The 2016 Olympiad in Rio de Janeiro: Who Can/Could/Will Beat Whom? [1]

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Abstract: Brazil has emerged on the global stage as an important player in terms of hosting sports megaevents. In particular Rio de Janeiro has acquired a primary position among Brazilian metropolitan spaces that have competed to sponsor such events. Rio de Janeiro's recent (and future) history with megaevents includes failed bids for the 2004 and 2012 Olympiads, the hosting of the 2007 PanAmerican games, the 2011 Military Games, the final match of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. This paper will evaluate the disruptions that the 2007 PanAmerican Games produced in terms of urban restructuring aimed at confronting spatial inequalities. This paper is also a preliminary attempt to evaluate the degree to which the initiatives carried out during the implementation of the PanAmerican Games are included and amplified in Rio's 2016 Olympic Bid, recently approved by the International Olympic Committee. The following analytic dimensions will guide this paper: (a) an analysis of territorial strategies; (b) the role and the involvement of public and private sectors in directing city marketing and infrastructure financing; (c) decision making processes and social control during the conception and implementation of such initiatives; (d) mechanisms of social support for these events.
Keywords: Olympiad; Megaevents; Rio de Janeiro.

1. Foreword

After failed bids for the 2004 and 2012 Olympiads, Brazil will finally host this mega-event in 2016. In this context, Rio de Janeiro has acquired a primary position among Brazilian metropolitan spaces that have competed to sponsor such events. Its recent history with mega-events including the hosting of the 2007 Pan-American games has stressed – at least for public urban administrators – its capacity of challenging other cities – Madrid, Chicago, for example –

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to host mega-events. Thus, emerging as an important player in the global competition to host sports mega-events, especially since it was chosen as the 2016 Olympic city, Rio de Janeiro will host a series of mega-events such as the 2011 Military Games, and the final match of the 2014 FIFA World Cup.

This paper is a first and preliminary attempt to evaluate the degree to which the initiatives carried out during the implementation of the Pan-American Games are included and amplified in Rio's 2016 Olympic Bid. Methodologically speaking the proposed analysis takes as point of departure an evaluation of the disruptions that the 2007 Pan-American Games produced in terms of urban restructuring aimed at confronting spatial inequalities. The following analytic dimensions will guide this paper: (a) an analysis of territorial strategies; (b) the role and the involvement of public and private sectors in directing city marketing and infrastructure financing; (c) decision making processes and social control during the conception and implementation of such initiatives; (d) mechanisms of social support for these events.

Besides this foreword and the conclusions, this article presents a preliminary comparison between the two initiatives here taken as a case study. Thus, we initially demonstrate a summary version of some of the findings regarding the 2007 Pan-American games reached through the following research: (I) "Large scale urban projects: what can be learned from the Brazilian experience?", (II) "2007 Pan-American games – between the competition for spectacle and the consolidation of the competitive city", (III) "Globalization, Competition and Metropolis: a comparison of management and production in contemporary Brazilian urban space", (IV) "Competitive Cities: sports in public development urban policies" and (V) "Spectacular City: territory, culture and citizenship in sport mega-events"[3]. We then try to foresee the degree to

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[3] The first research – carried out in 2006 – was financed by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and involved a group of Brazilian research groups from the following public universities: Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Universidade Federal Fluminense, Universidade de São Paulo, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Universidade Federal da Bahia, Universidade Estadual Paulista, Universidade Federal de Viçosa and the Instituto Paranaense de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social. The researches "2007 Pan-American games – between the competition spectacle and the consolidation of the competitive city and

which the initiatives carried out during the implementation of the Pan-American Games are included and amplified in Rio's 2016 Olympic Bid. As we are dealing with a urban process that is taking place at very moment that this paper is being written, it is important to be clear that much of the data here regarding the Olympiad is based upon official reports, dossiers, articles and news reports.

2. Rio de Janeiro 2007 Pan-American Games and 2016 Olympics: an introductory comparison

2.1. Territorial Strategies: 2007 Pan-American Games *versus* 2016 Olympic Games

In order to establish the location of the facilities of Pan-American games, in 2001 local authorities hired the *MI Associates*, an Australian consultant which was responsible of Sydney's Olympic Games (considered one of the most successful edition of the mentioned event) and according to the staff of Rio de Janeiro city hall this company also prepared the candidacy of Beijing and London. Together, local administration staff and *MI Associates* determined both the geographical location of the equipment and the organization of the event.

The definition of the four Olympic rings was based on a supposed social and spatial balance of parcels of urban fabric. The purpose was to distribute/share equally the benefits of the initiative. The four rings were: Barra da Tijuca, Deodoro, Pão de Açúcar and Maracanã. It is important to highlight that the majority of the resources invested was concentrated in a singular district – Barra da Tijuca, a selective residential sector – well served by existing urban infrastructure. This decision was criticized by many important social actors. The unbalanced localization of Olympic projects demonstrates the unfair distribution of facilities and financial

resources throughout the city. One of the most criticized decisions related to this area was the location of the *Vila do Pan*, the place where the athletes stayed during the games. The decision to place Olympic housing on the open market following the Pan American games Counteracted the previous experiences carried out throughout the world, at least until 1980 (Moscow), which offered/sold Olympic housing projects to low income people. This decision blocked an opportunity to enhance social and spatial justice. In addition the interests that were charged to the real state agents who promoted the initiative were too low considering real market value. According to the documents of 2016 Rio de Janeiro candidacy, once again the same residential sector was chosen to shelter the majority and most important facilities of the mega-event.

Among the planned installations in Barra de Tijuca are the Olympic Village and the media center (Media Village of Barra da Tijuca). As happened in the 2007 Pan-American games and despite the polemic involved at that time, the housing facility for the athletes will again be located in the same district. The revised version of the dossier declared that all athletes will be located in a safe and privileged area. Thus, it seems that once again the "traditional practice" of locating this kind of facility where low income people could buy affordable housing after the event will not be followed. In addiction, the location of housing facilities should consider areas where the urbanization benefits/advantages could generate other infrastructure and urban improvements. Experts of architecture and urbanism have stressed the consequences of such decisions alleging that they will deepen the already unbalanced distribution of infrastructure and social facilities of Rio de Janeiro. Social groups have proposed the area of the docklands as an alternative, especially to locate the housing facility. According to this logic, changing the location to a more central area could improve the distribution of social facilities in the urban fabric. Additionally, it appears that the discussion about where the media center will be located is far from to coming to an end. As published in an important Brazilian newspaper, the present mayor

of Rio de Janeiro city, Mr. Eduardo Paes[4], is thinking of changing it to the docklands area. The International Olympic Committee, initially rejected any change to the original proposal (approved and elected in October 2009)[5].

Related to that, it is important to highlight that there is a huge initiative that has been carried out (and propelled) by central, state and city government levels[6] – called "Porto Maravilha" – involving the docklands of Rio de Janeiro city, including three other nearby districts in Rio's central area.

As well as the 2016 Olympic project and differently from what happened during the 2007 Pan-American games, this linkage is much more articulated and structured[7], despite there having been decisions indicating that such articulation has faced problems: visiting London at the end of January 2010, Rio de Janeiro's state governor declared – apparently without consulting city administration – that the Olympic authority headquarters location would be in a historical modernist building[8] at very center of Rio de Janeiro[9]. In addition, he also stated that Mr. Tony Blair (former England prime minister) would be hired and paid by the private sector as an advisor of 2016 Olympic games[10]. Even though, it would not be a mistake – at least up to the present

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[4] During Mr. Cesar Maia first administration (1993-1996), Eduardo Paes was the administrator of Barra da Tijuca area and linked to a right wing party the "Partido da Frente Liberal", the same of the ex-mayor. In 1998 he was elected congressman; the best voted in the Rio de Janeiro. Today he is linked to the "Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro" (PMDB) one of the most important parties which support President Lula's government.

[5] BASTOS, I. "Jogos: Paes insiste em mudar centro de mídia". *O Globo*, November 2nd, 2009.

[6] Brazilian political organization is divided in three levels: local or municipal, state and central or federal government.

[7] Linked to this initiative and also with the rezoning and redesigning of the city (which maybe will affect both 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympiad), there is the rapid train connection (so called "Bullet train") between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo state capital city. Recently, President Lula declared that its implementation could be finished before 2014 soccer World Cup ("Lula pede pressa para trem-bala entre Rio e SP". February 4th, 2010, p.15.

[8] One of the most important icons of modern Brazilian architecture, the Gustavo Capanema Building was built from 1937 to 1945 and occupied in 1947, used to be the headquarter of the Education and Health Ministry, during the third period of President Getúlio Vargas – 1937-1945. At the present moment it has been sheltering many divisions and sections of central government in Rio de Janeiro.

[9] DUARTE, Fernando. & MAGALHÃES, L. Ernesto. "Ultrapassagem olímpica". *O Globo*. January 30th, 2010, p.12.

[10] BOTTARI, Elenice. "Tony Blair dará consultoria para a Rio 2016". *O Globo*. January 31st, 2010, p.19. http://esporte.uol.com.br/ultimas/efe/2010/01/30/ult1777u118500.jhtm (Accessed on February 2nd, 2010) There have emerged comments about such "invitation". One of them is from the Brazilian writer Paulo Coelho (an important who says that Brazilians could not have a man that supported the invasion of Iraq in the organization of 2016 Olympics. According to him the fact that Blair performed important role during the process of England's candidacy and implementation of 2012 Olympics do not legitimate him to work in the preparation of 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympiad. (For more information please check: "Paulo Coelho critica Tony Blair na Rio 2016". *O Globo*. February 2nd, 2010, p.13. and http://esporte.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/2010/02/01/1paulo-coelho-protesta-contra-anuncio-de-blair-como-consultor-no-rio-2016.jhtm

moment – to say that the political linkages between the three levels of government administration are much stronger in the preparation of the 2016 Olympic than they were during the arrangements that took place in 2007 Pan-American games. The leaders of each level of government are now taking political advantage from the event. This differs from the Pan-American games when former Mayor Cesar Maia could be considered one of the few political personas in the process, gaining in political and symbolic contexts. For the World Cup and Olympics, politicians at all levels of government are seeking to gain advantage.

The preparation of the city for the events linked to the 2014 World Cup involves a wide spread program of residential dislocation, especially slums (so-called favelas). The alleged reason is connected to the reformation of urban territory in order to rationalize public transportation through the creation of the "Bus Rapid Transportation" network[11]. Local media broadcast and publish news dealing with the arrangements connected to "freeing land" to build transportation infrastructure. The implementation of one of the most important transportation corridors – the "Transcarioca – Corredor T5" – will dispossess 3.630 real estate properties in different areas of the city. The amount of money involved is about U$S161.290.322,58 (R$300.000.000,00)[12]. The consequences of such implementation will undoubtedly impact thousands of people, especially those located in poor communities with lack of social and political organization to confront and resist this project[13]. In addition, city administration is also engaged in another project related to the removal of 119 poor community areas ("favelas") until 2012, involving around 12.196

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[11] There is another initiative connected to public security that the state government is implementing named – in Portuguese: "Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, UPP" – (something like Pacifying Police Unit) that also could be linked to the preparation of the city to be an important spot relating to mega-events. It seems that such initiative has as it main goal to establish a permanent policing presence in some violent poor communities (favelas) now controlled by drug dealers. Despite we do not have enough data which could allow us both determine the number of units and to evaluate its outcomes at the moment this article is being written, we believe that such procedure – for shore – is a kind of showcase in order to broadcast how concerned the Brazilian government levels are with the question of urban violence demonstrating their commitment of transforming Rio de Janeiro in a safe capital due to 2014 soccer World Cup and, of course, to the 2016 Olympics.

[12] Exchange rate: U$S1,OO = R$1,86. http://www.google.com.br/search?hl=pt-BR&source=hp&q=d%C3%B3lar&meta=&aq=f&oq= (Accessed on January 2nd, 2010)

[13] It seems that this initiative will repeat the same procedures and outcomes of what happened during the construction of the so called "yellow line", a road that connects Barra da Tijuca area to the north region of the Rio de Janeiro city and also during the implementation of 2007 Pan-American games.

dwellings. The Rio de Janeiro city administration has alleged that said initiative is necessary because the houses are located in protected environmental areas and/or places that are at risk of landslides and/or occupy public areas[14]. However, considering the recent history of social constraints that occurred during the implementation of 2007 Pan-American games, which brought many political problems for the city government, or maybe just to avoid any criticism or previous resistance, the present municipal housing secretary has stated that no removals will be executed by force or truculence.

Independently of the way that such removal will be implemented, this information validates what Gaffney (2009)[15] has indicated as one of the most important targets of the procedures that have been carried on by city administration: to reform the territory, "*to put the projects* [of the Olympic city] *in place*". It is connected to clear/prepare the territory – as an example – for real estate speculation. Besides, as the Olympics – ideologically speaking – have been "sold" as an important alternative to the development of the city, it is difficult to confront them. Thus, the possibility of any kind of social resistance (at least those related to poor communities) is also very difficult and, as what happened in 2007 Pan-American games, it has been seen as a kind of local antipatriotic position.

Gaffney (2009) also talks about the rezoning of some parts of the city of Rio de Janeiro in order to prepare the ground for the future investments required by these sport events. Related to that it is also important to point out that besides the 2014 soccer World Cup and 2016 Olympiad, Rio de Janeiro city administration is now proceeding its candidacy to host the 2020 World Expo[16]. This confirms Harvey's (1996) findings in as much as such exhibitions have been

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[14] BASTOS Isabela & SCHMIDT, Selma. "Prefeitura removerá 119 favelas". *O Globo*, January 1st, 2010.

[15] GAFFNEY, C. Interview with *Al Jazeera*. http//www.geostadia.blospot.com (Accessed on December 15th, 2009).

[16] BASTOS, Isabela & MAGALHÃES, Luiz Ernesto. "Depois dos Jogos, a Expo" *O Globo*, October 14th, 2009, p. 13. As it is indicated Rio de Janeiro city is the second Brazilian capital to host business (the first is São Paulo), and according to the International Congress and Convention Association (ICCA), the city is included in the small group of fifteen most important cities requested to host fairs, congresses and exhibitions in the world.

seen as one of the strategies that the present local – entrepreneurial – administrations have launched in order to bring capital and tourists to their cities.

Thus, in terms of territorial strategies it seems that there is already evidence showing some convergences between the 2007 Pan-American games and the 2016 Olympic Games. The unbalanced location of Olympic facilities in Barra da Tijuca is evidence of a continued strategy of urban re-territorialization. It is important to recognize that concentrating the majority of the most important facilities in Barra de Tijuca is now considerably amplified; the budget for the 2016 Olympics is approximately seven times that of the 2007 Pan-American games. In this way, some large scale projects connected to urban mobility have been presented and supported as feasible and necessary to the success of the mega-event: Bus Rapid Transportation, BRT, the T5 corridor, the refurbishing of Rio de Janeiro International airport, and expanding the subway connection to Barra da Tijuca. Needless to say, those interventions require large scale land dispossession and the consolidation of Barra de Tijuca as a "new" urban center. This new center will be constructed through a territorial logic based on the fluidity of the Olympic areas. On the other hand, important social and spatial aspects such as housing, equitably distributed metropolitan transportation, sanitation, education and public space, have not been considered in the Olympic plans.

According to media reports, there is a group of integrated territorial strategies that have been implemented simultaneously. The reforming of the docklands (project "Porto Maravilha"), the removal of poor areas in order to implement the "bus rapid transportation", and the rezoning of part of the urban space aiming the creation of the Olympic city (among other interventions) show that an important group of procedures have been enacted. These urban and social processes reinforce VAINER's (2010) observation that the implementation of 2016 Olympic Games (and maybe the 2014 soccer World Cup too) in Rio de Janeiro city has not happened by chance. As a matter of fact, since the first César Maia administration (1993 – 1996) new models of dealing

with a city as important and complex as Rio de Janeiro have been implemented in order to insert it into a globalized urban competition in an age of finance orientated capital accumulation. Thus we believe that the 2007 Pan-American games can be seen as an urban and economic experiment which is now being adapted and improved in order to prepare and to place Rio de Janeiro city in the center of the global competition to attract capital.

2.2. The role and the involvement of public and private sectors in directing city marketing and infrastructure financing

The linkage between sports and public policies related to urban development is very strong these days, performing an important role in the "world city market" (SÁNCHEZ, 2003). The notions of competition, health, teamwork, patriotic emotion, and discipline traditionally associated to sports, reinforce this feeling.

In the case of Rio de Janeiro city the Pan-American games of 2007 helped to restore political centrality to Rio, reversing a trend that began when the capital moved to Brasilia in 1960 and continued in the 1980 decade, due to the strength of the city of São Paulo. Since 1992, when Cesar Maia[17] was elected mayor for the first time, a group of initiatives – mainly linked to entrepreneurialism – were implemented in order to change the urban scene and to restore Rio de Janeiro city in the Brazilian political and urban scenes.

Maya's administrations carried out many projects related to urban renewal, management and planning innovations. The implementation of 2007 Pan-American games was one of the most important initiatives carried out during his tenure. Thus, Cesar Maia's administration filled the "political void" that Rio de Janeiro city was facing.

The failed bid to host 2004 Olympic Games propelled an aggressive marketing strategy by local government in order to launch (and sell) Rio de Janeiro in the sport mega-events market.

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[17] Cesar Maia – an economist who at first was linked to the left wing – was elected three times as mayor of Rio de Janeiro city: from 1992-1996, 2000 – 2004 and 2005-2009.

Its physical and social peculiarities – a geographically stunning and friendly city where people from different social classes could live together peacefully among others – were sold as primary characteristics that would justify a future choice as "the" spot where such mega-events could be developed. According to city administrators, these peculiarities allowed the city to compete and win the bid to host the 2007 Pan-American games, which – in their view - brought a group of social, cultural and economical advantages, especially those related to the development of sports and tourism. Even though the experience of the Pan 2007 was fraught with budgetary overruns and denounces of massive corruption, this experience proved invaluable for the organizers, prompting them to bid for the 2012 Olympiad (which will take place in London). In other words, at that time local administration thought and believed that through the 2007 Pan-American games, Rio de Janeiro could be turned into an important world player in terms of sponsoring and hosting such sports mega-events.

The political coalitions which dealt with the implementation of the 2007 Pan-American games were led by former mayor Cesar Maia who formed powerful groups of social actors which involved members of the city council and state legislators, congressmen and city hall technical staff. It is interesting to remember that during this process, in order to pressure on other levels of government to fund infrastructure for the Pan 2007, Maia usually blamed them for its probable/possible failure. Despite, and perhaps because of this tactic, the federal government performed a decisive financial role in the production of the event (OLIVEIRA, 2009)[18]. Despite Maia's powerful coalitions, he was not able to maintain the political base that supported his former administration, and an opposition candidate won the mayoral election in 2009.

It seems that in the case of both 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympics things have considerably changed, despite some decisions being taken without one or another administration

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[18] OLIVEIRA, Alberto. "O emprego, a economia e a transparência nos grandes projetos urbanos". *LASA2009 – XXVIII INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS*, June 11 – 14, 2009 • Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

level having agreed with it[19]. It appears that the three levels of government are taking advantage of the process and are working together. According to an important Brazilian newspaper in January of 2010 President Lula invited mayors and governors of the 12 cities that will host games of the 2014 soccer World Cup to sign an agreement of responsibilities in order to avoid the problems that happened in 2007 Pan-American games[20]. This may be seen as a preventative measure in order to placate the fears of the International Olympic Committee in regards to Rio de Janeiro's 2016 Olympic bid. In other words, as it is being broadcasted by media, independently of the party affiliation of the state governor and mayor, everyone is putting effort in order to take maximum advantage from the event, showing that there is an unified coalition to sustain and develop the mega-events, even though such effort is linked to the taking of political advantage.

Right after the announcement of Rio de Janeiro as the city that was chosen to host the Olympics, on October 3rd, President Lula declared that finally, Brazil had achieved "international citizenship". This statement indicates how important the event is perceived by the political elite in Brazil, including the belief that mega-events have the capacity to launch Brazil into a new international position. Another important aspect to be highlighted is that all members of Brazilian staff who were at the ceremony of the International Olympic Committee in October, reaffirmed that it was through the implementation of the 2007 Pan-American games that Brazil – and especially Rio de Janeiro city – have acquired the necessary experience to host the Olympics successfully.

In terms of finance it seems that the public sector will – again – sponsor the majority of both events, financing the main projects and infrastructure. Despite the spreading of the idea that the involvement of private sector is a key to the expansion of markets in an era of accelerated globalization, it seems that this has not happened, especially if we consider the implementation of

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[19] The case related to the choice of the Gustavo Capanema building by Rio de Janeiro state governor shows how things have been going as not even the present Brazilian ministry of education knew that it was chosen to shelter the Olympic Public Authority.
[20] "Sai hoje pacto para a Copa do Mundo de 2014". *O Globo*. January 3rd, 2010, p.30.

the 2007 Pan-American games. As Oliveira (2009) shows, in terms of funds invested, the involvement of private sector in such event was absurdly limited. The estimated amount of money spent by private sector was 4,3% of the total cost of the event paid by public sector; something around two billion dollars[21]!

It is also important to highlight that up to the present moment, no private sector initiatives have emerged in relation to the construction or refurbishing of any football stadium located in the cities where the matches of 2014 soccer World Cup will take place. It will be an probable necessity that once again the money will come from federal, state, and local governments - an unfortunate recurrence of the financing for the 2007 Pan-American games. The central government has recently offered one billion reais – through one of its development agencies (*Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, BNDES*), to finance the construction and the refurbishing of hotel infrastructure of the cities which will host soccer games during 2014 World Cup[22].

In a similar vein, the issue of privatization of public goods has come to the fore with the discussion surrounding the improvement of Brazilian airport infrastructure. There is widespread consensus that Brazilian airports and its airline industry are not prepared to face the consumer demand of the 2014 soccer World Cup. The lack of infrastructure has raised calls from the private sector to privatize public airports, traditionally operated by the federal government. This issue has returned to the agenda after the presidential elections in October 2010, as central government privatized three of the most important Brazilian airports in 2011.

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[21] Estimated rate: US$1,00=R$1,74 (http://oglobo.globo.com/economia/indicadores/ Accessed on December 18th, 2009).

[22] RIBEIRO, Erica. "BNDES terá R$1 bilhão para hotéis na Copa". *O Globo*. February 3rd, 2010, p.22. As it is published the interested entrepreneurs will have 18 years to pay their loans. The money involved is about US$ 531.067.445,565 (Estimated rate: US$1,00=R$1,88 http://economia.uol.com.br/cotacoes/cambio/dolar-comercial-estados-unidos-principal.jhtm). Accessed in February 4th, 2010), but this amount could be increased depending on the demand. As the press has broadcasted that there is a lack of hotel rooms available to face the demand of the mega-events here discussed, maybe this amount will certainly increase along the process.

As of this writing, the involvement of the private sector is still very uncertain, a clear indication that these mega-event projects are not economically viable. The experience of the 2007 Pan-American games indicates that at the end of the process it was the public sector that financed the event. The research shows that public-private partnerships take shape in discourse but not in practice. In this way it appears that the public sector will be responsible for the majority of the costs related to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics[23].

2.3. Decision making processes and social control during the conception and implementation of such initiatives

As Swyngedouw *et al* (2003, 21) have pointed out, the state is the sphere where political alliances and conflict happens. Considering the present reality of "post-Fordist governance", new state forms have been emerged. At the urban scale this shift has turned into a new and sometimes fugacious state apparatus (institutionally and legally speaking) that has been set up in order to rule the decision making process, especially when democratic processes are required. Consequently, it also provides the flexibility and the velocity required by the present forms of capital accumulation.

In the case of 2007 Pan-American games, Cesar Maia's administration created a special bureau which had the power and the means to implement its projects – the "Secretaria Especial Rio 2007" (Special Bureau Rio 2007). A small group of technicians headed by a politician this bureaucratic level effectively steered the process, justifying its acts/maneuvers as necessary in order to implement complex and time consuming projects. Due to the dispute/competition at the state levels, this peculiarity was emphasized by the local administration in order to get and increase political advantage as the process of implementation the projects was going on. Needless to say that this autocratic decision making process, assumed by all levels of government,

[23] *O Jogo Continua: megaeventos esportivos e cidades*. Organização, MASCARENHAS, Gilmar; BIENENSTEIN, Glauco; SÁNCHEZ, Fernanda. – Rio de Janeiro: EdUERJ, 2011, 302p.

generated significant social tension and political conflicts involving different groups of social and political actors.

In the case of 2007 Pan-American games, one of the most egregious examples of this approach was the building of the "João Havelange" Olympic Stadium ("Engenhão"). Located in a traditional residential class district known as Engenho de Dentro[24], where former railroad workers used to live, as one important railroad maintenance facility were situated there, this large scale urban project brought significant spatial and social impacts to the district.

At first, the stadium was supposed to be built in the Barra da Tijuca area. Although as social resistance movements rallied against this initiative, the city government decided to locate it in another district (Engenho de Dentro). This decision resulted in a number of zoning changes which strongly impacted and altered the urban fabric. The changes included altering zoning regulations allow maximum building height to change from two to eighteen stores with minimum apartment area (about 30 square meters), low cost dispossession of fourteen houses, extinction of leisure areas, among other interventions. Besides, there was a lack of public audiences in order to discuss the implementation of the stadium, not forgetting to mention that the promises related to job creation were not accomplished. When the residents realized that things were getting worse, the construction of the facility had already advanced and resistance was almost impossible[25].

Socially speaking, not even the main points of the Pan 2007 "social agenda" were implemented during or after the 2007 Pan-American games. The inclusion of social agendas was a requirement of the Pan American Sporting Organization (ODEPA) in order to leave a legacy of the games. In addition, the majority of the projects that needed to "free space" for Olympic development were accomplished by using different forms of violence (police force constraints,

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[24] This district is located at the north region of Rio de Janeiro city and was developed after the implementation of the Pedro II railroad, during the second half of nineteen century.

[25] BIENENSTEIN, G. et. al. "O que está em jogo? Contradições, tensões e conflitos na implementação do Pan 2007". *ANPEGE*. 2007.

lack of social and environmental agenda [26] etc). Moreover, most of the resistance social movements that emerged during the process of implementation of the 2007 Pan-American games were monitored or co-opted by city government as well as the private sector as long as they were seen by these actors as an obstacle to development of the city through large scale urban projects[27].

According to local media, the political linkages among the different government levels in regards to the 2014 FIFA World Cup have became stronger as they look for partnership agreements in order to avoid what happened during the preparation of 2007 Pan-American games. A recent initiative named "Accountability Matrix of 2014 World Cup" was established in January 2010 involving central, state and city administration levels in order to avoid the delays and other constraints that happened during the preparation of the 2007 Pan-American games. The agreement defines the responsibilities of each member involved and also establishes a schedule of the proceedings and the period that the infrastructure has to be finished[28]. Whether or not these mechanisms will function is still in question. The majority of the political actors involved in the construction of the Pan 2007 are still in power, we can only hope that they build upon their experience to deliver a more cost effective and socially just Olympiad.

On the other hand, and contrary to the advancements that have occurred related to political linkages, it appears that social conditions have not changed, as long as the city government as well as the city council has carried out initiatives in order to create a selective and socially exclusive territory, the Olympic city. According to GAFFNEY (2009), this very limited vision of the city has allowed the procedures (concepts and the projects) towards the implementation of both mega-events. Among such procedures, maybe one of the most important is the reforming of the Rio de Janeiro master plan without public audiences. The radical changes

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[26] It is interesting to highlight that a social agenda were one of the aspects required by the "Pan-American Sportive Organization" (ODEPA in Portuguese). In other words, in terms of the so called "legacy" of the event, not even this requirement was reached.
[27] BIENENSTEIN, G. Op. cit.
[28] "Sai hoje o pacto para a Copa do Mundo de 2014". *O Globo*, 3rd, January, 2010, p.30.

to the master plan have allowed long-desired real estate projects to move forward and, will affect poor communities located in the areas that will be impacted by the construction of the facilities connected to the events.

In terms of social and spatial decision making process and control the conception and implementation process of 2014 soccer World Cup as well as 2016 Olympic games seem to go through the same path of 2007 Pan-American games. The story is – unfortunately – being repeated; the losers have already been beaten, and the game is still being played.

2.4. Mechanisms of social support for the mega-events

Mega-events and their large scale urban projects have been taken (and "sold") as a decisive opportunity for large cities to face these times of fiscal constraints and deregulation. They are difficult to confront. Things become even worse when large urban projects are linked to sports as they are usually connected with to education, health, safety, transportation, and to the image that foreign tourists and capital have of the country.

One of the most common justifications to host the 2007 Pan-American games was linked to the view that by increasing Rio de Janeiro's exposure on a global scale by making it the Olympic center of the Americas would insert Brazil into the global competition for mega-events.[29]. This justification is linked to what can be identified as the "new urban agenda" which links the "inexorable process" of globalization process (which necessitates city marketing and competition) to mega-events (sportive, fairs, as an example) which could give the opportunity to localities to reinsert themselves in a supposed world urban map. It is in this context that Olympic urbanism (MUNHOZ apud MASCARENHAS, 2005) has emerged indicating the rebirth of the cities through the hosting of mega-events, not forgetting to mention the "army" of volunteers that

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[29] BIENENSTEIN, G. & SÁNCHEZ, F. "Jogos Pan-americanos Rio 2007". *Large Scale Urban Projects: what can be learned from the Brazilian experience?* Research Project. IPPUR/UFRJ, UFF, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2007.

has also emerged through such initiatives. In addition, there are also the "unseen legacies" of the games have been still spread as an important inheritance that could be reached through mega-events. On the other hand the "real legacies" are obtained by real estate entrepreneurs. A public security program is also indicated as an important legacy, although it is also conditioned upon unequal geographies of power that further exacerbate existing troubles in Rio de Janeiro.

It is a difficult task to confront something that is always connected to the rhetoric of bringing economic and cultural benefits for the city and the country. Moreover, as we said before, despite the problems that emerged during 2007 Pan-American games, the event has been used as a justification to launch Rio de Janeiro as "the" possible/feasible spot to host the Olympics. The power of this (mis)information was (and still is) so strong that even the poor communities that were negatively affected by the Pan 2007 urban initiatives (dispossession, as an example), declared that they were not against the Olympics, they only wanted to discuss it!

3. Conclusions

According to Vainer (2010) the choice of Rio de Janeiro city to host 2016 Olympics must not be seen as something that happened by chance. In fact, this event began in the early nineties, during the first administration of former mayor Cesar Maia (1993-1996, 2000-2004 and 2005-2008). Since then, a new pattern of dealing with the city as well as urban management and planning has been adopted. Besides, a new political coalition has emerged and wields extraordinary power, despite some dissensions. This coalition has implemented its hegemonic projects/conceptions fulfilling the political void that Rio de Janeiro had faced since the eighties, although, as it was mentioned, during the sixties, when the capital was moved to Brasília, the city also faced this political void.

This new urban agenda is totally connected and guided to the international trends towards market-based economies and the entrepreneurial city. In this context, the so called

public-private partnerships are the password that urban administrators must shout as one of the main "tools" to be used in order to condition their cities to the new times. However, this "tool" has been used much more at the ideological level than in practice. As Oliveira (2009) indicates the example of 2007 Pan-American games clearly shows this trend.

Regarding to territory strategies, it is clear to perceive how similar they are in 2007 Pan-American games as well as the 2016 Olympics. In this context, Barra da Tijuca district is – again – being favored.

The strong linkages between the three administration levels are another important aspect that must be stressed. Differently from what happened in Rio 2007, when these levels competed, now it seems that each member involved wants to take political advantage from the events avoiding any constraints that could weaken the process.

Finally, as we can see, in the case of 2014 world Cup and 2016 Olympics the debate is still strongly connected to the advantages (mainly at the level of discourse) that both initiatives can bring to the city as well as to the country, although the people are not yet feeling directly its real outcomes. In this way – at least at the present moment – (ideologically speaking) the mega-events are winning while the population is losing. It has been reinforced by the economic and political hegemonic of the interests linked to the mega-events, stressing that due to these two dimensions the population is also losing the match.

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