideologization episodes in the whole country" (A Escola, 2014). In this text, however, the newspaper criticizes the legal route adopted by ESP to solve the problem, because, besides defending the cases of indoctrination should be solved between parents and schools, it says that "the law creates the risk of a sterile denouncement, almost a school mccarthyzation."

Despite this position, the newspaper, the same of the "Monitor," had published various articles related to "indoctrination," most of them reflecting the expansion of interests that ESP began to show.

Before explaining this point, it is worth describing, synthetically, ESP. Created in 2004 by the lawyer and attorney Miguel Nagib, who was inspired by similar initiatives in the U.S., the movement began to gain greater visibility ten

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[14] See <https://goo.gl/jPPz9Z>. Access on Jan. 20, 2018.

[15] That is, liberal on economic matters and conservative on customs. According to Constantino (2017): "several classical liberals understood the importance of moral values to a free society. Liberals should not confuse liberality with freedom."

years later. This occurred in the context of manifestations against President Dilma Rousseff, when ESP received support from leaders and conservative groups, such as the Free Brazil Movement, MBL (Romancini, 2018).

The movement began to grow after initiating some sort of legal activism, urged by politicians such as the federal deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro (PSC-SP), with support for the presentation of bills, at different levels, to combat the ideological indoctrination. It was also important that he added the moral agenda to his concerns. Miguel[16] (2016), as well as other authors, notes that the ESP growth occurred after this operation. Thus, the fight against the so-called "gender ideology" has been stimulated, beside the concern with "ideological indoctrination."

Ongoing criticisms and analysis of the movement highlight its conservative content, with a technical conception of education, and the threat of curtailment of freedom and autonomy of teaching in case the projects inspired by ESP are approved (Almeida Neto & Silva, 2017).

For what it could be retrieved from pages that are no longer online[17], the "Indoctrination Monitor" on December 7 had as "Latest News" (at the bottom of the page) seven news stories (presented in the order they appear on the website) previously published by *Gazeta do Povo* on the subject, as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1. News Stories associated with the "Indoctrination Monitor"

Date	Title of the News Stories	Location:
10.24.2017	USP faz evento por "criança viada travesti" [Univesity of São Paulo makes event for "queer transvestite child"]	São Paulo – USP
10.11.2017	Drag queen dá "aula" sobre papéis de gênero [Drag queen "teaches" on gender roles]	Juiz de Fora – Colégio João XXIII
10.10.2017	Aula de química tem "Fora Temer" no quadro [Chemistry class has "Outside Temer" on the board]	Vila Velha – Escola Estadual Geoffrey Schneider
10.09.2017	Sindicato gaúcho usa alunos em protesto [Trade union of Rio Grande do Sul uses students in protest]	Porto Alegre – Elementary School
09.28.2017	Governo do Espírito Santo promove ideologia de gênero [Government of Espírito Santo promotes gender ideology]	João Neiva – EEEFM João Neiva
09.22.2017	Atividade de escola estadual tem beijo lésbico [State school activity has lesbian kiss]	Uiraúna – Escola Estadual José Duarte Filho
08.18.2017	MST promove doutrinação em Instituto Federal [MST promotes indoctrination at Federal Institute]	Chapecó – Instituto Federal Catarinense

Source: <https://goo.gl/p236Ly>. Access on Feb. 20, 2018.

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[16] In a reference to the country's current context, it is noteworthy that this researcher, who analyzed the "indoctrination" issue within ESP, was accused of "appropriation of public good for promoting party political thoughts" by the minister of Education (MEC, 2018) for proposing an undergraduate discipline at UnB called "the coup of 2016 and the future of democracy in Brazil." The minister received members of conservative movements pro-ESP soon after taking office; however, it seemed as if he was trying to distance himself from the movement, by criticizing the legal initiatives inspired by it (CRUZ and CRUZ, 2017). In this sense, his request for Miguel to be investigated is ambiguous.

[17] WayBackMachine, available from: <http://www.waybackmachine.org>. Access on Feb. 20, 2018.

By the titles of the news stories, we can see how "moral indoctrination" became important, as four of the subjects are addressed to it, while the other three are related to "political indoctrination." The "Monitor" had other pages, but they could not be retrieved. Thus, it is difficult to know whether he had accession or not, serving only to "rehash" the articles already published by the newspaper.

Although the newspaper claims not to support the legal initiatives of ESP, for certain positions, as well as for news coverage that promotes the cause (and with nuances encouraging the "moral panic"), there is alignment between the vehicle and the movement in question. Thus, it speaks to the conservative sectors through the "political indoctrination" criticism and to the religious through the "moral" issue.

There is here a strategy of market occupation, from a conservative segment. In this sense, what can be understood as the ESP "populism" articulates a form of "media populism" practiced by *Gazeta do Povo*. The characteristics of the populist movement of ESP include its antisystem content, as well as the exclusive character, separating people into "good" and "bad," the latter being seen as antagonists to be defeated (Hameleers et al., 2017).

"Media populism," in turn, has two current definitions, according to Mazzoleni (2014). The first highlights the character of contemporary media, in general, and the second its ideological element. Thus, the first definition refers to a guideline strongly directed to the market and in association with the "infotainment" in journalistic coverage. To make the news more palatable (and, in the era of digital networks, spreadable), the preferred option is to make them simpler and more customized. If the situation is exotic, unexpected (classic news values), it is even better.

We find this type of strategy in the association between a prestigious University and a "queer child" or in a drag queen "teaching" at a school (in the first two news of Table 1). In part, in the political news of the same table, the "scandalous" nature they try to give to the events, according to the titles, has a similar populist content – seeking to incriminate what the *antagonists* do.

The second definition refers to how the media contents can be ideologically associated with political movements. In the news stories of *Gazeta do Povo* related to ESP, which seem to strengthen the movement, this tends to occur, although in the editorial, the newspaper claims not to fully endorse the initiative.

Final considerations

What are the resemblances and differences of the cases analyzed? The similarities include: the conservative grouping, the moral and religious element

(especially in the first case), the attempts to create a "moral panic" based on social changes (also in the first case) and on the "media populism" (especially in the second case, although Jair Bolsonaro's "alternative media" can be considered populist).

Among the differences, first of all, there is the result. In the case of "gay kit," this is explained by the Brazilian electoral logic, in which the dissociation between the presidential and the Legislative results are common. Thereby, the elected government, in addition to socializing with the opposition, needs to compose heterogeneous "allied bases." The "strategic partnerships," to use Dilma Rousseff's term in relation to Evangelicals, are subject to the kind of tension we have seen in this article. And, more importantly, minorities have certain veto power.

This power should not be overestimated, according to Veloso (2016, p. 39), in an analysis on the Evangelical Parliamentary Front, because alone it can only obtain delaying favorable results.

> The implementation of the veto power, in fact, is only possible when there is a significant part within the [Chamber of Deputies] CD that agrees with their positions or when the definitor of the legislative agenda acts directly as an actor with veto power in the internal space to halt the progress of bills that are not in accordance with his personal beliefs, especially when this is part of the composition of this parliamentary front.

This strategy of the religious right can be associated with a more general pattern of conservatives of Brazil's "new right", who, for Delcourt, adopt an asymmetric counter-strategy in the democratic debate" (2016, p. 134), i.e. they seek to hinder the governance of progressive parties rather than formulate policies. However, it is important to ask, especially in the next election, if the latest proposals of this new right, as well as its forms of communication and style, tend to change in the direction of more constructive strategies. Maybe this can occur by the influence of conservative activities on other countries. It is noteworthy, for example, that the recent defense of the closing of Ministry of Education by a former minister of the Collor government (Cabrera, 2018) is aligned with activities from Trump's administration, in USA (Bauman & Read, 2018). An activity of this type, which would put the curricula and schools under the control of parents and communities, may represent "a more advanced form of 'school without party'" (Freitas, 2018).

Anyway, from a more reactive or constructive perspective, the activities and proposals of the right need social support. In this sense, the media presents itself

as an important agent of persuasion – the "moral panic" and populist communication strategies can be used for this purpose.

Now we can only try to answer why the "Indoctrination Monitor" failed. One of the possible explanations, of more general character, can be the actual context of the situations. While in first situation there was a left-wing party in power and the criticism on the subject was directly associated with it, in the second – at the current moment, post-parliamentary coup – we are under a government that groups the center-right parties, including most of those who make up the "Evangelical bench." Thus, there would be little interest in wearing out the current government with this theme.

A second explanatory element, more focused on the media itself, suggests that the adherence to the proposal was far from representing commercial gains to the vehicle, meaning that "indoctrination" was of little relevance to most readers. In this way, we can maybe figure out the current minority character of the form of conservative populism that projects such as ESP have in the Brazilian society, as well as the impact of the ultra-right on the country.

Another media dimension possibly related to the failure of the "Indoctrination Monitor" is the low viability of new and more radical journalistic projects of conservative character in Brazil today. In part, this occurs because the great Brazilian press is already dominated by vehicles that embrace conservative perspectives (Lima, 2015). Therefore, the competition is high. At the same time, and maybe with more importance, the "mass self-communication" phenomena occur today (Castells, 2009), through the various digital platforms in which individuals can manifest themselves politically, and through the emergence of parajournalistic digital vehicles, aimed at the production of skewed or false information. As determined in a research with supporters of School Without Party on Twitter, these people can give impact to the cause, skirting around the usually neutral or negative coverage that it receives from the traditional press, by the strong use of "information" from these new biased vehicles, for example, *JornaLivre* (Romancini, 2018, p. 13-14).

This echoes the trend, initiated or already perceived more clearly in the United States, of the emergence of a "new media regime," driven by cultural, economic, political and technological changes, which causes a "a fundamental shift in the relationships between journalism, politics, and democracy" (Carpini, 2018, p. 18). The author cited observes, in this perspective, the fact that a research of the website BuzzFeed[18] showed that the twenty major false news about the last

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[18] SILVERMAN, C. (2016, Nov. 16) This analysis shows how viral fake election news stories outperformed real news on Facebook. **BuzzFeed News**. Available from: <https://goo.gl/UygU5V>. Access on: June 22, 2018.

presidential election in the US generated more engagement (comments, shares, etc.) on Facebook than the twenty major articles on the same subject produced by major media companies.

This "new regime" perhaps has already been perceived in 2010 by Jair Bolsonaro, considering his political activities related to the use of social media in the case of "gay kit." The aggressive form of expression adopted by him characterizes the "new regime," as well as the strongest tendency to commercialism by the traditional media (which explains to some extent the significant press coverage received by populists). These aspects, according to Waisbord, Tucker and Zoey (2014), indicate a great break in the contemporary public communication, which favored the dissemination of false arguments and uncivil discourses in the USA, explaining the election of Donald Trump.

Thus, the way that media ecology is reflected in Brazil and becomes an inescapable context of activity of political groups of any ideology is a significant research topic to understand the political communication in a post-coup Brazil.

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The 2016 Elections on Brazilian Regional Newspapers' Fan Pages: Facebook as a space for distribution and visibility of news on the campaign

MICHELE GOULART MASSUCHIN

Associate Professor in Social Communication/Journalism, Federal University of Maranhão (UFMA). PhD in Political Sciences from Federal University of São Carlos (UFSCar). Coordinator of "Politics and Society" Research Group (COPS-UFMA), Imperatriz, Maranhão, Brazil. Email: mimassuchin@gmil.com. ORCID: 0000-0001-7918-4487.

Abstract

This article discusses how communication developed by the press from Northeast Brazil on Facebook during the 2016 elections was configured. The research involves two theoretical aspects: one about the centrality of electoral coverage and other about social media as a space for distribution and circulation of journalistic contents. Based on this discussion, we analyze the content published on the fan pages of 9 newspapers – O Estado do Maranhão (MA), Meio Norte (PI), O Povo (CE), Tribuna do Norte (RN), A Tarde (BA), Jornal da Paraíba (PB), Diário de Pernambuco (PE), Gazeta de Alagoas (AL) and Jornal da Cidade (SE) – during the 2016 election, totalizing 9,993 posts. The objective is to identify the visibility given to elections and which sub-themes on campaign were published. The main results indicate the prevalence of entertainment news, which indicates a moderate space for political issues and, consequently, for elections. Concerning the political campaign, posts were focused on the candidates' agendas and routines of this period, evidencing similarity with the coverage profile through traditional media i.e. few changes in the configuration of journalism since the advent of social media.

Keywords

Introduction

This article[1] discusses the configuration of communication developed by news media from Northeastern Brazil on Facebook during the 2016 elections. We analyze this phenomenon through content analysis of these newspapers' posts on their fan pages. In this research, social media are understood as spaces for journalistic content distribution and the coverage of elections is understood as central in the political run, mainly because it provides informational subsidies to voters and visibility to candidates. Thus, it is important for journalism, especially for political journalism, to understand how such spaces should be used[2] and which content should be selected for distribution through them. Although social media have emerged as a platform for promoting interpersonal relationship, journalistic companies have used fan pages as a space for distributing information, so this new practice may be investigated in order to understand its configurations. This feat becomes even more important because one can easily spread information through social media and this possibility allows the circulation of electoral content about local campaigns published on regional newspapers.

Despite the possibility of using social network sites as a potential space for political campaigns, we believe that public interest issues increasingly need to share space with entertainment topics. This "competition" tends to be stronger on Internet, so distributing which is considered more attractive news becomes relevant (García-perdomo et al, 2017). Then, newspapers choose featuring entertainment and celebrities' life instead of politics once those topics have potential for engaging more people. In the context of social media there is an emphasis on the conflict between the value of "public interest" and "entertainment", which achieves a new configuration due to the characteristics of the new platform.

In the context of dispute for the readers' attention, the use of social media can be an important action for the transmission of political information, mainly on elections time. During the campaigns, traditional news media constitute a space both to give candidates visibility and to offer informational subsidies for discussing proposals and assisting the opinion formation (Shaw, 1999). The studies about coverage on traditional media reinforce the relevance of this variable to the electoral process (Aldé; Mendes; Figueiredo, 2007; Mundim, 2014).

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[2] The focus of this work, therefore, is not on the constitution and the characteristics of the network formed through the pages of newspapers. We analyze the kind of content offered by journalistic institutions in order to be shared through social media.

Based on this discussion, we analyze 9,993 posts published on Facebook pages of nine newspapers from Northeastern Brazil – *O Estado do maranhão (MA), Meio Norte (PI), O Povo (CE), Tribuna do Norte (RN), A Tarde (BA), Jornal da Paraíba (PB), Diário de Pernambuco (PE), Gazeta de Alagoas (AL) e Jornal da Cidade (SE)* – during the 2016 elections. The research aims to identify the visibility[3] afforded to the 'theme' elections and its 'approach' on posts.

Hypothesis 1 (H1) recognizes that political issues, especially those connected to local political campaigns, achieve more space on the fan pages of regional newspapers than entertainment, considering the electoral context and the proximity of local elections to the constituents. This hypothesis allows us to identify the configuration of the use of social media by regional newspapers once previous research was mainly focused on national newspapers (Zago; Bastos, 2013; Massuchin; Carvalho, 2016; Johnson, 2015). It is expected that local themes, like elections, also appear on social network sites, contrasting the discussion about the prevalence of entertainment.

The second hypothesis (H2) recognizes that political coverage on newspapers' fan pages on Facebook brings few innovations compared to political coverage on traditional media, centralizing the content in candidates' agenda and in what Porto (2004) calls 'horse racing'. These points are connected to the few qualitative changes on journalism since the advent of use of social media, which would be directly reflected on the electoral coverage. Elections demand continuous coverage and could offer substantial gains to the audience.

Both hypotheses reflect the understanding of the logic of regional journalistic production turned to social media on newspapers less focused by communication studies in Brazil. Furthermore, the second hypothesis offers insights to understand the dynamics of coverage no longer on traditional news media but on the digital platform, which brings new insights to the area.

Centrality of journalistic coverage during elections

Since 1990's, the literature on elections has presented a systematic monitoring of electoral coverage in Brazil (Aldé; Mendes; Figueiredo, 2007; FUKS; Cervi, 2000; Mundim, 2014). The reasons to explain the constituents' behavior are diverse and also connected to journalistic coverage on elections (Shaw, 1999;

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[3] This text does not analyze the potential for replication of published contents. We are analytically worried about how Facebook is used by journalistic institutions. Even though the engagement explains the logic of consumption, the reach and visibility of news published on social media and being related to the use of them by communication enterprises, this feat constitutes another discussion that is out of the remit of this article.

Figueiredo, 1991). This motivates the development of political communication studies, in order to understand the way that communication tools address political disputes and candidates, on traditional or digital spaces.

During electoral cycle, information from parties, candidates – without passing through the traditional media filter – and journalistic enterprises are all references. Media coverage offers a rising number of contents to feed the informational repertoire of citizens (Cervi, 2010; Aldé; Mendes; Figueiredo, 2007), providing cognitive resources (Miguel, 1999), even though exerting direct relevance over the vote decision depends on several contextual facts (Mundim, 2014).

Lippmann (2010) says that the media is responsible for constructing images in our head and Tuchman (1980) recognizes that news are the window to the world. Then, we can make this fit with information concerning the electoral cycle and the media coverage of politics. Despite the proximity and relevance, campaign events are often only available to citizens in terms of content that arrives through media coverage. According to Aldé, Mendes & Figueiredo (2007, p. 155), the electoral run "imposes itself as agenda because of the calendar and the information market dynamics". This feat is related to the news values intrinsic to facts (Harculp; O´neill, 2001), i.e. relevance, notoriety of the evolved, presence of elites' power, magnitude, proximity and public interest, which are historically important to the understanding of the political news selection process.

However, digital communication shifts the news values interpretation, and complementarily establishes a new logic: the viral character of contents (García-Perdomo et al, 2017). Horan (2012) analyzed tweets and realized that they provide more information about entertainment than on public interest. Thus, it involves content that is produced by the media, which is taken by these news values. García-Perdomo et al (2017) studied Brazilian, US and Argentinian newspapers and concluded that entertainment tends to be more recommended on Facebook, but on traditional media news about the government, politics in general and crimes are more shared. The logic of interactivity shifts media processes because according to Trilling et al (2017) it is possible to foresee from newsworthiness criteria which content can engage more the public.

So, choosing to cover more or less the political run is a decision influenced by editorial policy, economic issues and news production routines (SHOEMAKER; VOS, 2009). This process has become even more complex, because it increasingly incorporates new questions, especially those related to the public and economy. Shoemaker *et al* (2010) also identified that the audience is more interested on unusual or scary content. It also impacts directly the selection of themes by the media.

The difference between 'hard news' and 'soft news' emerges, even though it is a controversial classification (Reinemann et al, 2011; Tuchman, 1980; Baym, 2008). The presence of news considered soft news (*fait divers*, infotainment) has characterized national and international journalistic production (Massuchin; Tavares, 2015; García-avilés, 2007) and are nowadays prevailing. Despite conceptual differences that the literature presents, there is more information on varieties, celebrities, sports, curiosities and unusual facts, which can be characterized as a type of "tabloidization" (Chagas, 2016).

Even though Reinemann et al (2011) points out several dimensions that define news as "hard" or "soft", in this article news analysis is based on the 'theme' (*topic dimension*) and the 'approach' (*focus dimension*), operationalizing the research according to García-Avilés (2007) and Lehman-Wilzig & Seletzky (2010). The justification is on the consideration of distinct news groups, which is constantly mentioned on the literature, as identified by the mapping in Reinemann et al (2011). The second dimension (*focus dimension*) is considered in order to analyze dubious news, for example, when it is focused on a celebrity but s/he talks about racial prejudice. We recognize the advancement of the literature and the proposition of new frames through intermediate categories (Lehman-Wilzig & Seletzky, 2010). However, the dichotomy hard *versus* soft news is used on the research only to relate to and oppose media coverage on political issues (hard news, according to literature) and entertainment (soft news*)*.

Thus, while soft themes gain space others lose prominence[4]. This ends up with a replacement of public interest issues for those in which the audience is interested. This change in production logic and producer interests is related to economic issues and increased audience (Chagas, 2016) and also has impact over the electoral coverage. The issues related to political campaign and political institutions (hard news) achieve few space on the media according to Miguel (1999), when the author studied *Jornal Nacional*'s[5] coverage and highlighted the 'empire of *fait divers'*. The issue "political campaign" has its repertoire of news values intrinsically connected to the events of the elections, which generates the expectation of achieving visibility on news coverage. However, the expansion of soft news competition among journalistic enterprises contradictory generates the visibility of politics (Miguel, 1999).

On the other hand, when political themes appear there are also deficiencies on the approaches, which are very limited to candidates' agenda (Fuks; Cervi,

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[4] In order to observe the relationship between politics and entertainment of other works, it is important to emphasize the approach from the point of view of the theme, as it was also accomplished in these works.

[5] A TV news program that achieves a broad audience in Brazil.

2000), or is based only on the results of electoral polls. It defines basically the 'horse racing' model (Porto, 2004)[6], leaving in the background the coverage on candidates' proposals and the debate on public interest issues. When media coverage do not shed light on political campaigns the analytical level of facts is not featured as well (Porto, 2004). In addition, there is a reductionist view of politics when media focus mainly on campaigns' routines and candidates' agenda. Emphasizing opinion polls also reduces the political run to 'horse racing'. This typical traditional media practice has been reproduced on media coverage of elections through social network sites.

To sum up, we need to firstly understand that in a context of political run any space is important (Borges, 2002) and this observation justifies the analysis on how media coverage of elections is made through newspapers' fan pages on social media, in Northeastern Brazil, once online coverage (similarly to offline) is "an operation of framing and constructing facts" (Azevedo, 1999, p. 11).

Social network sites and the flow of news

In the late 1970's, Tuchman stated that when the media disseminate content, they contribute to the circulation and construction of knowledge. It has always been one of the aims of communication enterprises on traditional or digital news. However, digital technologies intensify this process (Machado, 2008) especially social media, which is our research object. If information was previously distributed more slowly – and from an only center (Machado, 2008) – and each platform distributed different content, since the media convergence process started there is an increasing of informative content circulation and a mixture of contents that appear in different supports (Deuze, 2006), a kind of reutilization, reuse and redistribution. These contents are now interconnected and denominate what is called "network journalism" (Heinrich, 2008).

Even though social media have the aim of connecting individuals, they can be used for an infinity of functions, among them circulating information. But it is not about any kind of information. Traditional media, more specifically newspapers, are among the pages and public profiles no social media, which now compose newsrooms routines related to reunite, disseminate, select, and filter content, and also to alter relations with readers (Hermida, 2010; Recuero, 2011). Furthermore, newspapers are still considered trustable sources or at least more trustable than

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[6] This concept is taken as a component of the 'approach' variable, because we stated a category for postings that highlight polls results, even if there is not the variable 'framing' in the analysis. Due to the posts particularities, we chose to compose a new variable for aggregating other adapted categories.

other pages that also spread information (Recuero, 2011).

Studies on the use of social media by journalism have multiplied in Brazil (Zago; Bastos, 2013; Massuchin; Carvalho, 2016; Recuero, 2011) and other countries as well (Ferreira; Rodrigues, 2016; Hermida, 2010; Hong, 2012). Research shows that there are several reasons to explain newspapers' use of the online platform. The first one is the fast content circulation (Hermida, 2010), which complements information on traditional media. Furthermore, due to the decreasing of the volume of readers[7], the use of news portals and the migration to social network sites is an innovative way of attracting new readers (Hong, 2012). Social media act like a 'bridge' to portals and news websites through *links*, which is directly and indirectly a strategy (Zago; Bastos, 2013) for achieving more access and guaranteeing receipt (Hong, 2012).

Newspapers moved to the online platform and count on social media as a space for improving their content distribution. Hong (2012), for example, called attention to the increasing of newspapers access on the web and to the sharing of journalistic content by users, who proportionate an additional process that can be named 'recirculation' (Zago; Bastos, 2013; Recuero, 2011), i.e. content replication by sharing, liking or commenting on postings, which increase their distribution.

If social media are considered auxiliary tools for traditional means – e.g. printed newspapers – and serve to increase content circulation, we can say that they act simultaneously by giving visibility to certain issues – which are posted by newspaper companies – and blocking the distribution of content from other enterprises (Zago; BastoS, 2013; Primo, 2011). This feat has direct relation with the importance of publications about the electoral cycle, which would give space and visibility for this theme among potential readers. However, when the web open space for politics, we can identify the invisibility of the theme. There is a process of choice (similarly to traditional media) related to what will be echoed on the web (Recuero, 2011).

Even though this looks like a simple decision, there is still an attempt of calling public attention in order to receive more 'clicks', which interferes with the choice of themes and distribution of facts (Trilling et al, 2017; Jonhson, 2005; García-Perdomo et al, 2017). Readers interest is heavily taken into account in the process of journalistic choices, which points to a coexistence of the gatewatching and the gatekeeping (Primo, 2011), according to Trilling et al (2017). There is an endless amount of information on the web and users need to choose (Heinrich,

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[7] According to the Brazilian Institute of Circulation Verification (IVC), Brazilian printed newspapers versions lost between 8% and 15% of their readers in 2016. Data on the Brazilian Media Research also showed low access to printed newspapers and magazines, in this country. Pew Research Center pointed to a fall between 7% and 4% of readers since 2010, in the US.

2008), so the media use strategies to call attention and achieve more accesses. By knowing the positive relation between online traffic of information and receipts (Hong, 2012), offering what the public wants to read becomes a strategy.

Methodology

This article analyzes content daily posted on Facebook pages of nine newspapers from Northeastern Brazil: *O Estado do maranhão (MA)*, *Meio Norte (PI)*, *O Povo (CE)*, *Tribuna do Norte (RN)*, *A Tarde (BA)*, *Jornal da Paraíba (PB)*, *Diário de Pernambuco (PE)*, *Gazeta de Alagoas (AL)* e *Jornal da Cidade (SE)*. We chose one medium per state from that region. We also considered the history and circulation of each newspaper based on Brazilian Association of News Companies (ANJ) data.

The postings were collected from Facebook through the app *Netvizz*, and the corpus is formed by 9,993 messages. Data collection started in 16 August 2016 when political campaigns officially began and finished on the day of elections, 2 October 2016. They were analyzed according to a coding book[8] based on Bauer (2002) and the methodological technique adopted was a quantitative content analysis. The quantitative approach was taken due to the high amount of *posts* and the large analysis period (Cervi, 2009). The variables analyzed were 'theme' and 'campaign approach' of the posts.

The variable 'theme' has the following categories: Political campaign or political parties (only related to elections); Political Institutions; Economy; Health; Education; Minorities; Urban infrastructure; Environment; Violence and Security; Accidents and tragedies; Ethics/moral (linked to corruption); Varieties and culture; Curiosities (posts on unusual content); Sports; Other, when none of the other categories was covered in the post; and Missing journalistic information (MJI), when posts do not present any theme and there is no news content, mostly informal interaction posts (for example, "Good morning, dear readers! Have a nice day!").

The variable "campaign approach", coded only when 'theme' was 'political campaign or political parties', had the following categories: "campaign agenda", in which candidates' events and activities were considered; "proposals and themes", proposals presentation or thematic discussion among candidates; "campaign

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[8] The codification was made by a team of seven undergraduate students of Journalism, who were previously trained for collecting and then passed through a test from a sample of 49 posts, in order to identify problems on the understanding of variables and their categories. Based on this sample, we run a simple liability test considering the cohesion on the codification. All variables and categories were evaluated separately and achieved more than 80% matches between pairs.

information", related to rules of the electoral run; "electoral justice", on electoral justice decisions and illegality; "electoral polls/results", data on the polls or the final results; "simultaneous coverage", when the fan page covers events simultaneously; "declaration/candidates' opinions", based on candidates' speeches bits; and "other", when posts could not be classified into one of the characteristics listed above[9].

Electoral themes and differences among newspapers

This section presents the distribution of posts and 'themes' among the newspapers analyzed. Table 1 shows data related to the number of posts published by the nine fan pages aiming to understand if social media appropriation is balanced among these companies. However, data show that some newspapers post more, the case of *O Povo* (2,114), *Diário de Pernambuco* (1,558), and *A Tarde* (1,263), which are also the biggest companies focused. On the other hand, there are disruptive cases, e.g. *Meio Norte*, which is not among the biggest ones, but published 1,553 times during the period analyzed.

TABLE 1. Distribution of Posts by Newspaper

	N.	%	Med.
O Povo	2,164	21.7	45.1
Diário de Pernambuco	1,586	15.9	33
Meio Norte	1,523	15.2	31.7
A Tarde	1,263	12.6	26.3
Gazeta de Alagoas	1,171	11.7	24.4
Tribuna do Norte	664	6.6	13.8
O Estado do Maranhão	608	6.1	12.7
Jornal da Paraíba	581	5.8	12.1
Jornal da Cidade	433	4.3	9
Total	9,993	100	

The table shows that *O Estado do Maranhão* (608) and *Jornal da Cidade* (433) are on opposite sides concerning the frequency of use of Facebook for sharing content (Zago; Bastos, 2013). These differences – which can be explained among other reasons by the size of newsrooms, for example – show that it is not only the presence of technology that changes the way of content production and distribution in news companies. However, it is necessary the interest on have possible benefits from it, as circulation (Machado, 2008) and expansion of the

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[9] Some categories were established based on the debate over framing (PORTO, 2004). However, we added other categories in order to adapt the analysis to social media. So, the variable is labeled distinctly.

public (Hong, 2012), understanding the interconnection between traditional space and social media.

Despite the broader observation of data about intensity of fan pages use, we cannot say yet if issues on public interest or entertainment. The centrality of communication media on electoral disputes can be moved to the online platform only if there is content distribution that strengths (and offer subsidies for) public debate. So, graph 1 indicates the 'themes' distribution during the period in analysis. There is a prevalence of news related to varieties and culture (14.9%) – celebrities' life, soap operas, concerts, beauty etc. According to Zago & Bastos (2013), this profile achieves more potential through social media, where newspaper companies want to achieve more clicks, since these are themes that call readers attention (Shoemaker et al, 2010) and generates engagement (Trilling et al, 2017).

GRAPH 1. Distribution of 'Themes'

By choosing the electoral period, we assume as proxy a moment when there is less chance of soft issues to be featured. We estimate that in other moments there is probably a super estimation of this kind of "tabloidization" (Chagas, 2016) of regional quality papers. This attitude is similar to the national newspapers coverage. However, the presence of soft themes during the electoral run is not new, because the tendency of "tabloidization" was already identified by Miguel (1999) on television coverage.

The themes that can be considered 'infotainement', from the concept designed by Baym (2008) – varieties and culture, sports and curiosities – achieve

at least 30% of all publications analyzed. This reinforces the journalistic attempts (regional newspapers included) of producing and giving space to this content profile. Violence and security is covered on 13.9% of total publications, which can be connected to the context of these newspapers because many of them are from capital cities with high levels of violence. According to the centrality of the news value "proximity", especially in local or regional newspapers, this issue tends to be highlighted. On the other hand, we add the possibility of sensationalism and the pursuit of scary news (Shoemaker et al, 2010).

It is remarkable that all the other social themes – except those related to politics and 'violence and security' – have very low percentiles among contents posted on fan pages, which is the case of education (2.7). Thus, there is an occlusion of public interest themes on contents selected to circulate on social media, which makes them invisible (Miguel, 1999). They do not seem to foster engagement, so are not highlighted by newspapers (Trilling et al, 2017).

We concluded by the analysis of political themes that elections (political campaigns and political parties) constitute the fifth most frequent theme on news coverage on fan pages. 'Political institutions', which means political questions unrelated to local disputes, occupies the third place. Beyond electoral run, the impeachment process against Dilma Rousseff (the former President of Brazil) had many unfolding events during the period analyzed. This fact probably helped political themes to achieve so many publications on the regional newspapers fan pages.

The amount of posts on political issues reaches 18% of the total. They have an intermediate visibility concerning the hierarchy of circulation on social media but have less space than entertainment topics (30%). When we aggregate data, the first hypothesis is not confirmed. Then, soft topics does not appear only on national newspapers (Massuchin; Carvalho, 2016; Johnson, 2015) but regional ones also use the logic of calling readers attention by covering themes that achieve more engagement.

Even though political issues do not have centrality on news production, their intermediate visibility may be highlighted comparatively[10] to other public interest questions, which appear only in around 5% of postings. The justification for this positioning is the presence of traditional news value as relevance, magnitude and elites' power (Harculp; O´neill; 2001), which represent the first requisites for political facts to achieve journalists attention.

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[10] Even though we do not know how much the postings can reach the audience, which is out of the remit of this article, the first step for content circulation is to be produced and prioritized on posts by the newsrooms.

Moreover, the campaigns dynamics – daily facts – fed the proposal of instantaneity of social media and 'last minute' news. Campaign themes are probably "approved" by *gatewatching* (the readers) and by traditional *gatekeepers* (Primo, 2011) even if it is still necessary to call readers attention by using entertainment in other postings.

Since now, data were presented in an aggregative way, which is important for comparing and verifying differences between newspapers, because in some of them this dispute scenario between politics and entertainment can be shown distinctly. Table 3 shows the standardized residuals and chi-square tests in order to achieve the relation between themes and newspapers. Achieving almost 18% of political news through Facebook is not a pattern, and some newspapers treat more while others cover less these issues. This result allows us to think about grouping these newspapers according to their choices and aims, considering distributed content. The thesis of invisibility of politics, like on the coverage of elections in 1998 and 2000 on traditional media (Miguel, 1999; Fuks; Cervi, 2000), seems to be corroborated by some newspapers, whilst others highlight more this theme.

TABLE 2. Distribution of themes by newspaper

	A Tarde	Diário de Pernambuco	Gazeta de Alagoas	Jornal da Cidade	Jornal da Paraíba	Meio Norte	O Estado do Maranhão	O Povo	Tribuna do Norte
Political campaign	0.7	-7.2	2.3	3.1	4.9	-7.4	7.5	3.6	-2.5
Political Institutions	2.1	0.2	-4.1	3.0	0.7	-8.3	8.8	1.4	1.0
Economy	0.9	-0.7	0.9	3.9	1.2	-5.3	2.2	-0.5	1.2
Health	-2.3	1.6	-1.6	1.6	-1.4	2.4	1.3	-1.5	0.6
Education	-2.3	-0.6	-1.7	0.4	1.1	-3.3	0.8	3.5	3.0
Minorities	0.6	3.1	-1.3	-0.8	-1.7	-1.4	-0.6	1.7	-1.9
Infrastructure	0.8	-0.3	-1.9	2.3	-0.2	-5.6	3.6	1.7	2.1
Environment	-1.0	-0.5	0.5	1.7	-0.6	-0.5	0.2	0.2	0.9
Violence and Security	-2.9	-3.8	12.4	1.8	1.2	3.7	-1.0	-6.8	-1.5
Accidents and tragedies	0.5	-0.1	3.4	2.3	1.1	2.9	-3.2	-3.9	-2.4
Ethics/Moral	2.1	3.6	0.0	-1.7	0.7	-4.2	2.9	-2.1	-0.3
Varieties and culture	-0.9	7.5	-4.9	-4.2	-1.7	6.7	-6.9	-0.2	-2.0
Curiosities	-6.2	4.2	-4.6	-5.0	-4.5	21.7	-5.8	-2.7	-6.1
Sports	**7.1**	-2.3	6.6	-4.7	-5.1	-7.8	-5.6	3.2	4.8
Other	-0.9	0.7	-4.6	-2.4	6.8	-1.5	1.7	1.3	0.0
No journalistic info	1.3	-4.1	-6.8	1.6	-3.3	4.6	-3.5	3.8	4.9

X^2: 2,314.579 sig: 0.000 (Except by the theme 'minorities', which had cells with less than 5 cases).

Table 2 shows that five of the nine newspapers aggregate more news on politics: *O Estado do Maranhão, Jornal da Paraíba, O Povo, Jornal da Cidade* e

Gazeta de Alagoas. Even though *O Estado do Maranhão* is one of those to publish less content on its Facebook fan page, it concentrates the most posts on politics. This result shows that posting more is not necessarily making available contents of public interest. *Jornal da Cidade* and *A Tarde* are among those newspapers that also focus on political institutions.

The proposal of contribution of social media for the circulation of electoral content was identified only on part of the newspapers investigated. Even though the idea of presence of the political run over entertainment, it is not a pattern in all newspapers. Editorial interests, audience profile and other questions interfere on the way that enterprises deal with Facebook as a space for content circulation. The strict relation with political groups in the state could explain the high interest of *O Estado do Maranhão* in political and electoral themes. Similarly, *Gazeta de Alagoas* and *Jornal da Paraíba* have political attachs. However, it is necessary to conduct interviews or observe internally the news offices in order to understand better the logic of the particular interest by these themes, which was not our point in this research.

On the other hand, not all the newspapers studied drive visibility to political themes. Some of them prefer to post more soft and attractive themes (Shoemaker et al, 2010), which could increase the number of readers (Hong, 2012). If the aim is to achieve more clicks through links, this action is economically relevant, which happens specifically on *Diário de Pernambuco* and *Meio Norte*. It does not mean that there is no political themes on their fan pages, but that they are expressed in few posts compared to other themes and other newspapers. The graphs below (2 and 3) illustrate differences between two of them and show that they are on opposite sides related to themes priority on Facebook posts, mainly evidencing the centrality or not of electoral issues.

Graphs 2 and 3 – Distribution of themes on *Diário de Pernambuco* (left) and *O Estado do Maranhão* (right)

Some newspapers choose not to drive high visibility to politics, for example *Diário de Pernambuco*, which had more than 20% of posts on varieties and culture, contrarily to *O Estado do Maranhão*, which has almost 40% of its content about politics. This reality is also expressed on traditional news, as Fuks & Cervi (2000) had already found on some newspapers from Paraná during elections. The presence of certain news values and the proximity of elections are not necessarily determinant – even though they are relevant – for opening space to themes related to the political run, because economic questions and those of readers' interest have more decisive power (Shoemaker; VOS, 2009), as well as facts pointed out by Trilling et al (2017) and García-Perdomo et al (2017).

Even though entertainment has more space than political issues in general, which configures the fan pages use by Northeastern newspapers in Brazil even in electoral periods, data show that the prioritization of local disputes is worth noting. Then, it is important to understand political coverage through fan pages.

Dependence on agendas and speeches

This part of the analysis considers only 8.5% of total coverage, represented by 852 posts on elections. These postings specifically on campaigns were analyzed based on a specific categorization to understand the kind of electoral content that was more visible. Firstly, according to table 3, daily information on campaigns (dates, rules and events strictly related to the campaign) appears more. It achieves 25.8% of posts. "The meeting with coalition components happened last Friday (26) without any deal" (*Jornal da Paraíba*) is an example of this kind of content that generates continuous information on the dispute. This result is positive and meets the conclusions on Borges (2002), because it would give a sensation to the readers of knowing "details" about the political run. On the other side, they are strictly daily information, which does not lead us to any contextual and wider understanding of elections.

TABLE 3. Approach on posts about elections (n=852)

	N.	%
Daily information on campaign	220	25.8
Candidates' agenda	152	17.8
Electoral justice (problems with campaigns)	105	12.3
Polls/Final results	96	11.3
Instantaneous coverage	80	9.4

Other	80	9.4
Speeches/opinion of candidates	73	8.6
Proposals and themes	46	5.4
Total	852	100

Despite the invisibility on some newspapers (Miguel, 1999) and the obstruction of electoral issues on social media, electoral coverage is facilitated by several reasons. One of them is media centrality for candidates, who consider it a relevant factor for the dispute. So, campaign teams work to assist the media and share information (Lipinski; Neddenriep, 2014), which guarantee some space on the coverage. This attitude is evident on the 17.8% of electoral coverage focused on candidates' agenda, based on releases sent by their offices and the spaces that their advisors create to attend media demands. It constitutes almost a third part of every content on campaign through social media and points to how media 'follow' the electoral process and does not dominates it: on the contrary, it is dominated by it.

Declaratory journalism is connected to this result, which is supported by candidates' speeches and opinions on free electoral publicity on TV and radio (HGPE in Brazil), events, debates and interviews that are reproduced, generating episodic journalistic production on speech clippings. This category showed up on 8.6% of postings and if we aggregate it with 'agenda' they reach 26.1% of coverage focus on candidates and their private actions.

Proposals and discussion on themes, which would be relevant on the coverage for contributing to present wider and contextual approaches on candidates opinions on specific topics, have almost no feature (5.4%). Even though this approach can be ordinary on traditional news platforms, it is not recurrent, as some studies have showed. The absence of a propositional coverage, therefore, is expanded to coverage through social media.

From these data, the hypothesis about the journalism limitations on social media is partially confirmed. Media coverage on politics has limitations inherited from offline production, because there is a considerable part of postings related to candidates' agenda and speeches, which represents the media dependency and the absence of autonomy on the coverage. The traditional media model for covering political run as a horse racing (Porto, 2004) is in decay. Furthermore, even though electoral polls generated a high amount of posts on the day they were released, they were less addressed on that platform in general.

New approaches of the coverage through social media are worth noting. One of them is the instantaneity of social media, which allows a simultaneous coverage of events. During the campaign activities, newspaper post considerable content on that, e.g. "During the candidate's interview…" (*Gazeta de Alagoas*). This attitude

allows – in a certain way – an adaptation of the 'second screen' concept (Wohn; Na, 2011) that can be applied to the specific coverage on elections. At this moment, newspapers – not necessarily the public – decide to use social media to broadcast "live" information, which is a try for approximating with the public.

Conclusions

This article analyzed how social media are used by newspapers from Northeastern Brazil to publish journalistic content. The research mobilizes literature on political campaigns and social media to discuss how these newspapers used Facebook during the 2016 elections. We analyzed 9,993 posts aiming to identify the use of this platform during elections, from evidence of political or electoral themes.

Among the main results, we highlight a broader coverage on entertainment, following the assumptions of literature related to the pursuit of clicks and the use of content that calls audience's attention as a strategic behavior. On the other side, it is worth noting that some public interest themes were featured, as violence and security, and especially political campaigns and political parties in focus on this analysis. Data lead us to conclude that newspapers' pages on social media share mostly entertainment. However, there are some differences between newspapers: some fan pages contribute more with the diffusion of information about politics, e.g. *O Estado do Maranhão*. Even though this newspaper is one of those that have few postings on social media, it has the biggest percentile of posts on political campaigns and political parties. So, it was apparently an important political actor on the disputes.

Concerning the hypotheses, we refuse the first one, once entertainment (composed by varieties and culture, sports, and curiosities) is highlighted on newspapers fan pages on Facebook, contrarily to political themes, which reach 18% of postings. Even though electoral campaign was not the most featured theme on publications, it holds an intermediate position among all themes framed. This place indicates that political campaign is still an interesting issue for journalistic companies and can achieve readers' attention, despite the huge competition with entertainment. We may highlight that among the nine newspapers analyzed, six of them were more prone to cover the electoral issues through their profile, even though it does not have the biggest space.

The second hypothesis was partially confirmed. Data showed a continuity of offline production limitations, e.g. postings centralized on "candidates' agenda", which represents dependence in relation to campaigns to keep Facebook pages up to date. Despite the distinct flow of information, the kind of content posted on the

online platform is similar to those that newspapers posted on traditional media. However, there is a difference: the reduction of the view of electoral run as horse racing, with few coverage of electoral results. Instead, there is more information on campaigns' routines. We can still highlight the live coverage of political events, which also characterized electoral coverage on Facebook fan pages, the most innovative activity for newspapers.

To sum up, even though there are some studies in Brazil about journalism and social media, this research tried to fill in some remaining gaps. We tangentially discuss the distribution of news on political campaigns and political parties through social media highlighting the debate on the perspective of political communication, which is a missing topic on the Brazilian literature. Furthermore, it is a comparative research that covers Northeastern quality papers, which constitutes a broad scenario for investigation, pointing that most work has featured national newspapers when analyzing the configuration of social media use during elections. Finally, this is a systematic research of a long period, which allows detailed results on the behavior of newspapers on social media, and dialogues with literature about entertainment and other themes.

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Music Promotion In Brazil: from 'caitituagem' to the challenges of digital competition

DANIEL GAMBARO
PhD candidate at the Graduate Program in Media and Audiovisuals Process of Arts and Communications School from São Paulo University, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil. E-mail: dgambaro@usp.br. ORCID: 0000-0003-0903-8788

EDUARDO VICENTE
Associate Professor in Sound and Audiovisuals Media at the Arts and Communications School from São Paulo University (ECA/USP), São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil. PhD in Communication Sciences from the same institution. E-mail: eduvicente@usp.br. ORCID: 0000-0002-1130-0637.

THAIS SARAIVA RAMOS
Master in Communication Sciences from the Anhembi Morumbi University, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil. Professor at Communication School in the the same institution. E-mail: thaissramos@usp.br. ORCID: 0000-0002-8408-1594.

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Abstract

This article discusses radio as a mediator and curator of musical consumption, a historically-defined role that is currently questioned given the introduction of digital tools of music distribution. By means of interviews with professionals from the recording and radio industries, it describes the mechanisms used by the record labels' promotion staff to have a song on the radio airplay. Practitioners and stations used such commercial relationships to create legitimacy strategies that, even with the rapid growth of subscription-based music streaming services, support the curatorial mission. The radiophonic language, centred at the presenter, is complementary of the role undertaken by the software that organise and distribute musical content.

Keywords

Introduction[1,2]

This paper discusses how radio has historically functioned as "mediator" and "curator" of music consumption, a role institutionalised from its relationship with the music industry. Between the promotion work of record companies and the radio listeners, there is an open space for negotiation long operated by radio hosts and, for some time now, by station managers, thus configuring the broadcasters as mediators. Therefore, radio stations (represented by their practitioners) may be perceived as curators since, on account of negotiations with record labels and feedback from listeners, it occurred the consolidation of performers and bands who sustained, for a long time, the economic success of the Brazilian music industry. By sharing the exposure of performers with television, radio aids in the construction of the audience's memory through promotion and repetitive play of songs during programmes.

The *radio pluggers* – also called promoters, the record companies' employees responsible for contacting the radio staff – had a relevant backstage role in this stations/labels relationship, especially from the 1960 decade on, when more aggressive promotion strategies were implemented. Recognising the pluggers' work is part of understanding how music radio assumed its institutionalised form in Brazil. It is not our intention, though, to present a complete historicization of such relationship, but to draw its characteristics, especially from the implementation of FM (Frequency Modulation) stations during the 1970s.

We believe that knowing the procedures that configured the stations/labels relationship allows for a better-informed observation about the role occupied by radio today, considering the medium must compete for listeners' attention with music streaming services. Our main hypothesis is that, despite such services provide better alternatives for music consumption, radio retains its relevance as cultural mediator and curator, especially in regard of music genres of massive consumption, e.g. Brazilian Country Music (*Sertanejo*) and Funk from *Rio de Janeiro* and *São Paulo* (a variation of *Miami Bass*). The specific features of radio stations and their presence on the internet allow them to comply with the needs both of record companies and listeners. Therefore, radio can take a part on the *smart curation* (Martel, 2015), that is, the sum of informatic tools and human beings that organise, together, the ever-growing content offering.

The main discussion will be organised in three sections. After the adopted methodology is described, it will be presented a discussion on how the development of radio and music industries after the 1960s implied in an increasing rationalisation of activities related to the massification of cultural consumption. Next, results collected through interviews with professionals from radio and music industries will be aligned to describe – from the point of view of those directly involved – the works of music promotion. The third part, just before some final considerations, will discuss the historic processes under the contemporary reality of music distribution through digital media.

Methodology

Three procedures were used in the making of this research: interviews with professionals, both active and retired; bibliographic review about the theme; discussion of hypothesis from the crossing of the acquired information.

An empirical set of data was assembled from statements from radio pluggers, radio personalities and record producers, who described how they and their colleagues worked within the music distribution business, thus illuminating their influences over decision-making processes regarding the selection and promotion of songs by radio stations. The depositions were obtained as part of two different research projects undertook by the authors themselves. The first one, between 2007 and 2009, covered interviews with people from the record industry, especially music producers, recording engineers, music directors and music managers, focusing on people relatively known by the general public. The main goal was to establish a foundation with primary references for other investigations about the Brazilian phonographic industry. The second research, initiated by 2015, seeks to understand the dynamics of the promotion of music in Brazil and, concurrently, recover the memory of radio pluggers and discuss their part in the process. On this second phase, workers connected to music promotion departments occupying inferior levels in the record labels' hierarchy are being privileged. Radio hosts who acquired a status of celebrities are also being heard. The depositions are recorded in audio and/or audio and video, transcribed, analysed and compared in order to compose a unified set of information.

The "massification" of music

The fundamental role played by radio as a medium, in its relationship with the music industry, was (and our bet is, it lingers) the broad promotion and distribution of music, or according to our interviewees, its "massification". By

means of radio personalities' credibility and the rotational quality of the programming schedule, radio makes it possible to keep a song longer in the listeners' minds – an important effect to boost the sales of recordings and albums. The choice of playing or not a record constructs audiences as much as feeds the power relations between radio and labels, simultaneously impacting the popular culture (Berland, 1993; Dubber, 2013). Therefore, reproduction of a limited set of music reinforces fan familiarity and engagement. Nonetheless, such formula risks stations becoming less attractive due to repetitiveness and predictability (Warren, 2013).

Radio and music industries have a long and historical relationship in Brazil. First recordings of music date of 1902, and the first disc factory was established in 1913 (Vicente & De Marchi, 2014). Regarding radio, the first station initiated in 1923, and the growth of the Brazilian radio market was defined and backed by the 1932 regulation of commercial use of frequencies (Ortriwano, 1985). Between the 1930 and 1950 decades, radio had a significant part within Getúlio Vargas's political project, and the station *Rádio Nacional do Rio de Janeiro* assumed a leading role after being incorporated as a Brazilian State asset in 1941[3] (Saroldi & Moreira, 1984). Music promotion, at least in the first half of this period, was much less connected to market interests and much more to the "project of unification of the nation" and the consolidation of a "national culture" aimed at by the government (Vicente & De Marchi, 2014).

Starting on the 1960 decade, the greater presence of large international companies, as well as the emergence of domestic communication conglomerates[4], aided the development of a Brazilian music industry. Radio and mainly television (installed in *São Paulo* in 1950) were fundamental to the rise of a new generation of recognised Brazilian musicians and to consolidate the music market. The way cultural consumption developed in Brazil can be explained, at least in part, by the means commercial relations had been established, which led to domestic music prevailing as the most consumed genre in the internal market (thus transforming the country in an exception within Latin-America)[5].

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[3] Initially a private equity company, *Rádio Nacional* became the most important station in Brazil due to the large territorial reach of its emissions, especially from middle 1930s to the 1950s.

[4] Especially Globo Organisation, of which are part Globo TV Network, inaugurated in 1965, and the record label Som Livre, created in 1971.

[5] According to data released by IFPI, 9 on 10 albums figuring amongst the best-selling during 2013 were national (IFPI, 2014: 15). The country occupied the 9th position in a worldwide ranking of music consumption, presenting one of the highest growing rates of digital market up to that moment, always with great prominence of domestic repertoire (IFPI, 2015: 27). In 2015 and 2016, due to the economic crises, the country showed a small retraction without affecting its position as leader in Latin America (IFPI, 2017).

The decision on what music should be promoted to reach high sale indexes is – and has always been – a complex process determined by cultural, artistic and mostly commercial factors. Among the phases are: the labour of performers and bands' managers, record producers and their jobs inside and outside the studio, the label's management departments, as well as the promotion departments and their relationship with the radio staff. The quest for novelties includes observing independent music production that, sometimes, reach major labels[6].

Although the major international record companies operating in Brazil focused on Brazilian Popular Music (MPB) and, later in the 1980s, on Brazilian rock, due to higher selling prices of albums and hence higher profits (Vicente, 2014), the music genre that sold more album copies from the 1960s until the end of the 1980s is the one we are calling "popular-romantic", especially in the segments "*sertanejo*" and "*brega*" (tacky)[7]. The strong stratification established in-between these main segments of music consumption in Brazil was reproduced by the promotion media, in an early moment through the relations between TV and Medium Wave (MW) stations: popular TV shows and MW stations gave exposure to the most "popular" music, while soundtracks in telenovelas and specialist TV shows played the more-sophisticated MPB and Brazilian rock. As of the consolidation of FM stations in the second half of the 1970s, such stratification was replicated in the two frequency bands, with FM dedicated primarily to international music and Brazilian MPB/Rock. Such division started to disappear in the 1980s and had been overcame during the following decade, when the most popular strata reached diverse FM stations programming. Nonetheless, the work of music promotion is relevant in both situations.

The work of music promotion

Given that spread and memory of a music or performer rely, apart from other aspects, on how much it plays on radio, the relationship the medium had with record companies have always been central for the music industry. Especially after the 1960s and until the early 2000s, at least, the interfaces between labels and radio broadcasters largely depended upon a professional constantly obscured from artists biographies and from music scenes analysis: "the radio plugger". In words

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[6] Pena Schmidt, who worked for Continental label from the end of the 1970s to the first years of the 1980s, recounts there was the so-called "paid matter", i.e., when a performer or band hires the company to record their own album. Some works happened to be distributed by Continental, although most of the contractors have never become part of the labels' casting.

[7] We are defining as popular-romantic a wide range of artists to whom the romantic references are a shared particularity. Roberto Carlos – certainly the most important name of the Brazilian music industry between the 1960 and the 1980 decades – represents the most urban pole of this music genre, while other artists stand out as more connected to the urban peripheries and to rural areas, such as Altemar Dutra, Odair José and Waldick Soriano, among others.

put by Carlos Fernandes Conceição (*interview,* 2016), "the plugger is a link between the label and the performer, between the label and the field, the world. One must have a hell of sensibility, [must] believe in the product. It's not only to deliver a product, [we] must show some selling technics, we are salespeople". Carlinhos – the name used by his associates – worked as music promoter for several companies, as manager of BMG's Brazilian branch promotion department and today still performs as freelancer in the same line of work. He highlights that inside record companies the teams of radio pluggers used to be large, divided by sectors, and each one visited a determined number of stations each day.

Between around 1960 and 1980 the popular-romantic music was the most promoted. The period comes before the popularisation of FM stations in Brazil, which occurred only during the 1980s. Until then, MW station hosts were the main instrument (considering radio) for uncountable performers to achieve fame. The radio personalities based their careers on relations of intimacy with the audience – the result of a process of "individualisation of listening" that marked the period of transition after the popularisation of TV (Ferraretto, 2014). The low technological quality of MW stations to broadcast music is also relevant in the process, leading to a predominance of voice that, on its turn, served to legitimise the radio personalities for their audiences. Several names stood out then, such as Eli Corrêa, Hélio de Aguiar and Barros de Alencar, the latter indicated by all respondents as the most accountable for massive sales of albums in the period. The audience ratings of Alencar's show and, consequently, his efficiency in enhancing the sale of discs, were guaranteed by the legitimacy of his voice as perceived by his public.

Most times, for a song to be played by one station it should first be approved by the presenter and his or her producers. That is when the radio pluggers came in: they should demonstrate to the radio personnel the album had audience potential, and many hosts only played what they enjoyed. The resources used by promoters were varied: a good knowledge of popular music and market, friendships, negotiation with radio practitioners through "comforts", and even a "motivation" in cash, the "*payola*". The slang used by pluggers to define their work is "*caitituagem*" (peccaryness). According to online Portuguese dictionary Michaelis, "*caititu*" has three meanings: a mammal resembling a boar, native to American forests (called peccary); a piece of wood used in old flour houses to grate cassava; and those who insistently tries to

> promote compositions or recordings, of their own or of others, by means of constant visits to radio and television stations, contact

with DJs and organisers of popular festivals and parties, distribution of promotional material, and even bribery[8].

In other words, the function of music promoters was to "dig" radio and TV stations to uncover a space to expose albums, and to "grate" radio practitioners until they accepted to play the record on their shows.

There was a strong competition amongst record companies to conquer a space to play their artists, given the volume of production from each company. While disc stores received a large quantity of products to sell, the promoters of each label worked close to radio stations to promote something between five to ten albums a month. On this battle, radio pluggers used strategies sometimes unethical to break a song, such as scratching discs from competitors found at the station, sabotaging other promoter's vehicle so they would arrive late at stations etc., as remembers Moacir Matias (*interview,* 2015), he himself a radio plugger. The next topics of the text will explain in more detail how these professionals operated.

Hit parades

During the period of development of a Brazilian music market, some radio shows and some periodicals started to include "hit parades", i.e., charts listing the most-requested songs, the most played, or the most sold singles and albums. There is a chance the most important initiative was *Grande Parada Nacional* (The Big National Chart), produced by Sebastião Ferreira da Silva, radio plugger and presenter. The list started as part of a show hosted by Silva at *Rádio Nacional de São Paulo*[9] since late 1960s, when he weekly indicated the best-selling albums. His methodology was based on lists of sales provided by store owners. The data was collected and compiled by a team and later published in a specialist magazine that came to have a print of 25 thousand copies a month. The enterprise was financed by companies of the record sector through advertising spaces. Moreover, the best-positioned songs were played during Silva's show.

Sebastião Silva swears he has never accepted payments to change the position of a song in the Chart. However, normally due to his own work as a plugger or his relationship with other promoters, he deliberately included in the list some "new releases" – which he also played on the show – to boost the album sales.

The record companies saw the charts as a "sales bulletin". Being listed on one was the first step to consolidate the performer's career – or, anyway, to sell

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[8] CAITITU. In: DICIONÁRIO da língua portuguesa. Brasil, Michaelis. Retrieved October, 07, 2017 from: <http://michaelis.uol.com.br/busca?r=0&f=0&t=0&palavra=caititu>.
[9] A commercial station owned by entrepreneur Victor Costa until sold to Globo group in the 1960s.

more copies of a given album. Other radio practitioners followed the trends determined in charts to choose what to play on their programmes, often including the new releases. Bearing that in mind, music promoters also worked together with the main specialist stores to try and increase the sales and hence conquer a space in charts. According to Sebastião Silva (*interview*, 2015), usually it was only necessary to place an unknown artist in the bottom of the Chart, listed as new, for the name to be recognised and climb some positions in few weeks.

In terms of promotion, no other show seems to have been so efficient as *As sete campeãs* (The seven champions), presented by Barros de Alencar first on *Tupi* Radio and later on Record, both on the MW dial in São Paulo. According to Moacir Matias, a promoter who crossed different phases of music industry, "there was *As sete campeãs* on *Tupi* radio, and if you placed a song on the seventh position, the following day there would be a cue in front of stores. He [Alencar] was the only one like this..." (*interview,* 2015).

Other music charts, such as the ones made by radio stations *Bandeirantes* and *Gazeta*, were also popular. All shows with this format of lists were targeted and harassed by record companies, typically by means of radio pluggers, who could offer much more than a simple talk.

Small and big comforts

Our respondents stress that, initially, it was uncommon to give money to radio practitioners, although everyone recognised it as an existing practice. A very common trading currency were a few perks such as dinners, parties, trips and some goodies, addressed direct to the host. For example, Moacir Matias tells the story occurred in the 1970s, when he managed, for a famous radio personality and his children, a trip to Los Angeles and tickets to see a Jackson Five gig with access to the backstage: the label he worked for distributed the band's albums in Brazil. He did so without conditioning the "prize" to a given new release he was promoting, but as a way of strengthening his access to that radio host.

Sometimes the promoters offered trips to audition cocktails attended by the station employees, or even merchandising material to be given to listeners, such as t-shirts, discs, electronic devices, tickets for gigs and even meetings with artists. Such connection, settled with the pair presenter/producer and with the station manager, helped to sustain audience ratings – the ultimate objective of broadcasters that depend on advertising revenue.

The interviewed professionals made it clear the gifts were rarely connected to a specific promotion project. They should, however, strengthen the links between

hosts and pluggers, a fundamental harmony fomenting the good operation of *caitituagem*.

While, from the point of view of stations and programmes, this marketing strategy helped to create a loyal audience, from the label's one the enhancement in album sales amortized the high costs of the perks. According to our respondents, the performers promoted with prominence by the main radio personalities, exclusively due to the effort of radio pluggers, easily reached the mark of hundreds of thousands of sold discs. As comparison, good sellers from MPB, who received great importance in TV campaigns paid by record labels, reached a maximum average of 200 thousand copies.

Friendship

Almost every deposition we recorded present declarations about close relationships kept by radio pluggers with artists and with radio presenters. The links with performers and bands were strengthened when the radio plugger accompanied them in presentations, small concerts and radio show interviews. The hosts introduced live participation of artists (or their promoters) as a strategy to add value to their radio show. Hence the relations with radio practitioners made it easier to start a conversation and the negotiations. Eli Correa, for instance, acknowledged to play songs on his show only to help pluggers, thus improving the careers of performers or bands they believed in. "Especially because the mate [the promoter] is a friend. Sometimes you didn't like [the song] at first, but ended up liking it later, by insistence of the plugger, and suddenly the song really skyrocketed… The comrade guaranteed the success" (Eli Corrêa, *interview*, 2016).

It is important to stress that the radio personalities held, up to the 1980s, some autonomy to decide what to play on their programmes. During negotiations with radio pluggers there had been times when they refused to play songs they felt were unworthy or inadequate to their audiences. Likewise, in other moments the presenters gave airtime to recordings that, despite from the same album, were not the ones chosen to be promoted by the record label. The promoter's work was also a way for radio practitioners to identify novelties and trends, domestic or international, and use that knowledge to update their shows and reinforce the credibility they carried with the audiences.

The "payola"

The payment for a song to be included in the radio airplay is the most polemic theme addressed during the depositions. First, we must take into account

that, just like the distribution of perks, this manoeuvre is the practical consequence of the control and power once exercised by radio personalities and their producers over the music programming. Curiously, each side of the negotiation saw differently this type of bribery: while radio practitioners, with rare exceptions, tried to hide the scheme, pluggers recognised it as a regular commercial procedure.

The logic behind the acceptance of such manoeuvre is simple: the record company spent a huge amount of money producing and printings discs, as well as with the artists' contracts. Those expenses with promotion on radio, especially with "payola", should help to assure the profitable return of the investments made. For presenters, in turn, the matter was more complex: letting it clear that they received any type of financial advantage to break a song – disclosed as their or their audience's favourite – would certainly put their reputation into question. When asked about when the mechanism started, both Moarcir Matias and Luís de Souza (*interview,* 2015), who worked as music promoter on the 1960s, mentioned Genival Mello as the pioneer, manager responsible for artists like Antonio Marcos and Nelson Ned. Souza also associates the need for *payola* to impositions of sales made by record companies concerning the formation and launch of performers, intensified when international corporations extended their presence in Brazil. João Lara Mesquita (*interview*, 2008), C.E.O. of Eldorado label during the 1980 decade, opines that multinational corporations "hooked" the market and "asphyxiated" smaller labels. Those major companies had enough financial resources to put discs on store shelves by consignment contracts, that is, only receiving when the unit was sold. Mesquita denounced that big companies' branches sometimes invested more money on promotion on radio than in the performer's career because they had to prove to their headquarters a strong presence and domain of the Brazilian market. Therefore, the *payola*, more than a mechanism for promoting an artist or a recording, also became a way to exclude small companies from the music business, then assuring the exclusive presence of those hired by big companies on the main stations airtime.

During the 1980s, especially on FM broadcasters, the negotiations were transferred to the station management. The radio pluggers stopped contacting show by show to negotiate first with artistic directors and, later, with commercial managers, as noted by music promoter Umberto Campos. It was accorded how many times a song would be introduced in the station's playlist, and that generated a cost. "Why? Because advertising revenue dropped for radio, and then stations started to survive with money from the promotion of albums. So, why are there so many pitiful artists enjoying success? Because they have money. Who owns more,

plays more" (Umberto Campos, *interview*, 2015). When talking about changes on his activity, Moacir Matias stated that

> Before, the plugger presented a product, showed the music, he had to know everything, who was the composer, he talked about the strength of such song. Today the plugger only picks up an album and doesn't even know what it is. Today I am a music negotiator: I go there, pay the guy, he plays my music, and it's over. (Moacir Matias, *interview*, 2015)

The record producer Arnaldo Saccomani (*interview*, 2008), though, says it doesn't mean success can be invented. The station would not risk losing audience by playing songs incompatible to its identity. Moreover, as Saccomani points out, there are musicians that, even if intensely developed, don't show talent or charism required to convince a listener to buy their music or show.

Anyway, the demands of investments in promotion, especially with "payolas", makes the entrance ticket to the music business really high. With fewer record companies operating as of the 1980s – consequence of a process of acquisitions and merges (Vicente, 2014) – and with changes in the radio business, the emergence of new music artists became more and more conditioned to the available money.

Economic changes and smart curation

Following the popularisation of the FM band and consequent migration of audience to the new stations, especially after 1980, the music marketplace is also reconfigured in the next decades. According to Umberto Campos (*interview, 2015*), there was the emergency of a new public, and "the radio hosts felt obligated to be different, too". Popular-romantic music was then promoted over the new spaces, but competition became tougher than ever due to the also increasing presence of international music and new music styles. To face the challenges, the radio plugger "set up prizes for competitions on the FM, big prizes: took listeners to *Rio de Janeiro* [from *São Paulo*], gave tickets to great gigs, in Rio, in *Salvador*, even in other countries, Los Angeles. You had to be more aggressive", tells Campos (*interview*, 2015).

The emergency of new music styles is not necessarily a fabrication of the music corporations, in particular of the majors. On the contrary, we see it as resulting from the observation of independent cultural circuits, such as regional ones, and its adjustment to suit distribution throughout different marketplaces to renovate the cultural production flux. For instance, Kid Vinil (*interview*, 2008) indicated a few São Paulo stations that contributed to materialise the renovation of

rock'n'roll during the 1980 decade: Excelsior FM, from the end of the 1970s until the early 1980s, and rock-segmented stations 89FM and 97FM, in the following years, gave airtime to indie bands and artists from independent labels such as *Baratos Afins*[10]. In Rio de Janeiro, this function was covered by *Fluminense* FM. There was at first an important role played by disc jockeys (DJs), who broke and sustained the "new" music in the 1980s[11].

With payment for music exposure instituted in other levels inside the stations from the end of the 1980s, the radio personalities had their autonomy to decide which music would play on their shows reduced. Even hosts working at MW stations, so important for music promotion until late 1970s, lost power since the promotion efforts were then concentrated on FM band.

> Sometimes it is necessary for someone to be a little bolder. Today we can't do that because FM is in charge of playing everything, you only have to see what is playing there and play it here. It is not worthy trying to make experiments, today [one] doesn't achieve success on MW (Eli Corrêa, *interview*, 2015).

All at once, the 1990s saw the intensification of the movement started on the former decade, in which small labels disclosed artists inside their own cultural circuits, so later they would transfer to bigger labels (Vicente, 2014). Besides, as part of a long process of outsourcing the production activities undertook by major record companies, the record producer and the music director ceased being employed by those firms and, in many cases, turned into independent artist managers and agents, responsible for launching and sustaining the performers since the launch of their careers. This is the case of Arnaldo Saccomani, Pena Schmidt and Marco Mazzola, besides many others. It also composes an important factor the more concentrated market established from merges and acquisitions amid music corporations. Those firms started to reduce the costs for prospecting and producing performers by more and more using the effectiveness of small companies (Dias, 2008).

The record labels saw their market share and, consequently, their profit margin diminish as of the beginning of music distribution via internet around year 2000. Once the structures for prospection and production were already curtailed, the next step was to reduce the commercial divisions. The promotion departments were cut down and gave space for outsourced agencies that intermediate the contracts with radio stations. These agencies, working closely with artist managers,

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[10] Initially a store that sold albums, the micro-label from entrepreneur Luiz Calanca became one of the most prominent releasing the indie rock'n'roll produced on that moment in *São Paulo*.

[11] Examples are names such as Big Boy, in *Rio de Janeiro*, Kid Vinil himself and Maurício Kubrusly, both in *São Paulo*.

present the performers or bands to the stations, propose interviews, negotiate short concerts and, sometimes, book gigs. João Araújo (*interview,* 2008), ex-C.E.O. of *Som Livre* label and the Brazilian Association of Recording Producers (ABPD), lists the activities occupied by these firms: oversees the artist' career, develop his or her work and, when the artist becomes profitable, keep a significant part of his or her incomes.

Rogério Fernando Gonçalves, partner of a music agency, tells the process:

> When an artist comes to us, usually the album is ready. We give advice and discuss a plan with them, or we "do a lab" and decide to put money on the product, introduce it [to the market], until we find a favourable condition. If the music is successful, it will happen. If the song looks like a hit, it is *sticky*, it will surely happen. What changes is how long it takes: sometimes it skyrockets to success soon, sometimes it takes longer. (*interview*, 2016)

Selling albums has become a less important revenue source for performers, and the public presentation of songs and the experiences of a concert gathered forces as the core of the music business. Arnaldo Saccomani (*interview*, 2008) indicated, by the time he gave the interview, that "it is only worthy to produce music if it is getting radio airplay. If the it doesn't play on radio, don't make it, do not even compose it, because this album is not going to sell". The problem now is that, without the money for promotion from record companies, all costs must be afforded by the musicians and their managers.

> (...) as record companies outsourced their production structures, renouncing their basic functions and creating a network of autonomous service providers, many music artists started to realise that having a contract with a record label, major or indie, was disadvantageous to their careers... One tangible result is an immeasurable music production that find an output largely on the internet, where these artists expose themselves and do business. (De Marchi, 2016, p.180)

Such impact is notorious when active radio pluggers claim that, without money, the artists cannot make themselves a success. In other words, there is a process of contraction and homogenisation of music production towards more commercial appeal, what can put at serious risk small niches of consumption. Even the former promises of the internet democratising the access to production means seems to have led to no concrete results. According to De Marchi, "the formation of a digital content market comes with an aggressive reintermediation in the relationship between producers and consumers" (2016, p.190), i.e., although the decentred production increases the number of producers, only a few digital intermediaries effectively reach large audiences.

Pena Schmidt and Kid Vinil (*interview*, 2007 e 2008) agreed that creativity and innovation were lost both at record companies – now, mainly music distributers – and at radio broadcasters. It results from a process of rationalisation inside music stations that drags on since the 1990s all around the world, thus limiting the breaking of novelties (Berland, 1993; Ahlkvist, 2001). Radio repertoire is narrower, and the stations are playing less and less music. Record companies sell less, and radio personnel do not try anything new. The outcome is the loss of audience appeal.

In summary, we arrived at a scenario in which the radio practitioners, both from FM and MW stations, lost air time on the schedules and now show less accountability for the artists' achievements. Strictly commercial relationships between radio station and promotion agencies are being established, which reduces the capacity of performers to access the processes of promotion of their own music (Kischinhevsky, 2011). The prospection of new names becomes more difficult for the same reasons, even if it occurs in a more diffuse space and incorporates the possibilities arisen from the internet. The artists still depend upon larger structures such as the record companies and broadcasters to "skyrocket". In this scenario, a discussion on the concept of smart curation and its implications for the music business makes perfect sense.

According to De Marchi (2016), over the 2000 decade the majors felt it was safe again to invest in the digital market, making their music catalogues available in a range of services, from paid download to the streaming services and online radio. Brands such as YouTube, Spotify, Deezer were incorporated in the daily life, "firms notable for developing new business models using music in digital networks" (De Marchi, 2016, p.104). No one can deny this is a possible way for the reorganisation of today's scenario, since such strategies are valuable because they display the most dominant characteristics of the digital environment and conform to the listeners' lack of motivation to pay for music. However, they do not completely replace the "previous" model of music consumption. The theoretical freedom of production and consumption is still determined by a few "gatekeepers", usually web services that align tools such as subscription, recommendation, algorithm, group chats. All these elements are highlighted by Martel (2015) as decisive for the culture in the digital era, when the concept of "cultural service" becomes as relevant as the one of "product".

By analysing how algorithms work for recommendation of music – thus allowing the listener to find "new releases" – Martel warns those technological devices have some limitations. Firstly, because just like have always been the case of radio by means of promotion strategies, the search results may be tampered

with and a performer or band be favoured in detriment of others due to commercial reasons. Secondly, because by working only with quantitative data machines have difficulties in predicting behaviours, emotions and sensibilities, which leads to increasingly modest recommendations (Martel, 2015). Therefore, the human element is as important as the digital tools for recommendation. The author count on such approach to suggest the *smart curation*, a double filter that unites big data with human intervention. The smart curation is part of a conversation, a talk that allows exchanges, a plurality of tastes, and develops in different "spheres of judgment" (Martel, 2015).

We must point out, however, that Martel finds valuable the conversations and recommendations legitimised by the popularity of the critics on web-based environment (the "e-reputation"), but do not take into consideration the traditional means. In the specific case of radio, as can be understood from the interviews Martel selected to include in his book, it is clear he deliberately placed the medium in an inferior position, one of low relevance for music recommendation. In our opinion, his explanation is too simple and little connected to the different realities of the medium around the globe, including the Brazilian market. New and old communication means are combined to promote and distribute content, being the listener/user dimension a fundamental one. The decisions made by individuals are based on personal taste as well as on the reputation of a promoting agent, independently of the space where it occurs. So, opposed to the ideas of Martel, we believe that radio stations – digital or web-based – are also a fundamental factor in a *smart curation* of music.

To support our opinion, we highlight that the professionals we interviewed between 2015 and 2016, similarly to the ones interviewed in 2008, state in unison that radio is of utmost importance to music business, primarily because it is still the best suited communication means for music "massification" by repetition and memory creation.

Music streaming services and paid downloads, such as Spotify, do not satisfyingly reward the artists yet (Knopper, 2018). Live performances are fundamental sources of revenues for musicians and managers, and for that the web presents itself as a good channel for promotion. Rogério Gonçalves (*interview*, 2016) believes internet is a very important tool to his agency's work, since it gives substance while presenting trends to radio station and hence open spaces for exposing music. At the same time, radio promotion represents a possibility of improving the online visibility of the artists (by increasing the visualisation of social media profiles, for example). Thus, what is happening on the web sums up as a tool to be used in the decision-making process inside the music industry.

As for the radio business, it looks like a moment of opportunity is opening. Streaming services are not able to back the "massification" of music without the repetition and the presenter's voice legitimising a song or a performer or band. There is no doubt this type of service is becoming popular and has potential to reach many more users, especially with the probable improvement in the conditions of access to the internet in Brazil[12]. However, the current moment also implicates in changes in the radio formulae, maybe to recover its fundamental role in music release. To make it clear, we are not defending practices such as the payment of bribes to launch a song. On the contrary, we are suggesting a transition that returns the reputation of the radio personality to listen, evaluate and suggest music, thus contributing as part of the "human dimension" of the smart curation.

> Today radio represents a sequence of events that happened in the 1990 decade, it is not so innovative. Some stations even take some chances with this innovation, but could bet much more, because if radio puts its stakes on a new market, in the new music generation that is just happening, things would be easier [for independent music]. (Kid Vinil, *interview*, 2008)

That is to say two propositions intersect: one, to renovate the music programming, with space to sustain the current modes of production and to enable independent music offering and massification, with greater connection with autonomous music scenes; and two, to praise once again the radio personality, i.e., the link with the listeners construed in the course of the years and which is now expanding to web profiles. Indubitably, such renovation shall imply in a format of radio business less dependent on resources paid by record labels and music managers, and more concerned with strengthening the ties with the listeners and not solely with the music industry.

Conclusion

From depositions collected through interviews with professionals from different sectors of the music diffusion chain, this article demonstrated how the relationship between radio stations and record companies was assembled. Historically, personal relationships are added to market-oriented rational decisions to promote music and performers before a broad public.

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[12] According to Brazilian Association of Recording Producers (*ABPD*), in 2016 the income with digital sales of music reached 111.7 million dollars, or 49% of the total revenue of the music industry. As comparison, the income with public playing summed up 84 million dollars, or 36.6% of total. Streaming services represented 75% of total digital sales (90% if video streaming is also considered). The digital market grew 23% in 2016 in comparison to 2015. (Data retrieved Septembre, 22, 2017 from: http://abpd.org.br/home/numeros-do-mercado/).

Not denying the commercial relations resulted in the narrowing of the music distribution channels, by favouring big album sellers instead of a greater cultural diversity, it is clear that radio broadcasters took a significant role as cultural gatekeepers. As verified, such role is not completely erased with the introduction of automatized mechanisms for music recommendation, available through digital platforms. Quite the reverse, it is on its historically-attributed function that the radio business may find a competitive advantage to the maintenance of its legitimacy as curator for music consumption.

We do not wish to advocate in the benefit of unethical practices such as those described in this text. Nonetheless, we tried to show how the historical development explains the way radio is perceived today by its public – positively or negatively. The relationship between radio pluggers and radio practitioners, for instance, was important for many radio personalities to establish their reputation with the audience. We believe, with a certain optimism, that such deeds can be reversed to a greater cultural diversification on the mediatic content offering related to music.

Today, the job of radio promoter becomes wider and more complex. Considering the feasible multiplication of specialist spaces of music distribution, the work of the pluggers seems to dislocate from the promotion oriented to "massification" to niche markets of relatively independent circuits of music.

For a possible extension of this research it would be required an additional, qualitative investigation with the audience, to answer how the music consumption is divided amid the new and the old channels of music circulation. It would also demand the observation of audience movements in specialist music shows, normally offered in channels alternative to traditional radio broadcasting, such as podcasts and webradios. The set of data to be obtained, together with the observations detailed on this article, would make it possible to propose business models that horizontally integrates different recommendation strategies that qualifies the smart curation.

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Facebook interactions and practices

ALEX PRIMO
PhD in Computers in Education (PGIE/UFRGS), professor at the Communication and Information Graduate School at UFRGS, Porto Alegre, Rio de Grande do Sul, Brazil. Researcher with a productivity grant from CNPq. E-mail: aprimo@ufrgs.br. ORCID: 0000-0003-2848-0301.

VANESSA VALIATI
PhD in Communication and Information (PPGCOM/UFRGS). Professor in the Journalism department at Feevale University (RS), Novo Hamburgo, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. E-mail: vanessa.valiati@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0001-9183-2301.

LUDMILA LUPINACCI
PhD student in the department of Media and Communications at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London, England, United Kingdom. E-mail: ludmila.lupinacci@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0002-4371-6768.

LAURA BARROS
Master's in Communication and Information (PPGCOM/UFRGS), Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. E-mail: laurabarros5@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0002-8872-7647.

Abstract

This article discusses the transformations brought about by computer-mediated communication, and more specifically by online social networking services, for subjective expression, journaling and self-writing. Later, based on quantitative results obtained through a survey that reached 810 respondents, this paper discusses the most prevalent uses of Facebook: keep informed on current issues; have fun with funny jokes, videos and photos; participate in awareness campaigns; talk about work and learn about the professional growth of others; and know what friends and enemies are doing.

Keywords

Introduction

Considering the number of active users, Facebook is the largest social networking service on the internet[1]. Therefore, it is natural that this service, created in February 2004, is also the most frequent and intensively studied online service in digital communication research and related areas. Yet, in 2013, Feyter et al. (2013), after a review of the literature on Facebook produced between 2006 and 2012, recognized a demand for greater theoretical and methodological assessments on the practices related to Facebook. The authors found an abundance of academic articles that do not commonly explore the site in its plurality - either because they focus on the practices of a specific user profile, or because they cannot obtain statistical representativeness, or even because they do not dialogue with previous researches. Since then, one can observe the growing attention of researchers from diverse fields that focus on that communication service. But, because of the continual changes in the platform and the permanent transformation of practices, the need for more studies remains. With regard to the interactions of Brazilians with and on Facebook, the demand for discussions based on empirical approximations is even more urgent.

If even the research developed here does not overcome all the limitations raised by Feyer et al. (2013) — it does not investigate a stratified sample representative of the Brazilian population, for example —, one of its greatest merits is to discuss the practices, tastes and uses of people outside the traditionally studied circuit, notably American and European youngsters. Here, we extend our previous work, in which we deal with conversational traffic between different online sociability platforms - that we have called fluid conversations (Primo et al., 2017). In this article, we seek to deepen the discussion about the uses of Facebook. In addition, we believe that looking more closely at such a meaningful platform will contribute to the advancement of the understanding of how Brazilians interact on the internet today.

In this article, we seek to update the understanding of the current uses of Facebook. One aspect that the results allow us to perceive is how self-disclosure practices - whose link with identity construction have been extensively studied - are losing space on Facebook, giving rise to other forms of interaction that will be here discussed.

Methodological procedures

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[1] Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/>. Accessed on: August 1st, 2018.

This article seeks to continue the discussion of the results obtained in previous research related to the uses of Internet interaction services (Primo et al., 2017). Although the data presented here were collected through the same survey, in this work we will discuss the results that basically focus on Facebook (and that were not used in the previous article).

As detailed in our previous article (Primo et al., 2017), data collection was performed through an online questionnaire created with Google Forms, which was available online between October 27 and November 24, 2015. The form was composed by 44 questions: 8 multiple choice questions, 19 gradual scales, 15 in which the respondent could select multiple options from a list, and 2 open questions. In total, 1050 responses were obtained from respondents living in 25 different states — 55.7% of these individuals were from the South and 25.6% from the Southeast, demonstrating a discrepancy in the representativeness of these two regions in relation to the other ones in the Brazil. Therefore, due to the low statistical significance of the responses from the underrepresented regions, as well as few responses from younger people (96% of respondents stated that they had at least incomplete higher education), we decided to consider only the 810 responses of persons older than 16 years, residing in the South and Southeast, and with at least incomplete higher education. The demographic data can be observed in Figure 1.[2]

Figure 1 - Demographic data

Regarding the specificities of Facebook uses, this research assessed frequency of access, most used devices and a scale of taste. Regarding the number of hours dedicated weekly to the service (Figure 2), most respondents consider their use intense (46.9%), followed by those who consider their Facebook use to be

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[2] It is important to note that the number of valid answers (N = 592) considered for the "age group" question is different from the other questions due to a technical problem that caused 218 age responses to be lost.

high (34.6%) and average (14.2% %)[3].The devices most used to access Facebook are mobile (51.6%), personal notebook (21.2%), work desktop (11.2%) and home desktop (8.3%).

Figure 2 - Access to Facebook

A taste scale (Figure 3) was used to assess how the respondents liked or disliked certain practices in their daily use of Facebook.[4] First, after being presented with a list of possible actions in Facebook, respondents should rate them on a scale ranging from "I like it a lot" to "I hate it."

Figure 3 - Taste scale

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[3] In this question, it was not defined how many hours of use are pertinent to each stratum. The definition of low, medium, high and intense use refers to the respondent's self-perception.

[4] It is important to note that the other five topics in the taste scale are not discussed here because they were presented in a previous article (PRIMO et al., 2017).

What do you enjoy doing on Facebook? (%) (N=810)

■ I like it a lot   ■ I like it a little bit   ■ So-so   ■ I do not mind it   ■ I do not like it   ■ I hate it

Activity	I like it a lot	I like it a little bit	So-so	I do not mind it	I do not like it	I hate it
To know what my friends are doing	23,3	33,3	27,0	11,4	3,1	1,5
To keep informed about current topics	61,5	22,7	10,5	3,0	1,0	0,57
To report what I am doing	5,1	13,8	25,4	16,0	25,1	14,6
To express how I am feeling	4,6	10,6	25,6	15,2	25,7	18,4
To have fun with funny jokes, pictures and videos	35,9	32,7	20,1	6,9	3,1	1,2
To see motivational messages	5,3	9,6	19,9	21,4	22,7	21,1
If I am at home in the evening, to know that my friends are having a good time	2,3	7,3	18,4	45,9	17,3	8,8
To talk about my work	10,7	17,3	25,4	14,8	22,7	9,0
To know about the professional achievements of others	12,8	28,6	26,7	19,5	8,9	3,5
To have access to pictures and videos of serious issues	11,6	20,7	31,2	10,5	15,8	10,1
To participate in awareness campaigns	23,2	32,7	25,6	10,0	5,7	2,8
To show with whom I went out and where we went to	4,4	15,8	23,0	19,5	22,5	14,8
To know what my enemies are doing	2,8	9,0	13,8	26,3	25,4	22,6
To meet new people	5,6	12,3	26,7	29,0	21,0	5,4

During the following sections, results obtained from the scale will be analyzed in parallel with the theoretical discussion related to the main aspects of each practice. First, however, some considerations need to be made about self-disclosure in the context of online communication.

Computer-mediated communication and self-exposure

In the pioneering works on computer-mediated communication, the quality of interactions was questioned in face of limiting non-verbal cues. Walther (1996), however, recognized the potential of online communication as a facilitator for relationship development. While studying the pre-web era, the author identified *self-disclosure* as a strategic action that seeks to create intimacy.

In current settings, according to Jiang, Bazarova, and Hancock (2013), the higher levels of self-exposure observed in online environments are primarily a matter of reciprocity — when someone speaks of himself, his partner would feel impelled to do the same. On the other hand, the authors reject the idea that the mere use of a digital medium would necessarily foster intimacy exposure. Dick (2012) argues that Facebook does interfere in the sharing of private information as it requests information on kinship, relationships, preferences, etc. That is, self-

disclosure itself is not at all spontaneous, because the platform makes people do things (Latour, 2012).

Thus, exposing oneself to social networking services cannot be interpreted only as a trivial and carefree practice. Considering the experience accumulated after so many years and through different online communication services, users are now more concerned with privacy. Georgalou (2016) notes that people have come to understand which audience they should publish to, and which content content is appropriate to which situation. It is important to consider the phenomenon of "collapse of contexts", as described by Marwick and Boyd (2011), which occurs when publications directed at certain people are also seen by those who do not belong to the intended audience.

The following sections discuss the results obtained through our survey. Each section, whose titles reproduce the question shown to the respondents, will also bring a brief review of the theoretical background on the themes under study. That is, the theoretical discussion and presentation of data will not be split into separate sections. Based on these discussions, we will show how Facebook uses have been updated. As self-reports no longer prevail in comparison to the early years of social networking sites, other uses have captured greater user interest.

"To Report What I am Doing"

Far from being a practice inaugurated in social networks, self-writing has always served as a way for subjects to shape their ethics, values, beliefs and understandings, and reflect on their subjectivities (Sauer, 2014). Throughout the history of humanity, self-writing has been undertaken in letters, autobiographies, journals, and has always been aligned with identity construction. According to Foucault (1984), writing is a technique of the self, in which the subject engages with him/herself and with others, and that reveals him/herself and presents him/herself to an audience. For Lejeune (2008), self-writing is intrinsically a mundane practice that satisfies spontaneous wills of expression. When a subject writes about herself, she constructs a self-representation from her view of herself, or how she aspires to be.

When it comes to online social networking services, the production of content about oneself (be it texts, images or videos) is affected by the awareness that there is scrutiny of a public eye. In this regard, people are constantly encouraged to work on themselves and adapt their discourse to represent what they aim to represent, considering the imagined audience (Sauer, 2014).

Through Spearman's Correlation Coefficient[5], we observed that the practice of "To report what I am doing" correlates directly and significantly (at a significance level of 1%) with "To express what I am feeling" (p=0.710), "To know the opinion of others about what I publish" (p=0.512), "To talk about my work" (p=0.403) and "To show what I left and where we went" p = 0.526). That is, people who report on their everyday life on Facebook also talk about themselves and express an interest in others' opinions about their practices and feelings.

On the other hand, exposing personal questions on Facebook is not a unanimous preference among respondents: the highest percentages of responses to "To express what I am feeling" and "To report what I am doing" are located between "I do not like it" and "so-so" (around 25% each), which represents more than half of the answers in both questions. These results contradict the common sense that people who are on Facebook expose their privacy carefree.

Given the quantitative nature of this research, it is not possible to assess whether a lower interest in self-exposure on Facebook is justified by greater awareness of risks or by previous stressful experiences. In any case though it is necessary to consider the diversity of digital social platforms that have emerged in recent years to meet the different types and preferences of the interacting agents. Considering the concept of polymedia (Madianou and Miller, 2012), Facebook is one among many other opportunities for communication that is part of an environment of affordances. Thus, it cannot be studied in isolation. The expansion and diversification of social networking services and their appropriations by users can interfere with users' interactions with Facebook. An example is the emergence of the Stories feature in apps like Snapchat and Instagram, which value images and the ephemeral (at the expense of text, the main format of Facebook narratives), which has been highlighted by the everyday and mundane character of narratives (Barros, 2017). Facebook has been implementing features that favor this kind of interactions with the introduction of Facebook Stories and Facebook Live.

"To know what my friends and enemies are doing"

Whereas we have previously dealt with the public exhibition of oneself on the Internet, this section will deal with the "other side of the coin": information seeking. If the acquisition of information about other people in the past was slow and few options were available, today blogs and social media have multiplied ways of getting to know each other (Tokunaga and Gustafson, 2014). Stefanone, Hurley, and Yang (2013) argue that the affordances of social networking services and the

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[5] The closer p is to 1, the stronger the correlation

lower transaction costs (compared to face-to-face engagement) offer innovative opportunities for retrieving personal information available online. According to the authors, the main reasons for users to search information online are: creation and maintenance of social relationships, search for social support, reduction of uncertainties and social influence.

Ramirez et al. (2002) describe four information-seeking strategies in computer-mediated communication: passive, active, interactive and extractive. As at the time of the proposal of this typology social network services were not yet available, we will make an approximation of those categories with current practices on Facebook. The passive search for information refers to discrete observation, such as viewing posts that appear on the timeline. Active strategies involve collecting information about others through exchanges with a third party (such as a conversation with a common acquaintance in Facebook Messenger in order to know what happened to that person). The interactive form occurs when people dialogue through comments in a post or debate in a group. Finally, when someone uses Facebook's search engine to find someone's profile, in order to get to know him better, to find a person's posts, or when an employer searches for more information about someone, an extraction strategy is undertaken. In our previous article, "keeping in touch with friends" — Facebook's original purpose — was found to be the most popular practice (Primo et al., 2017). This is not to say that people use Facebook merely to talk (interactive strategy). The service affordances also facilitate following the life of others in a passive and active way.

According to our data, "knowing what friends are doing" pleases more than half the respondents (56.6%). This scenario changes when it comes to "knowing what the enemies are doing": most respondents answered that they hate (22.6%) or dislike (25.4%) this type of surveillance. And 45.9% of the respondents say that they "do not care" when they learn on Facebook that their friends are having fun at night while they are at home.

Although these two last aspects show low preference indices, when these practices are maintained they correlate with people who say that they like to follow the lives of their friends. Through Spearman's Coefficient of Correlation we found that "To know what my friends are doing" is directly and significantly correlated (at the significance level of 1%) with "If I am at home in the evening, to know that my friends are having a good time" (p=0.329), "To know about the professional achievements of others" (p=0.382), and "To know what my foes are doing" (p=0.373). In other words, there is a statistically relevant relationship between two forms of Internet surveillance (called stalking): looking not only at what friends do, but also at what people they dislike are doing.

"To talk about my work" and "To know about the professional achievements of others"

The use of Facebook to talk about work is a practice that displeases 31.7% of respondents (22.7% "do not like it" and 9.0% "hate it"), while 28% liked it (10.7% "like it a lot" and 17.3% "like it a little bit"). As for "To know about the professional achievements of others" through Facebook, 28.6% of respondents "like it a little", 12.8% "like it a lot" and 26.7% "so-so". There is a low number of respondents who dislike this use (8.9% answered "I do not like it", and only 3.5% "hate it").

Regarding the use of social networking services to talk and learn about professional issues, Sardá (2015) analyzes the similarities, complementarities and differences of the simultaneous use of various online services. According to her, there are at least 15 strategies that govern the management of the combined uses of platforms, such as maintaining different attitudes in each site, developing different contact networks, and evaluating how much to expose about themselves depending on the service being used. Although the promotional discourse presented by different platforms already provides some clues about positioning (in Facebook´s case, for example, as a space for connection and sharing), interfaces and features influence uses and practices, as well as the subject's perception of what he believes his or her imagined audience will think about what is published, shared, or enjoyed (Sardá, 2015). Facebook is usually understood, at least as far as personal profiles are concerned, as an environment in which career themes are not the priority, which is reflected in the results obtained in our questionnaire. However, it is necessary to consider the existence of platform-specific functionalities for the sharing of information regarding professional life. This is the case of the so-called Facebook "pages", whose professional nature differentiates them from Facebook's profiles. This means that practices and even roles (the friend, the consultant) can vary within Facebook because of the features (quotes, "friends" lists, closed groups) and "regions" (personal profile or page) in use.

"Identity management", referred by Sardá (2015), occurs precisely when subjects actively seek to define which audiences will have access to which information, and in what form. Still, it should be recalled that Facebook often employs resources to try to persuade users to provide more information about their private lives, including links and professional developments. The effort also involves sending notifications that are intended to alert the subject that he has not updated fields in his profile for a certain period of time. In this regard, job-related changes

are treated as important events, gaining relative prominence in the timeline as soon as they are shared.

"To have fun with funny jokes, pictures, and videos"

According to our results, one of the uses of Facebook that respondents most appreciate is "to have fun with funny jokes, pictures, and videos": 68.6% say they like (35.9% like it a lot, 32.7% like it a little it), against only 1.2% that "hate it". It should be noted that the consumption and sharing of humorous content has, in recent years, dominated several communication platforms. Actually, the circulation of comic content was already popular before the web, via email, discussion forums, and instant messengers. What the development and popularization of social media platforms did was to broaden the scope and visibility of these practices. As Barbosa (2015) points out, some of the peculiarities that make digital platforms prone to entertainment are the potential velocity in publishing and sharing, the immediacy of the network, and the existence of increasingly simple and intuitive editing software, which allows even the most unskilled user to make his own interventions with comic intentions (the so-called memes are a good example of this).

It is now important to recall the concept of spreadability, explored by Jenkins, Ford and Green (2015), which refers to the set of properties that make certain types of content more prone to circulation than others. According to the authors, one of the characteristics that drives the circulation of the media material is precisely humor. To post this type of content is, therefore, to take advantage (consciously or not) of comedy's affective power to attract greater visibility (Mckay, 2008).

This article does not aim to conduct an extensive survey on the history of laughter and its significance. What we would like to highlight though is the fact that humour is notoriously a social and collective process that is created within communities, societies and cultures, that depends strongly on sharing (Bergson, 1980; Saliba, 2002; Santos, 2012; Barbosa, 2015).

It is possible to understand that during these processes of consumption and circulation of funny jokes, photos, and videos users often end up using these contents to get closer to each other. An obvious example is the popularity of Facebook pages dedicated to funny content. Similarly, groups are another resource in Facebook where humorous content is circulated. Hence, groups and pages serve as aggregators of people who have common interests, and who gather to consume and share funny content.

Often, these practices are considered as a "waste of time". Yet, the may also become a form of expression and encourage social and relational life (Fontanella, 2009). As noted by Primo (2007), the relevance of content that essentially seeks laughter is in large part justified by the collective sensibilities that are motivated by the pleasure of sharing emotions, tastes and values, even if they are not long lasting.

"To keep informed about current topics"

According to our results, the preferred use of Facebook is to "keep informed on current topics." Information consumption on Facebook pleases more than 80% of the respondents: 61.5% "like it a lot" while 22.7% "like it a little bit". These significant values confirm the data collected by the Brazilian Media Survey (2015)[6], which shows information consumption as one of the main motivations for Facebook access (67%). Our result is also aligned with the *Reuters Digital News Report* (2017)[7]on the digital consumption of news. According to the publication, Latin Americans receive more news through social media and chat applications than in other parts of the world — in Brazil, 57% of consumers use Facebook to consume news, followed by WhatsApp (46%)[8] and YouTube (36%).

The consumption of information on Facebook happens in the newsfeed. According to Araújo (2017), the *feed* represents a flow of publications from friends, content producers and companies, among others, that are part of a large ecosystem. The flow created is personalized: "Based on the data generated by users' actions and by the number of clicks and interactions (likes and comments) that each publication receives, posts are selected and organized according to their relevance" (Araújo, 2017, p.17). Thus, through algorithms that analyze the contents that are mostly accessed by users, as well as their habits and tastes, Facebook is able to increase the visibility and motivate the consumption of certain information.

It is important to note that, while this process helps the organization and delivery of content, it can lead to the creation of information bubbles that can reduce the diversity of news, showing only the content in line with users' interests

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[6] In the 2016 report (Brazil, 2016) no results are presented regarding motivations for the use of social networking sites, neither about the services most used.

[7] The survey was conducted with 70,000 online news consumers in 36 countries. Available at: <http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2017/overview-key-findings-2017/>. Accessed on June 23, 2017.

[8] The report points out that WhatsApp has been gradually gaining ground and is now competing with Facebook for user preference because of its greater privacy, absence of algorithmic filtering, and special data packages offered by telecommunications operators. The document draws attention to the fact that this growth should be understood as an extra layer regarding the use of social networking sites and not as a substitute, since Facebook is the owner of WhatsApp.

(Beam et al., 2017; Zago e Silva, 2014; Pariser, 2012). On the other hand, recent studies (Garret, 2009) based on the selective exposure perspective[9] show that, although users tend to select and focus on information that is aligned with their interests, there is no significant evidence that individuals totally abandon news that contain information that they do not agree with (Beam et al., 2017).

It is also important to consider that because speed in publishing, updating and sharing has become so important, the understanding of content may be impaired. Zago and Silva (2014) argue that not all information circulating on social networking sites is actually consumed[10]. On many occasions, content is shared without being visited and read. Furthermore, according to the authors, social networking sites such as Facebook often cease to be just complementary channels for information and become the main source of news. This aspect may also be related to the proliferation of fake news. Yet, our results, while not specifying the origin of the content consumed, show that the preference for Facebook to get news and share information has been consolidated among the respondents.

"To participate in awareness campaigns"

Finally, regarding the use of Facebook as a way to "participate in awareness campaigns", more than half of the respondents express a positive opinion — 32.7% say that they "like a little bit", while 23,2% like it very much. Furthermore, 63.5% of the respondents say that they like "to have access to images and videos of serious issues" at different intensities ("a lot", 11.6%; "a little bit", 20.7%; and "so-so", 31,2%). This aspect relates directly to the potential of civic and political engagement facilitated by social networking sites, in a collaborative and horizontal way (Castells, 2013; Malini and Antoun, 2013).

According to Peruzzo (2013), in general, social networking services are environments that facilitate relationships, the articulation between people and collective actions, as well as being spaces for diffusion, access, debate, and exchange of information. Therefore, this potential has been increasingly used for social mobilizations and collective actions (Zago and Batista, 2009). In this regard, Zuñiga, Jung and Valenzuela (2012) reinforce the idea that social networking services on the Internet can help the construction of personal identity, allowing multiple channels for interpersonal contact and the acceptance of others. At the same time, the increasing exchange of information among the participants of

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[9] According to this perspective, people prefer news that align with their own interests and perspectives (Beam et al., 2017).

[10] According to Zago and Silva (2014), consumption refers to the meaning given by the reader/user to the media product. Thus, a quick read would not be considered effective content consumption.

specific groups helps to create trust among members. This can be seen in civic engagement campaigns and social manifestations on Facebook. By publicly linking to a cause, users can engage with that movement in its most varied forms (tagging, sharing, confirming presence at events, etc.). And by letting their audiences know their preferences (such as the event they attend and the causes with which they agree), they express and build their identity.

The results of this research confirm the importance of Facebook in expanding the number of potential activists, facilitating the dissemination of information (Christensen, 2011). When we add to this analysis the answers reported in our previous article (Primo et al., 2017), such as "to discuss politics" (9% "like it a lot", 16% "like it a little bit") and "to discuss topics of interest" (27,3% said they "like it a little", 25,1% "like it a lot"), it is possible to verify the trend of using Facebook as a space for expression and sharing of opinions capable of stimulating civic and political engagement.

Conclusions

Facemash, the site created in 2003 by Mark Zuckerberg, was the embryo of Facebook. Originally developed for the judgment of how seductive were pictures of Harvard students, the project almost resulted in Zuckerberg being expelled from the university[11]. Since then, Facebook has been expanded to a communication service of great complexity, which can be accessed from different devices. By selling user data, collected within Facebook´s site and applications, and externally on every digital media using Facebook´s login (Primo, 2014), Zuckerberg's company has become an advertising powerhouse.

Facebook invaded people's daily lives, being consulted several times throughout the day. According to the results of our research, the great majority of interviewees believe that their use of the platform is heavy (46.9%) or high (34.6%). With this empirical assessment, it was possible to confirm the importance of this social network service for users to socialize and to know more about their friends and foes. The incentive to sociability is in fact a Facebook flag, always mentioned by the company in times of criticism to the platform. On the other hand, even recognizing the importance of digital spaces for the construction of identity, we could observe a greater concern with privacy. The data resulting from the query on personal expression and daily reports revealed a certain reserve in sharing intimate information. Of course, this cannot be understood as an abandonment of

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[11] Available at: <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2003/11/19/facemash-creator-survives-ad-board-the/>. Accessed on: August 1, 2018.

the publication of photos and reports of trips, dinners, etc. But recognizing the sociocultural and age specificities of the interviewees, we presume that the preoccupation on which facts and opinions should be published may be a result of a greater accumulation of experiences on the Internet. That is, unlike the incessant sharing of selfies and opinions, typical of younger users, it is possible that the our data reveals a greater knowledge about the risks present in social networking services and, perhaps, the result of previous problems. However, future qualitative research is necessary to better understand this behavior.

Another factor previously mentioned, that is significant for the discussion on self-writing on Facebook, is the plethora of digital services available nowadays. Although Facebook indicates that it intends to be the single space for all forms of publication (texts, photos, videos) and interaction (personal and professional), it is possible to observe a movement from users to diversify the places where they publish each information and maintain different forms of interaction.

Aware of the surveillance forms on social networks on the internet (practice also maintained by them!), several subjects practice what is called "identity management." Through this procedure, publications are shaped to achieve certain goals (such as conveying an image of professional success). Having faced problems with the "collapse of contexts" (Marwick and Boyd, 2011), and recognizing that it is not possible to foresee exactly who has access to each information on Facebook, many subjects choose certain services especially for certain opinions, photos, etc. The use of WhatsApp groups for private discussions, for example, and Facebook to share photos of professional events. In this polymediatic scenario (Madianou and Miller, 2012), it is worth pointing out that the effects of the collapse between identity-building processes and the careful image management on Facebook also demand further studies.

In addition to the interaction between friends, family and colleagues, Facebook was singled out by respondents as a source of news and entertainment. The amount of news and humorous publications guarantees content that is always new in the *timeline* and potentially interesting to users, filtered by the system's algorithm in face of previously expressed interests. This information, added to the personal publications of friends, can encourage the ongoing consultation of Facebook during the day. On the one hand, one could welcome the users' greater interest in news and public debates. However, the practice of sharing links to news stories that have not even been read cannot be ignored. It is also important to note that research shows the relationship between the intense use of Facebook with problems of procrastination (during study time, at work and in interpersonal encounters) and anxiety (Barry et al., 2008).

Finally, it is necessary to recognize the limitations of our sample, since it is not representative of the Brazilian population. Nevertheless, because our Brazilian respondents are older and show a higher educational level, new questions can now be thought of in a scenario dominated by statistics on the use of social media by young Americans.

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