The connection between intentionality and consciousness: a philosophical study
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22409/1984-0292/2024/v36/5810Keywords:
intentionality, consciousness, phenomenal intentionality, separatism, rationalityAbstract
This paper discusses the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, arguing that these two fundamental features of mind are intrinsically interwoven. From the perspective of the Phenomenal Intentionality Theory (PIT), we explore how phenomenal intentionality depends on consciousness for its proper representation by subjects, highlighting Dennett’s view on original phenomenal intentionality. Then, we analyze Searle’s transcendental argument for free will, which has revealed valuable insights into how rationality can be experienced. By combining PIT’s assumptions with the analysis of free will, we argue that the experience of freedom to act is based on reasons and is mediated by consciousness. We conclude that consciousness and intentionality are not separate as isolated entities, but are interdependent and complementary. Therefore, understanding these facets as integrated elements is essential for a comprehensive understanding of mind. This study contributes to the theoretical and conceptual advancement in the field of consciousness psychology and provides a framework for future research on the interaction between consciousness and intentionality.
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