

BEHIND THE SCREEN: THE “TANAKA MEMORIAL” AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN BRAZIL DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

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Abstract: Whether in Japan or Brazil, little is known about the anti-Japanese movement in Brazil that occurred in the first half of the 20th century. The height of this movement was in May 1934, when the new Brazilian constitution was passed in the National Constituent Assembly. The aim of this article is to discuss the repercussion of the “Tanaka Memorial,” — a spurious document referring to Japan’s imperialist ambitions over Brazilian territory — and how it was commonly used at that time to justify segregationist and anti-Japanese movement in Brazil against Japanese immigration, especially during the drafting of the 1934 Constitution. Initially, we will give an overview of this anti-Japanese movement during the interwar period (1918-1939). Furthermore, through the Japanese diplomatic cables and the memoir of Noda Ryōji, the then first secretary of the Embassy of Japan, that was printed in the magazine *Burajiru*, we will view the radical change of thoughts toward Japanese immigration of Félix Pacheco, a poet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the President of the influential Brazilian newspaper *Jornal do Commercio*. We will also discuss the general understanding and acceptance of the “Tanaka Memorial” in Japan and Brazil and examine how Brazil’s anti-Japanese movement transformed in light of the positioning of Félix Pacheco and his newspaper company. In short, we seek to demonstrate how the “Tanaka Memorial” was involved in the anti-Japanese movement in Brazil, although apparently not intrinsically related.

Keywords: Tanaka Memorial; anti-Japanese movement in Brazil; Félix Pacheco; Japanese immigration; imperialism.

POR TRÁS DAS TELAS: “MEMORIAL TANAKA” E O MOVIMENTO ANTIJAPONÊS NO BRASIL DURANTE O PERÍODO ENTREGUERRAS

Resumo: Seja no Japão ou no Brasil, pouco se sabe sobre o movimento antijaponês brasileiro durante a primeira metade do século XX, cujo auge foi em maio de 1934, por conta da nova Constituição brasileira, aprovada pela Assembleia Nacional Constituinte. O objetivo deste artigo é discutir as repercussões do “Memorial de Tanaka” — um documento falso referente às ambições imperialistas do Japão sobre o território brasileiro —, o qual foi comumente utilizado na época para justificar movimentos segregacionistas e antijaponês do Brasil contra a imigração japonesa, especialmente durante a elaboração da Constituição de 1934. Inicialmente, daremos uma visão geral deste movimento antinipônico durante o período entre as duas guerras mundiais (1918-1939). Para, em seguida, analisar mudanças radicais de pensamento em relação à imigração japonesa na pessoa de Félix Pacheco, poeta, Ministro das Relações Exteriores, e o Presidente do influente *Jornal do Commercio*. Para tal, utilizaremos documentos diplomáticos e artigos reproduzidos pelo então primeiro secretário da embaixada do Japão, Noda Ryōji, na revista *Burajiru*. Também discutiremos o entendimento geral e a

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aceitação do “Memorial de Tanaka” no Japão e no Brasil, e examinaremos como o movimento antijaponês no Brasil se transformou à luz do posicionamento de Félix Pacheco e sua empresa jornalística. Em suma, procuraremos demonstrar como o “Memorial de Tanaka” esteve envolvido no movimento ant-japonês no Brasil, ainda que aparentemente não intrinsecamente relacionado.

Palavras-chave: Memorial Tanaka; movimento antijaponês no Brasil; Félix Pacheco; imigração japonesa; imperialismo.

INTRODUCTION

Whether in Japan or Brazil, little is known about the anti-Japanese movement in Brazil that occurred in the first half of the 20th century. The height of this movement was in May 1934, when the new Brazilian constitution was passed in the National Constituent Assembly.

The “Tanaka Memorial,” which was regarded as “the secret document that described the standards and guidelines of Japanese imperialism in its program for world conquest” (O CRUZEIRO, February 6, 1943)², is even less known than the anti-Japanese movement itself. This document was reportedly conveyed to Emperor Hirohito in 1927 by Baron Tanaka Giichi, the then Prime Minister of Japan. Although its official name was “the memorandum with reference to positive policy in Manchuria and Mongolia,”³ it became known internationally as the “Tanaka Memorial” or “Tanaka Memorandum” from 1929.

The purpose of this study is to rethink the repercussion of the “Tanaka Memorial,” which is still deemed as “the biggest forged document in the history of modern Japan” (FUJII, 2013, p. 2), concerning the debate about Japanese immigration, especially during the drafting of the 1934 Constitution, and to clarify how it was associated with the seemingly unrelated anti-Japanese movement in Brazil.

To do so, we first outline the anti-Japanese movement in Brazil during the interwar period. Then, we examine connections between the anti-Japanese movement and the “Tanaka Memorial,” emphasizing Félix Pacheco as a key figure. Although Pacheco was known to be pro-Japanese in his role as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Arthur Bernardes’s government (1922-1926), he became anti-Japanese in the 1930s. To

² All Japanese and Portuguese references in this paper have been translated by the author.

³ 「満蒙における積極政策にかんする覚書」 In: Fujii, 2013, pp. 3-4.

ascertain what made him change his mind, we primarily consider the Japanese diplomatic cables and the memoir entitled “The late Mr. Félix Pacheco, who went from pro-Japanese to anti-Japanese” (親日より排日に轉向した故フェーリス・パシエコ氏), written by Noda Ryōji, the then first secretary of the Embassy of Japan, that was printed in the magazine *Burajiru*. This memoir, which consists of simple sections such as “Life History,” “Poet,” “The Foreign Minister,” and “Motives for a Change of Heart,” was written by Noda shortly after Pacheco’s death with the aim of “expressing my deepest condolences to his bereaved family as an old friend” (NODA, 1936, p. 33). Then, we discuss the general understanding and acceptance of the “Tanaka Memorial” in Japan and Brazil and consider how the anti-Japanese movement in the latter was transformed by the existence of both Félix Pacheco and the document.

Finally, we seek to determine the impact of the “Tanaka Memorial” on the anti-Japanese faction and consequently, on the anti-Japanese movement as a whole, clarifying the changes in the discourse of major anti-Japanese activists in the anti-Japanese movement in Brazil.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN BRAZIL

For Japan, 1853 is considered a watershed year. That was the year Commodore Matthew C. Perry, who led the “Black Ships,” arrived at Uraga and played a decisive role in the opening of Japan. In the following year, with the signing of the Peace Treaty between Japan and the United States (Convention of Kanagawa), Japan’s 200-year-long isolation policy was abolished.

Eventually, Japan’s last shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, decided to transfer power back to the Emperor on October 14, 1867. This, in turn, prompted the start of the Meiji Era in 1868, which led to a series of political, economic, and social revolutions, promoting the “modernization” and “westernization” under the banner of *Fukoku Kyōhei* (fortifying the country, strengthening the military), *Shokusan Kōgyō* (encouragement of new industry), and *Bunmei Kaika* (civilization and enlightenment).

Meanwhile, Brazil was still in the middle of slavery. From the late 1870s, however, the abolitionist movement was gaining momentum, and slavery was finally abolished with the declaration of the *Lei Áurea* (“Golden Law”) on May 13, 1888. Some coffee

planters in São Paulo anticipating the abolition of slavery, as well as the coming of the capitalist society, attempted to introduce a large number of Italian immigrants as labor force, even before the effective abolition by Princess Isabel. In this way, Brazil became the last country in the American continent to abolish slavery, a big step in becoming a modern nation.

40 years after the Meiji Restoration in Japan and 20 years from the abolition of slavery in Brazil, interactions between Japan and Brazil began in 1908. During this year, the first group of 781 Japanese immigrants (in addition, there were 12 free immigrants) set sail on the steamer *Kasato-Maru* from the port of Kobe on April 28 and arrived at the port of Santos on June 18, after passing through Singapore and the Cape of Good Hope. According to Kōyama, it is presumed that from 1908 to June 1941 approximately 188,309 Japanese immigrants emigrated to Brazil (KŌYAMA, 1949: 428). Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Gentlemen's Agreement between Japan and the United States in 1907-1908, whose main objective was to impose restrictions on the entry of Japanese immigrants into the United States, impacted Japanese immigration policy. As a result of the agreement, the Japanese government was forced to transfer their immigrant destination from the United States to Brazil, making a great change in their conventional immigration policy.

A history of Japanese immigration during the prewar period also tells the story of Japanese exclusion. Even today, little is known about the various oppositions to Japanese immigration that were raised in the early days. One example is that of Antônio Bandeira de Melo, a Brazilian publicist who stressed “the difficulties in the integration of yellow colonists in national territory” (MORAES, 1942, p. 54) during a conference held in Belgium, before a large audience from the *Société Belged'Études Coloniales de Bruxelles* on March 13, 1911.

The following year, an article entitled “Colonização Japonesa” (Japanese Settlement), written by a person named Luiz Gomes, was published in the *Jornal do Brasil*. In the article, Gomes criticized the Japanese from a racial point of view, not only for “an unsightly and yellow race that is diametrically opposed to the Aryan ideal that civilizations long for” but also for being “an inferior” and an “unassimilable” race (JORNAL DO BRASIL, April 30, 1912).

When recounting the history of Japanese immigration in Brazil, the role of Paulo de Moraes Barros, who was known to be closely connected to early Japanese immigration, cannot be overlooked. The state of São Paulo had been inviting Japanese immigrants on a trial basis to verify their aptitude for work on arable land ever since the first Japanese immigration was realized by the signature of Carlos Botelho, who was the then secretary of Agriculture of São Paulo (MORAES, 1942, p. 50). However, in 1914, Barros, the new secretary of Agriculture in the state of São Paulo, was dissatisfied with the result and stopped the state's subsidization of Japanese immigration in March of the same year. Subsequently, further Japanese immigration was suspended until he re-granted authorization in 1919 (BURAJIRU JIHŌ, April 29, 1934). In response to this, a Japanese named '海谷野人' who regarded Barros as a Japanophobe, stated in 1917 that "he (Barros) is the one who has always expressed unabashedly in public that the Japanese are disgusting because of the facial ugliness. Japanese immigrants have indeed been stopped by Mr. Moreira de Barro [sic]" (OSAKA ASAHI SHIMBUN, August 6, 1917); as such, he attributed the decision to discontinue subsidies to Barros's racial prejudice against Japanese people.

After the 1920s, such anti-Japanese activity increased. Soon after the problem of Japanese immigration came to the surface, it became a subject of debate, and the justifiability of arguments on both sides was discussed. The trigger was the Reis bill, which sought to prohibit the entry of black immigrants and restrict the entry of immigrants of yellow origin through an annual quota corresponding to 3% of the number of yellow immigrants already entering Brazil. It was presented in the lower house of the National Congress on October 22, 1923, by Congressperson Fidélis Reis from Minas Gerais.

On one hand, according to the *Burajiru Jihō*, a possible reason the Reis bill was filed was to prevent the United States government's plan to send approximately 200,000 domestic black people for the purpose of colonizing and building in the Amazon Basin (BURAJIRU JIHŌ, April 29, 1934).⁴ On the other hand, as stated by Carlos de Souza Moraes, there is a theory that the United States was aiming to acquire space in the state of Mato Grosso, rather than in Amazonas. He also added that two congressmen,

⁴ Cf. Zaihaku Nihonjin Bunka Kyōkai, 1934, p. 90.

Cincinato Braga (from São Paulo) and Andrade Bezerra (from Pernambuco), had submitted a bill on July 28, 1921, to inhibit such a move (MORAES, 1942, p. 54).⁵

There is an inconsistency between the *Burajiru Jihō*, which claimed that the Reis bill was presented to deter black immigrants from entering Brazil, and Moraes, who stated that the matter of black immigrants had already been resolved before the Reis bill was presented. Although it remains unclear which is correct, considering that the Reis bill stipulated that it would definitely not allow the blacks to enter Brazil, as well as the Reis's statements in a speech that was given in the lower house of the National Congress in 1923, the United States' plan to send black immigrants to Brazil would have been a solid fact.⁶

In the case of the Reis bill, the forth article is very important: it states that “the Government will exercise strict control over immigration to Brazil, whatever its origins, to obstruct the entry of all and any elements considered harmful to the ethnic, moral, and physical formation of nationality” (ANNAES, 1923, p. 140). Fidélis Reis is renowned as one of the most ardent advocates of the ideology of “whitening,” which appeared around the same time as the Proclamation of the Republic of Brazil in 1889. Therefore, as previously mentioned, he submitted the bill with the aim of preventing the entry of anyone considered “harmful” to the ethnic, moral, and physical formation of nationality, primarily to promote colonization of the European agricultural migrant families.⁷ In addition to this, in a speech justifying the bill, Reis directed his attack toward Japanese immigrants, claiming that “we should in no way sacrifice, for the sake of immediate interests, the type of mixed race with the mass introduction of unassimilable or prejudicially assimilable ethnic elements” (ANNAES, 1923, p. 145). In fact, after the presentation of the Reis bill, both friendly and hostile opinions of Japanese immigration appeared in the newspapers.

⁵ Thomas Skidmore has the same opinion as Carlos de Souza Moraes. “In 1921 the western state of Mato Grosso made a land concession to developers. According to the press these developers were linked to organizers in the United States who were recruiting black North Americans to emigrate to Brazil. The President of Mato Grosso (a Catholic Bishop) immediately canceled the concession and so informed the Brazilian Foreign Minister; but the press continued to spread the alarm” (SKIDMORE, 1993, pp. 192-193; 1990, p. 23).

⁶ “When, then, we think, Mr. President, of the near or remote possibility of the immigration of American black people to Brazil, it is that we come to admit the eventuality of the disturbance of peace on the continent, as long as it is promoted or encouraged by the government of Washington” (ANNAES, 1923, p. 147).

⁷ De Souza, Verbete de Fidélis Reis, in FGV/CPDOC, p. 1.

As a consequence of the massive response this elicited, although the bill passed through the Industry and Commerce Committee and the Finance Committee, it was eventually rejected in 1927. Throughout the period of Washington Luís's government, which succeeded former president Arthur Bernardes, a relatively peaceful approach to Japanese immigration was taken; Washington Luís appointed Lira Castro and Oliveira Botelho, both of whom strove to repeal the Reis bill, to be the Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Finance respectively. As such, although the Reis bill, which had been discussed throughout the 1920s, frustrated the plan of the entry of black immigrants, it also resulted in the instilling of anti-Japanese sentiment among Brazilians.

Brazil's next decade started with the Revolution of 1930, which broke out on October 24. This military *coup d'état* by Getúlio Vargas forced then-president Washington Luís to withdraw from the presidency and, then, Vargas came to head the provisional government from 1930 to 1934. At the time, coffee prices had plummeted due to the Great Depression in 1929 and the deterioration of financial conditions after the Revolution of 1930 sharply increased the rate of unemployment, which in turn caused nationalist ideas and feelings of antipathy toward foreign immigrants to widely infiltrate Brazilians. In this context, on December 13, 1930, Vargas ordered Lindolfo Collor, the Minister of Labor, to prohibit the entry of third-class ship passengers (emigrants) into Brazil for one year in order to safeguard the domestic unemployed.

However, Japanese immigrants, most of whom were agricultural workers, were exempt from the entry ban, because the intention was to save the urban unemployed by prohibiting industrial immigration and preventing urban concentration. Thus, from January 1931, Vargas, in his role as interim president, made Japanese immigration exempt from the decree because he deemed them suitable for agricultural work; as such, 12,000 Japanese people were allowed to enter the country. This immigration policy, which gave special treatment to Japanese immigrants, not only caused jealousy and antipathy among foreign countries but also encouraged people to foster anti-Japanese sentiment. Moreover, a convocation of the National Constituent Assembly that was focused mainly on the establishment of a new constitution triggered a more energetic anti-Japanese movement.

After taking control of the government, Vargas began to emphasize the ideology of "Brazilianness" in social and cultural aspects and demand the assimilation and

integration of all foreigners residing in Brazil under the banner of nationalism based on the centralization of power. Under the provisional government, Brazil was governed in a dictatorial way; however, it also accumulated voices which requested parliamentarism by the immediate promulgation of a new constitution, which served to provoke the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1932 that broke out in São Paulo on July 9. In view of the social circumstances at the time, the government appointed 26 commission members to draft a new constitution in 1933, and they soon set out to formulate the constitution's drafts. After a draft was published, a general election was held on May 3, 1933, in which 250 Members of Parliament were elected. The opening ceremony of the National Constituent Assembly took place on November 15, the day of the Proclamation of the Republic of Brazil (ASHIDA, 1934, p. 120).

On May 24, 1934, the amendment proposed by Miguel Couto to restrict the annual number of immigrants from each country, including Japan, to 2% of the total number of residing immigrants in Brazil over the past 50 years (1884-1933) was ratified at 146 vs 41 in the National Constituent Assembly. As a result of the inclusion of “the two percent limit clause” (Article 121, Clause 6) in the 1934 Constitution, the number of Japanese immigrants entering the country was legally limited to 2,849 (2% of the total number of 142,457 over the past 50 years) (BURAJIRU JIHŌ, November 3, 1934). This restriction, however, was not immediately applied, and as the number of minors under the age of 14 was not taken into account in the quota, approximately 5,000 Japanese immigrants could enter Brazil by 1937 from the establishment of the “Estado Novo” by Getúlio Vargas (AOYAGI, 1941, p. 139).

A CHANGE OF HEART FOR FÉLIX PACHECO

The Life of Félix Pacheco

The anti-Japanese faction included the following politicians: Miguel Couto, Arthur Neiva, Xavier de Oliveira, and Monteiro de Barros, all of whom played a central role in passing the Constitution of 1934. However, as mentioned above, there were several disputes about the Japanese exclusion issue at the Assembly since the early days of Japanese immigration, involving many politicians, scholars, scientists, and journalists. Therefore, the Japanese exclusion issue or the anti-Japanese movement should not be

discussed only by the aforementioned activists. Accordingly, in this chapter, we will treat Félix Pacheco as a person who is thought to have had a strong influence on the anti-Japanese movement along with the anti-Japanese faction and examine how he approached the movement and influenced it.

The poet, journalist, and politician José Félix Alves Pacheco was born in Teresina, Piauí, on August 2, 1879, and passed away in Rio de Janeiro on December 6, 1935. In 1890, he moved to Rio de Janeiro with his maternal uncle, Teodoro Alves Pacheco, who was a senator. However, his uncle, who was his effective guardian, suddenly died in 1891, forcing Pacheco to study hard from an early age. He went on to study law at the Army Cadet School and, after graduating in 1897, he threw himself into the newspaper world, starting as a reporter for the *O Debate*. After this newspaper was discontinued a little later, he moved to the *Jornal do Commercio* in 1899, where he became chief editor and eventually took control of the paper as its president.

A big achievement of his was adopting a new and improved style dactylogram identify method in Brazil. Therefore, although “Gabinete de Identificação e Estatística da Polícia do Distrito Federal” was established on December 29, 1902, it was renamed “Instituto de Identificação Félix Pacheco (IIFP)” in honor of Félix Pacheco in 1941.⁸ Later, at 30 years old, Pacheco came to enter politics, while still in control of the *Jornal do Commercio*. He held various important positions such as Federal Deputy (1909-1921), Senator (1921-1928) of Piauí, and also served as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1922-1926) under the government of Arthur Bernardes. Pacheco was also renowned as a poet.⁹ His poetry, in a style between Parnassianism and Symbolism, was so highly regarded that, on May 11, 1912, at the age of 33, he became the first Piauiense (from Piauí) member of the *Academia Brasileira de Letras* (ABL), and was enrolled on August 14, 1913.¹⁰

Changing his Mind: from Japanophile to Japanophobe

⁸ Noda, 1936, p. 26; Polícia Civil, IIFP- Instituto de Identificação Félix Pacheco.

⁹ Félix Pacheco was the first translator of the French poet Charles-Pierre Baudelaire. He gave a lecture on “Baudelaire and his miracle of imagination” (“Baudelaire e os milagres do poder da imaginação”) on November 24, 1932. Furthermore, he grappled more energetically with literary activities in the next year, publishing three booklets. In: Sandroni, Verbete de Félix Pacheco, in FGV/CPDOC, p. 2.

¹⁰ Biography of Félix Pacheco in the Brazilian Academy of Letters (ABL).

In the 1920s, in contrast to the domestic disturbances in Brazil, Japanese immigrants experienced a period of relative stability. As mentioned above, in 1923, there was a growing trend against Japanese immigration not only because the Reis bill appeared unexpectedly, but also because Miguel Couto, the president of the *Academia Nacional de Medicina* (ANM), supported the bill. However, according to Noda Ryōji, who worked as the first secretary of the Embassy of Japan in Rio de Janeiro for more than two decades, Pacheco's attitude toward Japan was "not just a lip service, but totally pro-Japanese behavior" (NODA, 1936, p. 29).

For example, in 1924, the issuance of a visa for Japanese immigrants' passport was suspended. Nevertheless, it is said that by May of the following year, there were around 4,000 Japanese immigrants. In this regard, the *Nippaku Shimbun* reported Pacheco's argument as follows:

In Japan, they are actively researching what is most suitable for the development of Japanese people and generally propagating this through books and other means. The Japanese ambassador to Brazil even said to me that there is no other place for Japanese people to settle than the fields of the Far East and that the number of immigrants to Brazil, no matter how easy the procedure is, will never be enormous; therefore, it would not cause any danger to Brazil. (NIPPAKU SHIMBUN, May 1, 1925)

This statement is said to be "a reply to Professor Miguel Couto's fear of Japan" (NIPPAKU SHIMBUN, May 1, 1925), and Pacheco, who was the Foreign Minister at the time, was pro-Japanese immigration and in disagreement with Miguel Couto. In fact, the *Jornal do Commercio* under Pacheco's control was "originally pro-Japanese, and many of its reporters, including its chief editor Vítor Viana, had pro-Japanese tendencies" (NODA, 1936: 33). As Noda recalls, Pacheco was certainly amicable to the Japanese.

Pacheco's pro-Japanese attitude certainly continued even after resigning as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the tenure of the second Ambassador Ariyoshi, Pacheco, his wife and daughter attended receptions at our embassy when invited. The *Jornal do Commercio* also maintained its traditional pro-Japanese attitude and had been gladly publishing the articles that we requested in the paper (NODA, 1936, p. 30).

However, in his later years, Félix Pacheco, who had turned into a Japanophobe, ended up dying "as an enemy of Japan" (NODA, 1936, p. 33). On the occasion of

Pacheco's death, the *Seishū Shimpō* reported the change of his attitude, which was once pro-Japanese, by saying:

Pacheco had a special friendship with Mr. Horiguchi Kumaichi, our minister, when he was the Foreign Minister, and on the occasion of Mr. Horiguchi's return to Japan, Pacheco even gave a farewell speech of an unprecedented magnitude in the diplomatic circles of Brazil, but after that, for some reason, he transformed himself into Japanophobe (...). (SEISHŪ SHIMPŌ, December 10, 1935)

After the passage of the 1934 Constitution, the Japanese government decided to dispatch the former minister of the legation in Brazil Horiguchi Kumaichi as a cultural ambassador to Latin American countries for about one year, with the purpose of "eliminating the anti-Japanese sentiment by making them recognize correctly the misrepresentation through propaganda" (BURAJIRUJIHŌ, September 15, 1934). Thus, Horiguchi assumed the role of the first cultural envoy and, on August 20, 1935, he stepped on Brazilian soil for the first time since 1923.

On this occasion, Horiguchi visited his old acquaintance Pacheco, yet he "cleverly pretended to be out, although Horiguchi had visited three times" (SEISHŪ SHIMPŌ, December 10, 1935). Pacheco behaved this way not only toward Horiguchi but also toward Noda, who admitted that "I had met him dozens of times and already had a good relationship with him" from June 1911 (NODA, 1936, p. 29).

The problem is that rather than simply hating the Japanese, Pacheco also distanced himself from the Japanese people who he had previously been associated with, including long-time acquaintances such as Horiguchi and Noda. Provided that we believe Noda's recollection that Pacheco's pro-Japanese attitude continued even after he stepped down from his role as Foreign Minister, it was within 10 years of his death (i.e., between 1931 and 1932) that he turned into a Japanophobe (NODA, 1936, p. 32). This begs the question: what happened around that time to transform Pacheco's attitude so drastically? And what kind of event would cause him to break with his long-standing acquaintances so abruptly?

Motives for a Change of Heart

When Noda visited the newspaper company *Jornal do Commercio* despite being repeatedly absent, he encountered an old acquaintance, Mr. B, a former reporter for the *Jornal do Commercio* and the first secretary of the legation at the time, at the company's entrance.¹¹ It was then that Noda heard the story of how Pacheco's change of heart happened.

Dr. Miguel Couto, who had been tirelessly advocating for restrictions on Japanese immigration, frequently urged his colleagues to support his argument by sending letters to them, and Pacheco, a fellow of Couto at the *Academia Brasileira de Letras*, had been involved with him for some time. In addition, with the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, Pacheco, who was already inspired by Couto's Japanophobia, read the so-called "Tanaka Memorial" and, much to his surprise, decided to take a firm stand against Japan and the Japanese by means of his newspaper company (NODA, 1936, p. 31; Cf. GAIMUSHŌ, 1933, p. 952).

From the above discourse, three things can be identified: (1) Pacheco was involved in the anti-Japanese movement led by Miguel Couto, (2) he was inspired by the Manchurian Incident, and (3) his anti-Japanese attitude was determined by the "Tanaka Memorial". As a matter of fact, it can be said that this statement is highly credible, although it was heard from Mr. B. In this section, we will refer to (1) and (2) in particular, and (3) will be discussed in the next chapter.

The anti-Japanese movement in Brazil cannot be talked about without mention of Miguel Couto. Miguel Couto (1865-1934), a physician and professor of the third department of internal medicine of Rio de Janeiro Medical School, was a figure of authority in the Brazilian medical world who served as the president of the *Academia Nacional de Medicina* from 1914 until the day of his death. He was also the most influential anti-Japanese activist and published the anti-Japanese booklet *Seleção Social* in 1930, which was a compilation of editorials written for the *O Jornal* from 1924 to 1925.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the course of the anti-Japanese movement in Brazil changed with Miguel Couto's entry into politics. In May 1933, he ran for the National Constituent Assembly and became a member of the Assembly. Following this, he became even more committed to the anti-Japanese movement, and on May 24, 1934,

¹¹"Afterwards I literally went to the newspaper company *Jornal do Commercio* over and over and asked to see him, but he was always absent and I could not see him. So, I came to realize that he had been absent for the purpose of refusing to see me" (NODA, 1936, p. 31).

after seeing through the passage of the Constitution of 1934, he suddenly died of angina on June 6 (NIPPON SHIMBUN, June 13, 1934).

What makes Couto's anti-Japanese activities different from other anti-Japanese activists is the length of his period of activity. As stated above, after the submission of the Reis bill, a variety of voices against Japanese immigration began to appear in the newspapers, the first of which came to light when Couto publicly announced his extreme opposition to Japanese immigration in the *O Jornal* in 1924 (NIPPAKU SHIMBUN, October 31, 1924). Since then, Miguel Couto linked the theory of correction of the Brazilian race from the medical perspective using the eugenics standpoint, and while acknowledging the strengths of the Japanese, he also stubbornly asserted that "the increase in the number of Japanese, just like Gresham's Law,¹² is driving out the superior factors of the Brazilian ethnicity" (OSAKA MAINICHI SHIMBUN, June 8, 1934).

In addition to this, Miguel Couto was also the largest supporter of the Reis bill; as soon as the bill was submitted, he was supporting it alongside the whole *Academia Nacional de Medicina* (NIPPAKU SHIMBUN, April 29, 1934). After the bill was repealed, there was no overt anti-Japanese activity in Fidélis Reis, whereas Couto continued his steady anti-Japanese campaign. When the 1934 Constitution was passed, the *Jiji Shimpō* reported that Couto "took advantage of his position as a leading figure in the Brazilian academic world, traced his relationship between master and pupil, appealed to their friendship, and pressured them to sign in favor of his proposal" (JIJI SHIMPŌ, June 10, 1934). In light of these conventional actions, it is not surprising that Miguel Couto, who became a member of the *Academia Brasileira de Letras* in 1919, began to associate himself with Félix Pacheco through this institution, which instilled anti-Japanese thoughts in him.

For Pacheco, there is no doubt that the Manchurian Incident of 1931 was the catalyst for his change of heart. For instance, as can be seen in the diplomatic cable addressed by Hayashi Kyūjirō, the Ambassador of the Japanese Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, to the Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki in 1934, the Manchurian Incident was a turning point in the direction of not only Félix Pacheco, but also many Brazilian elites on the path of becoming anti-Japanese.

¹² "Gresham's Law" is a monetary principle in economics stating that "bad money drives out good."

The anti-Japanese activists (...) also took advantage of the fact that a friend of Dr. Couto and former Foreign Minister Félix Pacheco had been extremely prone to exclude the Japanese after the Manchurian Incident, and encouraged him to pass Couto's proposal by regularly publishing disadvantageous articles on Japanese immigration in his influential newspaper, *Jornal do Commercio*, as a media organization (GAIMUSHŌ, 1934, p. 906).

However, the Manchurian Incident was not the only reason for the exclusion of Japanese immigration. As mentioned earlier, the success of the Revolution of 1930 brought about the "Vargas Era" (1930-1945) in Brazil. In the 1930s, as the momentum of nationalism was surging and spreading worldwide, nationalism became evident in Brazil as well.

The beginning of it was the Great Depression of 1929, after which, as the number of unemployed people soared, so did the spirit of nationalism. Foreign immigrants were already making inroads into every area of Brazilian society. It was against this backdrop that Vargas issued a decree in late 1930 restricting the entry of foreign immigrants in order to protect the domestic unemployed. Yet, this was limited to urban immigrants, and as Japanese immigrants were mostly agricultural immigrants, they were exempt from the restriction thanks to the efforts of Bruno Lobo (NIPPAKU SHIMBUN, May 12, 1932; February 28, 1934).¹³ In the years that followed, Japanese immigrants continued to occupy a large percentage of Brazil's population, but they also came to be jealous of other foreign immigrants.

It was not just foreign immigrants who frowned upon the fact that only Japanese immigrants were allowed to enter Brazil. A stronger reaction came from the anti-Japanese faction, centering on Miguel Couto, who was advocating an improvement of the racial type from the standpoint of eugenics. For the anti-Japanese activists, the Manchurian Incident broke out at the time of pent-up dissatisfaction, effectively making it "a new and valid reason for the Japanophobes in Brazil and one that helped to intensify anti-Japanese sentiment" (GAIMUSHŌ, 1933, p. 952).

¹³ Bruno Álvares da Silva Lobo, known as a pro-Japanese along with politician and lawyer Carlos de Moraes Andrade and anthropologist Edgardo Roquette-Pinto, was a professor at the Rio de Janeiro Medical School and the director of the National Museum in Rio de Janeiro between 1915 and 1923. He was also the author of *Japonezes no Japão, no Brasil* (1926), *De Japonez à Brasileiro* (1932), and *Esquecendo os Antepassados: combatendo os Estrangeiros* (1935), among others.

After the Manchurian Incident, threats against Japan's "imperialism," "militarism," and "territorial expansionism" were loudly proclaimed in Brazil. In the next chapter, we will discuss such a theory, including Japanophobia, in light of its relation to the "Tanaka Memorial."

THE INFLUENCE OF THE "TANAKA MEMORIAL" ON THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN BRAZIL¹⁴

In the future if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the World, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us (CROW, 1942, p. 29).

The above passage is the most famous part in the "Tanaka Memorial." The document is generally said to be a secret document that was presented by then Premier Tanaka Giichi to Emperor Hirohito (Shōwa) on July 25, 1927. It was once regarded as a manifesto not only for the invasion of the Great Empire of Japan upon Manchuria and Mongolia, but also for world conquest; today, it is positioned as an anonymous document propagated by China with anti-Japanese objectives.

In April 1927, along with the formation of a cabinet, Tanaka made his policy toward China into positive. From June 27 to July 7 of the same year, the Tanaka Cabinet convened diplomatic and military officials to discuss Japan's policy toward China and held the Eastern Conference (東方會議) in Tokyo. Based on the decisions made at the conference, the "Tanaka Memorial" specifically described a total of 21 items regarding the measures for the management of Manchuria and Mongolia, including the dispatch of military spies to Inner and Outer Mongolia, the acquisition of mines, the migration of Koreans, the construction of railways, and the monopoly of Manchurian and Mongolian specialties. Later, however, despite no specific policy decisions being made on Manchuria and Mongolia, China propagated the "Tanaka Memorial," and claimed that a concrete plan for Manchurian rule was being laid out in the document.

¹⁴ The memorandum is now considered a forgery on account of some formally suspicious points and clear factual errors. Yet the authenticity continues to be discussed today. In this paper, we do not refer to these details because it is outside of the paper's scope and objectives. *Vide*: Fujii, 2013.

The first time that the “Tanaka Memorial” became widely known was when a pamphlet in Chinese “田中義一上日皇之奏章” was printed in December 1929 in the Chinese monthly magazine *Jiji Geppō* (published in Nanjing, China). In its preface, the magazine stated that Japan’s policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia was based on the legacy of the Emperor Meiji, according to which there were three phases: the first was the occupation of Formosa (Taiwan), the second was the annexation of Korea, and the third was the conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia. At that time, they were considered to be in the third period. As a result of the Eastern Conference, positive policy on Manchuria and Mongolia such as political expansion, economic invasion, and transplantation of populations was proposed, and the *Jiji Geppō* warned that it was being carried out in accordance with the “Tanaka Memorial” (NIKKA KURABU, 1930, p. 1-2).

Little is known about the existence of a Portuguese version of the “Tanaka Memorial” in Brazil.¹⁵ In Japanese newspapers, Shiino Yutaka (椎野豊) was the only journalist to mention the existence of anti-Japanese book in the *Seishū Shimpō*, stating that “it is regrettable that an unpleasant book, which summarized anti-Japanese arguments from a political viewpoint and should have never been, has appeared in Brazil” (SEISHŪ SHIMPŌ, August 17, 1937). In Brazilian newspapers, several articles on the “Tanaka Memorial” had appeared even before they were mentioned in said Japanese newspaper.

The “Tanaka Memorial” began to be picked up more in Brazil when a Portuguese version of the “Tanaka Memorial” was inserted into the book *O despertador da Asia*, published by Editorial PAX in São Paulo in 1932, and was distributed throughout the country.¹⁶ In Brazil, the “Tanaka Memorial” was considered the Japanese version of

¹⁵The “Tanaka Memorial” itself has mentioned a few times in the study of Marcia Takeuchi Yumi (2012, p. 106; 2016, p. 182).

¹⁶ In: *Diário Nacional*, June 16, 1932; *Diário de Notícias*, July 29, 1932. The original version of *O Despertador da Asia* is *El Despertar de Asia: Japón, China, India, Persia, Turquía, Afghanistan* by Publicaciones Mundial, published in Barcelona in 1931. The authors were Worsky and Augusto Riera y Sol, but oddly enough, none of their individual information is available. In a diplomatic cable, Ambassador Hayashi Kyūjirō mentioned that the “Tanaka Memorial” was mailed by someone to each newspaper office in São Paulo in April 1932 (GAIMUSHO, 1933, p. 950). According to Noda, the “Tanaka Memorial” was inserted in two Portuguese books entitled 『亞細亞の覺醒—日本と印度』 and 『亞細亞の暴風雨—滿州のための闘争』 written by マンツラー (there is no information about the author of the latter) (NODA, 1936, p. 32). In 1937, Carlos de Souza Moraes also inserted the memorandum in his book: *A ofensiva japonesa no Brasil*. (see Figure 1)

Mein Kampf (“My Struggle,” by Adolf Hitler) and was used as wartime propaganda, especially during World War II, to prove Japan’s intention to invade. Moreover, most articles were accompanied by the adjectives *famoso*, *célebre* and *notório*, among others, meaning “famous.” Although the “Tanaka Memorial” is said to be a forged document, it is rumored to have either been invented by maneuver of a Chinese Communist Party, or taken from Tokyo’s naval archives by Russian spies (in accordance with Leon Trotsky’s testimony) (Cf. DIARIO CARIOCA, March 22, 1942), or written by a Japanese person. The source of the memorandum remains unknown today, yet the majority of Brazilian newspapers are of the opinion that Tanaka himself wrote it. In short, Brazilians at the time generally thought that the “Tanaka Memorial” was authentic, including Félix Pacheco.




Figure 1. “Tanaka Memorial,” inserted in *A ofensiva japonesa no Brasil* by Carlos de Souza Moraes.

It should be mentioned that there was also an article in the *Jornal do Commercio* which reported that the “Tanaka Memorial” was a forged document, although many people believed that it was authentic. Yet in fact, according to Noda, the Japanese Embassy “published that article intentionally in the paid sections of the *Jornal do Commercio* in order to inform the Brazilian public and Mr. Pacheco” (NODA, 1936, p. 32). In the subheading of this article, the “Tanaka Memorial” was described as “a document forged by the Chinese for anti-Japanese propaganda,” and the text is explained as follows:

In it (*O despertador da Asia*) was inserted the false memorial in such a way that the innocent and unprepared reader will see truth in the cited documentation. However, this document is nothing more than a pure invention of the Chinese, that was cleverly put into practice (JORNAL DO COMMERCIO, November 13, 1932).

Thus, it cannot be overlooked that, while Japan was asserting its legitimacy, Miguel Couto referred to the “Tanaka Memorial” in the 1934 Constituent Assembly, and recognized it as having been “cunningly invented by China” (ANNAES, 1935, p. 491-492). Nevertheless, Couto claimed that the “Tanaka Memorial” was solid evidence of Japanese imperialism. In response, Ambassador Hayashi refuted Couto’s attitude in the *Diario Carioca* as follows:

As for the memorial, Mr. Editor, I must say that I have not yet been able to understand how such an outstanding and prudent intellectual — such is my opinion of your great Miguel Couto —, can accept such an absurdity (DIARIO CARIOCA, March 6, 1934).

Ambassador Hayashi then accentuated that the “Tanaka Memorial” was a forgery, as the Japanese government had previously claimed.

In the memorable discussion between our representative in the Geneva League and the Chinese envoy, the falsity of this apocryphal document was absolutely and definitely proven. It was forged in China on the occasion of the *Conferência dos Povos Pacifistas*¹⁷, held in my country, and with the malevolent intent of placing us in a situation of compromising dubiousness. The whole world has already clarified this fact (Ibid.).

¹⁷ If we translate this literally, it means “Conference of the Pacifist Peoples”, yet it is unclear what it was. Considering that it was Ambassador Hayashi’s statement, it might refer to the Eastern Conference.

Despite the fact that its authenticity was apocryphal, the “Tanaka Memorial” was considered to be a blueprint for Japan’s plot to dominate the world, because its contents were in line with Japan’s subsequent policy of aggression (GAIMUSHŌ, 1933, p. 952). Therefore, it was very convenient as an instrument of propaganda for Miguel Couto, who had expressed the sense of crisis against Japanese imperialism, saying that “our homeland is in grave danger, threatened by the dynamic and insatiable imperialism of Japan,” regardless of its authenticity (ANNAES, 1935, p. 146).¹⁸

It is also interesting that Couto said that there was no Japanese immigration issue in Brazil, as the issue of national defense was more important to Couto (ANNAES, 1935, p. 79). In the Assembly, he made three suggestions relative to Japanese immigration; firstly, “restricting” it to a more appropriate number; secondly, “regulating” its distribution and the acquisition of land in Brazil; and thirdly, “preparing for national defense” (ANNAES, 1935, p. 496). Furthermore, Couto imagined that “if we are prepared, if we have a thousand airplanes, a thousand well-trained pilots, and if we have submarines, we will defend ourselves perfectly” (ANNAES, 1935, p. 497).

Why did Miguel Couto put so much emphasis on “national defense”? The reason can be found in a speech he gave in 1934. It was around Christmas time in 1912, when he visited Berlin with his family. According to Couto, it was customary in Berlin to decorate the tables of hotels and pension houses at that time. At the private residence, he said, was a small flag of each person’s homeland, and Couto went out with his children to buy a Brazilian flag. Later, when Couto’s children found a Brazilian flag in the window of a store, they tried to buy it from the clerk in fluent German, yet the clerk told them that she didn’t know anything about Brazil and treated them carelessly. When the children pointed to the Brazilian flag, the German clerk blurted out that Brazil was “the possession of Germany in South America” (ANNAES, 1935, p. 490).

¹⁸ Miguel Couto had opposed Japanese immigration in the 1920s on eugenics grounds, yet after the 1930s he became opposed on imperialist grounds (*Vide*: ANNAES, 1935, p. 488). Oliveira Vianna, in his book *Raça e Assimilação* published in 1932, stated that “This exclusion (...) must be justified, no longer on the basis of the inferiority of the Japanese race, but on the contrary: its superiority,” and gave reasons for exclusion not to the inferiority of Japanese people, but to their non-assimilation and collectivity. It is undeniable that these changes in Vianna’s view of Japanese people may have influenced Couto’s discourse on Japan (VIANNA, 1959, p. 154).

It is not difficult to imagine that Couto would have been outraged by such an attitude. From his own experience, Couto argued that “What was happening in Germany can also happen in other lands, in other countries, and in other imperialist nations that fill Brazil with their natives” (ANNAES, 1935, p. 491), and he feared that the same thing would happen again. Therefore, the Manchurian Incident would have been enough to evoke an imperialist fear of Japan in Couto. Another point that cannot be overlooked is that the migration of Japanese immigrants to Northern Brazil, or the Amazon, which had begun in 1929, was disgusting to the anti-Japanese activists.¹⁹



Figure2. Article about the Japanese world conquest project in the *Diario Carioca*, published on March 22, 1942.

¹⁹ Even after the Constitution of 1934, the Japanese immigration issue was discussed in various ways. In particular, the issue of concession contracts for huge areas of land to Japanese people in Amazonas became controversial. However, it was eventually rejected in August 1936. In: *Burajiru Jihō*, August 21, 1936.

There is no doubt that from the 1930s onwards the greatest threat to Couto was Japanese imperialism based on events including the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the publication of a Portuguese version of the “Tanaka Memorial” in 1932, and the notice of Japan’s secession from the League of Nations in 1933 (GAIMUSHŌ, 1933, p. 952). As a result of such incidents, the anti-Japanese movement in Brazil took on an anti-imperialistic aspect over time. However, it would have been a natural consequence of the global trend of nationalism. It should also be noted that the Germans, Italians, and Japanese were the immigrants that primarily moved into Brazil. These countries, which constituted modern Brazil, subsequently became the Axis Powers (i.e., the enemies) in World War II, and at the same time risked potentially dividing Brazil’s territory.²⁰

The fact that Félix Pacheco was Foreign Minister when Japan began encouraging immigration into Brazil as a national policy in 1925 further highlights how much his thoughts changed throughout the years. At the time, Pacheco, through the *Journal do Commercio*, stated that “today Brazil has not the slightest need to worry about Japanese immigration” (OSAKA MAINICHI SHIMBUN, December 5, 1924), and in 1925, he even defended Japanese immigration against Miguel Couto’s anti-Japanese argument. Yet, Xavier de Oliveira, who was a disciple of Miguel Couto and was summoned to the medical office by Couto before the Constitution of 1934 was passed, testified that Pacheco had been present earlier.²¹ Around the time of the Manchurian Incident, under direction of Pacheco, the *Jornal do Commercio* was “not to publish any articles that would benefit Japan” (NODA, 1936, p. 30-31; GAIMUSHŌ, 1933, p. 952). This also means that Pacheco — at his own discretion — could exploit the *Jornal do Commercio*, which “provided spaces in its pages for the whole reproduction of the eugenic and xenophobic arguments expressed by Miguel Couto and by the Society of the Friends of Alberto Torres (Sociedade dos Amigos de Alberto Torres)” (TAKEUCHI, 2016, p. 224; Cf. TAKEUCHI, 2012, p. 97).²²

²⁰“Latin America would be shared between Germany, Italy and Japan. Logically, Santa Catarina would belong to Germany. Japan is known to have colonies spread across South America, from the Pacific Ocean to Santos”. In: *O Estado de Mato Grosso*, March 25, 1942.

²¹ In: Moraes, op.cit., p. 64. Carlos de Souza Moraes cited the following book: *O problema imigratório na América Latina — o sentido político-militar da colonização japonesa nos países do novo mundo*, published in 1934 by Xavier de Oliveira.

²² The Society of the Friends of Alberto Torres (SAAT) was founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1932 and probably dissolved in 1945, whose principal objective was both to disseminate the ideas of sociologist Alberto Torres (1865-1917) and to realize various actions that would contribute to the nation, promoting

To reiterate a point made earlier in the paper, the influence of Miguel Couto and the Manchurian Incident were the main factors that led to the hardening of Pacheco's attitude. It would not be far-fetched to presume that the thing that corroborated it and provided Pacheco with a decisive guideline was, as Noda stated, the "Tanaka Memorial." According to Noda, Pacheco read the document, which had been sent to Itamaraty (MRE) by a person concerned with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stationed in another country, and was tipped off as an important secret document by Mr. P, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil to whom Pacheco was particularly indebted during his time as Foreign Minister (NODA, 1936, p. 31). Although the source is still unknown, it is known that the memorandum was mailed from somewhere to major Brazilian newspapers. What is clear is that Pacheco and Couto had formed an "alliance" for the exclusion of the Japanese immigration and used the *Jornal do Commercio* as a propaganda organization for the anti-Japanese movement.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Subsequently, the "Tanaka Memorial" was picked up by an increasing number of newspapers, especially after Brazil's entry into World War II in 1942, and was promoted as the bible of Japanese wartime imperialism. In addition, some of the articles that circulated in Brazil were reprinted from British and American media sources, revealing the indirect influence of these countries on Brazil's policy toward Japan.²³

For example, it is said that the "Tanaka Memorial" had a strong influence on the United States' policy toward Japan because it depicted the coming Japan-US war as a prelude to Japan's conquest of China and consequently, of world conquest. Therefore, after Japan's surrender in the war, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East

meetings, lectures and debates on issues such as rural education, immigration problems against, in particular, Assyrian, Japanese, Jewish, and the use of resources as a source of energy, among others. Félix Pacheco was one of the founding members of this nativist entity (JORNAL DO BRASIL, December 14, 1932), and for this reason, he "offered the group free space in his newspaper for attacks on the Japanese, the League of Nations, or any other non-nationalistic element which at the time may figure in the news" (LESSER, 1999, p. 69). The fact that the SAAT's headquarters was located in the building of the *Jornal do Commercio* draws our attention (DE PINHO, 2007, p. 173). In this respect, it would be necessary to pay more attention that the campaign by the *Jornal do Commercio* and the SAAT was also promoted from outside the National Constituent Assembly, colluding with the anti-Japanese faction.

²³ Cf. *Vamos Lêr!*, October 24, 1940, pp. 24-25, 60; *Diretrizes: política, economia, cultura*, February 5, 1942, p. 9; *Diário Carioca*, April 19, 1942, p. 21; *Vamos Lêr!*, February 11, 1943, pp. 28-29.

(IMTFE), also known as the Tokyo Trial, included its evidence of conspiracy in the war of aggression. The International Prosecution Section (IPS) searched for the original text of the “Tanaka Memorial” until the trial began, yet as it turned out to not exist, the “Tanaka Memorial” was eventually excluded as a form of evidence.

In this paper, we have attempted to examine how the “Tanaka Memorial,” which was seemingly unrelated to the anti-Japanese movement in Brazil, was relevant to the movement, how it influenced, and how it was reflected in its development. As we have seen, the “Tanaka Memorial” served the anti-Japanese movement in Brazil as a symbolic document providing evidence of Japan’s militaristic ambitions. In particular, it is important to bear in mind that the “Tanaka Memorial” — at least to Miguel Couto — was used as material for anti-Japanese propaganda, even though it was considered to be a fake document. The argument was that Japan’s military action after the propagation of the “Tanaka Memorial” itself proved the authenticity of the matter.²⁴

Japan’s military actions, namely, the Manchurian Incident, also had a profound effect on Japan-Brazil relations. Miura Saku, the president of the *Nippaku Shimbun*, once said that Ambassador Hayashi’s statement that the Manchurian issue was a direct cause of the exclusion of Japan was “nonsense” (NIPPAKU SHIMBUN, August 8, 1934). Although Miura had foresight on the issue of Japanese exclusion in Brazil, no matter how much of an anti-government stance he may have taken, it is undeniable that he downplayed the Manchurian issue in light of his assertion that Manchuria was not the direct cause of the anti-Japanese sentiment.

The aftermath of the Manchurian issue is present in the discourse of the anti-Japanese faction. According to Japanese newspapers, Miguel Couto feared that “Japan gave Manchuria its independence in 1932. If Japan proceeds with the current situation, Japan will next merge Brazil around 193X [sic]” (HŌCHI SHIMBUN, May 27, 1934; Cf. DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, February 28, 1934), while Arthur Neiva claimed that “the second Manchuria should not be established in the Amazon” (JIJI SHIMPŌ, May 17, 1934). In addition to this, there are also speeches given by Xavier de Oliveira and Monteiro de

²⁴ A similar discourse was still stated in a magazine in 1967, some twenty years after the war. In: *Revistamarítima brasileira*, n.d., Ano LXXXVII Abril, maio e junho de 1967 (n. 4, 5 e 6), p. 48.

Barros that yearn for Brazil or the Amazon not to become a second Manchuria.²⁵ In this way, the psychological impact of the Manchurian Incident on the Japanophobes cannot be ignored. One person that was influenced by them — especially by Miguel Couto— was the once pro-Japanese Félix Pacheco, whom we have considered a key figure throughout this paper.

The role played by newspapers in the development of the anti-Japanese movement was also significant. There were certainly pro-Japanese newspapers such as the *Diários Associados* by Assis Chateaubriand and the *Diário da Noite* by Antônio de Alcântara Machado, yet they could not put the brakes on the anti-Japanese propaganda of newspapers such as the *Jornal do Commercio* by Félix Pacheco and the *A Nação*, which Arthur Neiva became the owner in 1933.

As mentioned, up until today the “Tanaka Memorial” has never been mentioned on a full scale in relation to the anti-Japanese movement in Brazil, however this paper has shown that the document had much influence, particularly on Miguel Couto, Arthur Neiva, and Félix Pacheco, who were dubbed the “Three Heroes of the Anti-Nipponic Campaign” (OLIVEIRA, 1945, p. 235; LESSER, 1999, p. 100). As a matter of fact, the anti-Japanese issue in Brazil involves extremely complex elements, and the “Tanaka Memorial” ought to be considered just one of them.

Therefore, the media’s anti-Japanese propaganda, including the “Tanaka Memorial,” should not be disregarded in light of the international situation during that time. In order to further clarify the reality of the anti-Japanese movement in Brazil in the future, it would be necessary to pay more attention to international relations, and to regard these so-called “maneuvers” as one of the elements that are organically linked to the anti-Japanese movement.

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²⁵ About Xavier de Oliveira: *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun*, May 12, 1934; Monteiro de Barros: *Nippaku Shimbun*, August 8, 1934. At the time, the Amazon was repeatedly compared with Manchuria. In: Geraldo, 2009, p. 186.

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